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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION  
Section I – Problem Outline and Research Question 
Globalization and technology are two of the main driving forces of the 21st century. While 
economic and technological progress has long gone beyond borders, many legal issues remain 
stuck in the 19th century. Nothing can illustrate this problem better than the insolvencies1 of 
multinational companies and groups. Notably, the Asian region proves to be particularly 
problematic. 
Currently, there is no Regional Insolvency Framework in Asia. What's more, no one Asian 
country – with the exception of Japan and, to some extent, Singapore – has laws on cross-border 
insolvency. This fact causes difficulties not just for legislators, but for national insolvency 
courts and other authorities too. Also, parties to cross-border insolvency proceedings find 
themselves helpless, lost in an opaque jungle of national insolvency rules and exceptions. They 
often feel themselves unfairly treated and face insurmountable obstacles during insolvency 
proceedings. Cross-border insolvencies in Asia have caught the world's attention since the 
outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The emergence of regional cross-border 
insolvency rules has hastened significantly since then. The Asian financial and economic crisis 
inevitably led to the collapse of global players on the world business stage. A prime example 
of a company in financial distress on the Asian market is demonstrated by the insolvency of 
Asia Pulp & Paper. The case occurred in 2001 in Singapore and caught international attention. 
The Singaporean courts rejected the petition of creditors to appoint a judicial manager because 
he would not be able to act in other jurisdictions such as China or Indonesia, as he would not 
have the powers demanded by local insolvency laws. Many other questions also remained 
unresolved. 
However, the problem of cross-border insolvency arose much earlier. In the course of its 
development, international institutions suggested various legal projects on cross-border 
1 The term ‘insolvency’ is used in the same meaning as the term ‘bankruptcy’. Different names have purely 
linguistic nature due to different legal systems. Traditionally, civil law countries use the former while common 
law countries apply the latter. However, some jurisdictions use the both to determine different stages of 
proceedings, e.g. in Indonesia ‘bankruptcy’ is a separate issue from ‘insolvency’. See e.g. S. Mandala, ‘Indonesian 
Bankruptcy Law: An Update’ in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (ed.), Asian Insolvency 
Systems: Closing the Implementation Gap. Conclusions of the Fifth Meeting of the Forum for Asian Insolvency 
Reform (FAIR) on 'Legal and Institutional Reforms of Asian Insolvency Systems' (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2007), 
pp. 103–8, at p. 107 
2 
insolvency rules such as model laws, regional regulations, etc. As a regional set of rules, the 
European Insolvency Regulation (EIR) proved to be effective. 
Being a regional economic and political union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations2 is 
on the way to building a workable cooperation between its member states. Like the European 
Union, it has a common framework for some fields, but the question of cross-border insolvency 
remains a missing gap. For this reason, in 2013 the Government of Indonesia raised the question 
of an urgent need for a Regional Insolvency Framework in ASEAN and its implementation in 
the foreseeable future. This is a very goal-oriented task and this thesis looks to contribute to it. 
This research will examine cross-border insolvency laws in Asia. It looks to find out how to 
draft a Regional Insolvency Framework and to make the distribution of insolvency estates fair 
for all parties to cross-border insolvency proceedings. It does not try to give a new Regional 
Insolvency Framework; rather, it looks to determine influential factors which lawmakers must 
consider while drafting a new regulation. The thesis will argue that in addition to legal criteria, 
some new scope is necessary for the implementation of purposeful rules. In order to address 
cross-border insolvency cases in the 21st century, a simple legal scope will not be sufficient. 
Historical exigency on the one hand and modern technologies on the other hand demand to play 
a significant role in supporting the legal approach to this issue.  
Section II – Previous Works and Incentives 
Diverse projects and incentives on solving the problems entailed by a cross-border collapse 
have been launched worldwide. International organizations and financial institutions have 
named some key problems of cross-border insolvency and have undertaken some steps to 
negotiate sustainable international legal texts, both those currently recognized and those with 
future potential. This research and these recommendations are by no means conclusive and 
final; however, they give valuable insights in helping to understand the core problems of cross-
border insolvency laws and their business, social and cultural circumstances. Researchers, 
national governments, international organizations, and other involved institutions tried to work 
out methods and rules for cross-border insolvency law in Asia. In essence, efforts with this aim 
can be considered in two groups. The first is those which directly address the question of cross-
border insolvency law in Asia. The second is those that are not directly involved in but do still 





have an indirect influence on the development process of this issue. In both cases, the lion's 
share of the work has been carried out through contributions from institutions. 
The pioneer on cross-border insolvency in Asia is the Asian Development Bank.3 In 1997, it 
conducted a comparative review of eleven Asian countries4 over the course of two years.5 
Inspired by the G22 Working Groups’ 6  report on the ‘International Financial Crisis’, 7  in 
October 1998 it started the regional technical assistance project 8 RETA 5795 dealing with 
insolvency law reforms in Asia. On 3rd December 1999, the RETA Screening Committee 
approved the technical assistance under the title ‘Developing Cross-Border Insolvency 
Solutions’. The scope of the RETA 5795 was twofold: in Part A, it deals with cross-border 
insolvency and international cooperation, and in Part B it focuses on international good 
practices in informal restructuring processes. In October 1999, the ADB completed the project 
‘Insolvency Law Reform in the Asian and Pacific Region: Report of the Office of the General 
Council on TA-5795 Reg: Insolvency Law Reform’ and reported it in 2000 in the ‘Law and 
Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank’. The ADB developed a project of ‘ADB 
Standards’ for insolvency law application in every country.9 In 2000, the ADB presented 16 
principles of insolvency law.10 
RETA 5975 represented another incentive to promote regional cooperation and the 
development of insolvency law, targeting the interaction between insolvency law regimes and 
secured transactions. The major outcomes and findings of the project TA-5975 Reg. came up 
 
3 R. Harmer, ‘Assessing the Assessments’, International Insolvency Review 23 (2014), 3–19, at 3; hereinafter 
referred to as ADB. 
4  Those countries are Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, India, 
Pakistan, and the Philippines. 
5 R. Fisher and M. Sloan, ‘Why Asia Needs a Regional Insolvency Pact?’, International Financial Law Review 23 
(2004), 44–6, at 44 
6 G-22 Working Group is a working group on international financial crisis set up by the International Monetary 
Fund comprising finance ministers and central bank governors of 22 states. 
7 The report was published by International Monetary Fund on 2nd October 1998. It released a short list of 
insolvency law principles, however, it does not contain special recommendations, see The World Bank (ed.), 
Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights System (Washington D.C.: The World 
Bank, 2001), p. 82 
8 Hereafter RETA; also, another project had been started at that time, namely, RETA 5773 on secured transactions 
law reform. 
9 Harmer, ‘Harmer 2014’, 5 





in the report ‘Promotion Regional Cooperation in the Development of Insolvency Law 
Reforms’ in 2008 following RETA 5795 and RETA 5975 associated work. 
In 2003, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development11 undertook an assessment 
of insolvency laws in 27 countries by means of a functional approach. The EBRD was also one 
of the first institutions to have recognized the importance of secured transactions and worked 
out ten basic principles in relation to it.12 
One of the most extensive cross-border insolvency projects is the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency. 13  It was launched by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law14 and is the most extensive and detailed project, with some explanatory 
guides following behind. The Model Law was initiated by the UNCITRAL in cooperation with 
the International Association of Insolvency Practitioners.15 In 1995, after two joint international 
colloquia, the Working Group V on Cross-Border Insolvency was given four two-week sessions 
to draft a project on the Model Law. The draft was discussed in March 1997 by insolvency 
specialists from all over the world. The concluding discussion took place in May 1997 during 
the thirtieth session of UNCITRAL. 
The Model Law together with the ‘Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency’16 was adopted on 30th May 1997 by judges, government officials and 
members of different interest groups. In December 1997, the General Assembly expressed its 
gratitude for the Model Law scheme. 
In June 2009, more than 80 judges from over 40 countries took part in a colloquium in 
Vancouver to elaborate on a text aiding judges in the application of the UNCITRAL Model 
 
11 Hereinafter referred to as EBRD 
12 The World Bank (ed.), Creditors Rights and Insolvency Standard: Based on The World Bank Principles for 
Effective Creditor Rights and Insolvency Systems and UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Revised 
Draft (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2005), p. 83 
13 Resolution of the General Assembly 52/158 from 15th December 1997 
14 Hereinafter referred to as UNCITRAL 
15 Hereinafter referred to as INSOL 
16 Hereinafter referred to as ‘The Guide to Enactment’; on 18th July 2013, the General Assembly revised the ‘Guide 
to Enactment’ by including further explication for interpretation of the ‘centre of main interest’. The Commission 






Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.17 It came up with the ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency: The Judicial Perspective’. 
In 2010, the UNCITRAL developed and prepared the ‘UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-
Border Insolvency Cooperation’18 with a focus on the implementation and commentary of 
Article 27 (d) of the Model Law, handling at length the forms of cooperation. The ‘UNCITRAL 
Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation’ was released to provide non-
prescriptive information for judges and practitioners on the practical side of communication 
and cooperation in cross-border insolvency. It focuses on the Article 27 (d) of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, dealing with forms of cooperation and discusses 
various methods of cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases. In also examines the 
effectiveness of cross-border insolvency agreements.19 
In April 2001, The World Bank together with its partner organizations such as the Asian 
Development Bank, African Development Bank, European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development, International Finance Corporation, Inter-American Development Bank, 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Monetary Fund, 
INSOL International, International Bar Association, and United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law issued the ‘Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and 
Creditor Rights System’. It is of use first for financial systems in component identification as 
well as to assess methodologies for core system milestones and in applying standards. The bank 
staff prepared a framework for policy makers and businesses under consultation with more than 
70 international experts, and more than 700 specialists from the private sector from over 75 
countries. Primarily the Principles and Guidelines assess key elements such as the roles of 
enforcement systems, legal framework for creditors' rights, legal framework for secured 
lending, legal framework for corporate insolvency, framework for informal corporate workouts, 
and implementation of the insolvency systems with respect to its international dimensions.20 In 
 
17  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (ed.), UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation (New York: United Nations Publication, 2014), p. 9 
18  The Resolution A/RES/64/112 on Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law was adopted by the General Assembly on 16 th December 2009 
on the report of the Sixth Committee (A/64/447) in the sixty-fourth session. 
19 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (ed.), UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border 
Insolvency Cooperation (New York: United Nations Publication, 2010), 1 et seq., 9 





particular, principle 24 discusses international aspects of insolvency law and eliminates the 
most essential features such as competent jurisdiction, recognition of foreign judgements, 
choice of applicable law and cooperation among courts in different states; it suggests the 
implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.21 In February 
2000, prior to the publication of the ‘Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and 
Creditor Rights System’ the World Bank published a contextual document ‘Building Effective 
Insolvency Systems: Towards Principles and Guidelines’ inspired by a statement from the 
International Monetary Fund published in May 1999 in relation to the Asian Financial Crisis, 
‘Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures: Key Issues’. The ‘Principles and Guidelines for 
Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights System’ was used as a model for the program ‘Review 
of Systems and Codes’ (‘ROSC’) by The World Bank on the invitation of the participating 
countries.22 
In December 2005, the World Bank revised its ‘Principles and Guidelines for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor Rights System’ and issued a new document, ‘Creditor Rights and 
Insolvency Standard’. It was based on the earlier ‘Principles and Guidelines for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor Rights System’ of the World Bank and on the ‘UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide’.23 The last revisions took place in 2011 and 2015, after which the World Bank published 
the revised document.24 
In 1999, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released the report ‘Orderly and Effective 
Insolvency Procedures’ identifying core elements on insolvency law and examining its policy 
and design.25 
Based on the London Rules informal workout methods, INSOL International issued a 
‘Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts’ in October 2008.26 
 
21 ibid., p. 52 
22 Harmer, ‘Harmer 2014’, 6 
23 The World Bank (ed.), The World Bank 2005, 1 et seqq. 
24  The World Bank (ed.), Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regime, Revised Draft 
(Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2015) 
25 The World Bank (ed.), The World Bank 2001, p. 82 





The Forum on Asian Insolvency Law (FAIR) is a prominent platform for insolvency law 
discussion in East Asia. It has already conducted several meetings27 on Asian insolvency law.28 
It was set up as part of a common effort from the OECD, ADB, WB and Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC),29 and supported by the public and private sector. 
In addition, APEC launched another project in this direction called the ‘Regional Network on 
Asian Insolvency Reform’. The proposal was discussed at the 5th FAIR meeting in Beijing, 
China on 27th and 28th April 2006 and approved in June 2006 in Nha Trang, Vietnam during 
the meeting of the APEC officials. The purpose of this network is to act as a platform for sharing 
information, building capabilities and providing technical help for Asian insolvency matters. In 
short, it should collect information on insolvency laws in Asia and present it for further research. 
Apart from Asia-focused projects, further international and regional insolvency projects are 
worthy of note because they are indirectly related to the research topic and give the theoretical 
basis for this thesis. 
Section III – Methodology and Limitations 
The main method of assessment in this thesis shall be a review and analysis of primary and 
secondary sources. The original legal texts such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency, the European Insolvency Regulation as well as the Transnational Insolvency 
Project will be presented and discussed. An overview of secondary sources to those texts will 
also be undertaken as well as mentioning fundamental theories in cross-border insolvency law. 
Additionally, some attention will be paid to accompanying documents such as working papers 
and protocols. Furthermore, the works of ADB, WB and OECD will be taken into consideration. 
The purpose of this method is to understand and to digest their existing implications for cross-
border insolvency issues and to apply these insights for the issue in question. 
 
27 Since its establishment following FAIR meetings took place: 1st in Bali, Indonesia on 7 – 8 February 2001; 2nd 
in Bangkok, Thailand on 16 – 17 December 2002; 3rd in Seoul, Korea on 10 – 11 November 2003; 4th in New 
Delhi India 4 – 5 November 2004; 5th in Beijing, China on 27 – 28 April 2006; 6th in Bangkok, Thailand on 16 – 
17 July 2009; 7th in Delhi, India on 8 – 9 April 2010; 8th in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 30 November – 1 December 
2011; 9th in Manila, The Philippines on 3 – 5 December 2013. 
28 R. Tomasic, ‘Insolvency Law Reform in Asia and Emerging Global Insolvency Norms’, Insolvency Law Journal 
15 (2007), 229–42 
29 APEC is a leading economic forum supporting a sustainable economic growth and prosperity in Asia-Pacific 





Some interviews with practitioners and researchers have been conducted. In August 2013, an 
interview was held with insolvency lawyers from the Kitahama law office in Osaka with the 
aid of Mr. Professor Takahashi from Osaka Graduate School of Law and Politics. In August 
2013, another interview was conducted with Mr. Professor Yamamoto in Tokyo under the 
assistance of Professor Fujimoto from Osaka Graduate School of Law and Politics. 
Furthermore, this work will assess the Asia Pulp & Paper case study and the implications of 
this judgement for a legal problem. In cultural terms, closer observations will be made into the 
discussion of ‘Asian Values’ driven by its advocates Mahathir Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew 
to analyse its practical significance for cross-border insolvency law. Finally, this work will 
evaluate and introduce new developments in legal technology and its impact on cross-border 
insolvency law. 
Section IV – The Research Roadmap and Benefits 
In addition to this introduction and conclusion in Chapter VII, the thesis consists of following 
chapters.  
Chapter II gives a general overview and more detailed background to the problem of cross-
border insolvency issues in Asia. First, it analyses the Asian financial crisis, second, it assesses 
the Asia Pulp & Paper case study, and finally, it shows the interest groups, that is to say parties 
to insolvency proceedings. 
Chapter III begins by presenting concepts and theories on cross-border insolvency law and 
continues by giving an overview of earlier global and international projects on cross-border 
insolvency. At the end, it provides a broader overview of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency. 
Chapter IV addresses regional insolvency projects and regulations, such as the European 
Insolvency Regulation and Transnational Insolvency Project. In addition, it gives a short 
overview of some solutions in court-to-court communication. Finally, this chapter tackles the 
groups of companies facing insolvency. 
Chapter V handles national insolvency laws and their traditional impact in ASEAN and 
ASEAN+3. First, it gives a general overview of ASEAN as a regional union of independent 





insolvency in Southeast Asia such as proposals of the Asian Development Bank and some of 
the Forum on Asian Insolvency Law Reform's approaches. In addition, an overview of national 
insolvency law regimes in the Member States of ASEAN and ASEAN+3 follows. Finally, this 
Chapter presents traditional terms and ‘Asian Values’ as general concepts in ASEAN and in 
ASEAN+3. 
Chapter VI assesses and analyses the existing rules and incentives on cross-border insolvency 
law and again takes up the Asia Pulp & Paper insolvency case study. Then it determines some 
legal criteria for consideration by legislators for a Regional Insolvency Framework in ASEAN 
and ASEAN+3. Subsequently, it addresses traditional impacts and their role in the law-making 
process, and finally, this chapter works out other factors and gives new insights into legal 
technology and its role in regional insolvency solutions. 
This thesis will have the following benefits for law-making institutions, practitioners, courts, 
and parties to cross-border insolvency proceedings.  
First, the thesis will present different legal criteria for a Regional Insolvency Framework in 
ASEAN and ASEAN+3. This will give lawmakers more information to draw on in the drafting 
of new rules. 
Second, it will show that the legal findings are not enough in addressing cross-border 
insolvency challenges in Asia. Far more reflection on local conditions and the historical impact 
in terms of ‘Asian Values’ is required. This aspect plays a sustainable role in the law-making 
process. As a result, this thesis will present some other essential factors which demand careful 
consideration in the law-making process of the Regional Insolvency Framework because those 
factors entail various limitations. 
Finally, this thesis will show that legislators and other institutions must forge new paths in the 
law-making process and broaden their horizons, moving past a purely legalistic perspective 






CHAPTER II – CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY PROBLEMS IN ASIA 
This Chapter II presents in its Section I the origins of transnational insolvencies and their impact 
on economic growth in the Asian region. To illustrate the problem, it is worthwhile analysing 
the causes of cross-border insolvency in the context of the Asian region. In fact, this requires a 
brief assessment of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. In Section II, a study of the Asia Pulp & 
Paper case will show legal obstacles that parties face in cross-border insolvency proceedings 
across multiple jurisdictions. Finally, the last section gives an overview of the various 
stakeholder interests in insolvency proceedings and asset allocation. 
Section I – Globalization and the Asian Economic, Currency and Financial Crisis 
of 1997 
The first issue that led to the appearance of cross-border insolvency is the globalization of the 
world economy by means of its accelerated development and the birth of international 
transactions. The second cause of cross-border insolvencies in Asia was the Southeast Asian 
financial crisis of 1997. This period has not only affected many countries30 in the Asian region 
but in its wake has had far-reaching repercussions worldwide. 
Initially, the Asian financial crisis began in Thailand31 and spread to the rest of Southeast and 
Northeast Asia. Thailand was a starting point because it had up to forty percent of outflowing 
investment capital and maintained the favourable exchange rate of the Thai baht. After the 
crisis's outbreak, one third of Thai banks and financial institutions closed, leading to the 
financial bailout in Thailand and a change of government.32 The crash of the Thai currency led 
to a domino effect in other Southeast Asian countries.33 
 
30 Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea 
31 R. Wade, ‘The Asian Debt-and-Development Crisis of 1997: Causes and Consequences’, World Development 
(1998), 1535–53, at 1541 
32 T. Van Hoa, ‘Causes of and Prescriptions for the Asian Financial Crisis’ in T. Van Hoa and C. Harvie (eds.), 
The Causes and Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis (2000), at p. 12; some authors underline the role of corporate 
governance playing in the outbreak of the Asian Financial Crisis, see e.g. T. Mitton, ‘A Cross-Firm Analysis of the 
Impact of Corporate Governance on the East Asian Financial Crisis’, Journal of Financial Economics 64 (2002), 
215–41, at 216; S. Johnson, P. Boone, A. Breach and E. Friedman, ‘Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial 
Crisis’, Journal of Financial Economics 2000 (58), 141–86, at 142 et seqq. 
33 Y. Wang, ‘The Asian Financial Crisis and Its Aftermath: Do We Need a Regional Financial Agreement?’, 





The second country which faced the crisis was Malaysia and with it came consequences for the 
national financial system that saw the devaluation of the Malaysian ringgit, damages to the 
economy and to growth.34 
More serious shock waves of the crisis were witnessed in Indonesia. The devaluation of the 
Indonesian rupiah reached 700 RP/1 US$ at its most critical level, which was then followed by 
the closure of the country's biggest banks. In addition, the Indonesian economy suffered as a 
result of burning off the country's forests, causing disastrous ecological problems for itself and 
neighbouring countries, not least in pulp and paper production. Just some years earlier, these 
countries had been touted as the developing countries with the best growth potential. 
Malaysia was followed by South Korea in facing currency devaluation and the biggest bailout 
in Asia in December 1997, alongside the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Vietnam. 
Before analysing the global impact of the crisis on the qualitative and quantitative increase in 
cross-border insolvency and lessons learnt from that, an overview of the causes of the crisis is 
necessary.35 
1. Origins of the Asian Financial Crisis 
Although there is no unanimity about grounds for the Asian financial crisis, without doubt the 
origins of the crisis are multifaceted and merit detailed investigation and classification. Several 
authors trace the causes back to moral hazard problems, treating these as different, mutually 
complementing and interacting dimensions with corporate, financial, and international 
components. The formal classification of the causes consists of four categories: 
macroeconomic, financial, structural, and institutional categories,36 which are in fact broad in 
themselves. These authors are likely to offer an explanation in the form of a link between the 
cross-border insolvency phenomenon and the Asian financial crisis, because this explanation 
 
34 F. Sufian, ‘The Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on Bank Efficiency: The 1997 Experience of Malaysia and 
Thailand’, Journal of International Development 22 (2010), 866–89, at 867 et seqq.  
35 M. Khor, The Economic Crisis in East Asia: Causes, Effects, Lessons, Third World Network (1998), 1 et seqq.; 
Van Hoa, ‘Van Hoa 2000’, 12 
36 G. Corsetti, P. Pesenti and N. Roubini, Paper Tigers? A Model of the Asian Crisis, NBER Working Paper Series 
(1998), vol. 6783, p. 1; for early warning system against financial crisis, see G. Kaminsky, S. Lizondo and C. M. 





follows along general economic and legal lines, enabling an overarching but also pointed 
analysis of the posited question.  
The macroeconomic approach refers to the tight monetary policy practised by Japanese 
financial authorities who argued that the value of the Japanese yen had been decreasing and had 
worsened the economic situation in the country. Southeast Asian countries had few 
macroeconomic problems prior to the crisis. As a matter of fact, those macroeconomic 
inconsistencies were based on the following indicators: foreign debt and budget and current 
account deficit, unfavourable rates of growth and inflation, exchange rates, savings and 
investment proportion, political instability, in- and outflowing capital, debt service ratios and 
monetary policies, an excessive bank lending system and fragile financial system, debt and 
profitability measures.37 
Consequently, the Japanese monetary authorities drastically increased exchange rates. Hence, 
the demand for Japanese yen achieved an upsurge. Even if this danger had never occurred, those 
acting in financial markets in Southeast Asian countries would have reacted to this strict policy 
by the active exchange of national currency against the Japanese yen or US dollar. Therefore, 
panic spread as soon as bankers started to sell Southeast Asian currency to protect their 
monetary funds. Even before the aforementioned currencies collapsed, stocks in local 
currencies – having lost their value – suffered the loss of their attractiveness. Advocates of the 
financial approach accused the leading managers of financial markets. The financial 
liberalization strongly affected the countries in Asia where the foreign capital became 
convertible with local currency for anonymous capital inflow and outflow. This process was 
extremely deregulated. Thus, local banks and other financial institutions borrowed ample 
volumes of foreign funds.38 
The so-called ‘carry trades’ bankers profited from the threatening financial policy and low 
interest rates in Japan. They borrowed in yen and US dollars, and then bought short-term 
securities in Southeast Asian countries which paid higher rates. Thus, they could attract new 
investors imitating the financial stability of currencies, and yet if the currencies lost their value, 
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it would lead to their fall or even losses for investors. This scenario finally occurred. The 
depreciation of currencies caused a growth in debts, increasing in proportion with the sums of 
local currency needed for loan repayments. The short-term foreign loans began to drag out 
abruptly, triggering the overthrow of local reserves. Having faced their financial limits, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea requested the help of the International Monetary Fund.39 
The crisis had not only affected the financial markets and banking systems, but also the real 
estate market. Due to the depreciation of currencies, as well as the halting of stock exchange 
prices, there was decreased demand and an oversupply on the real estate markets. The prices of 
buildings and housing fell dramatically.40 
Proponents of the structural view claim the misallocation of foreign investments by local 
governments within Southeast Asian countries, especially in the case of Thailand on real estate 
markets and in Indonesia in the aviation and automobile industries, without clear reason. In 
addition, they reproach the obstruction of development by enormous debts in the private sectors. 
Being involved in a deregulated financial market, they caused an extensive in- and outflow of 
capital without the attention of the government. From the perspective of institutional theory 
advocates, the financial authorities in Southeast Asian countries unofficially introduced the 
system of instantaneous and implied braces to settle their currencies with US dollars. Big 
players felt comfortable and did not purchase insurance in case of falling currency exchange 
rates because of high costs.41 
To sum up, on the one hand, companies in Asia could obtain funds at comparatively low interest 
rates from foreign investors interested in the development of new markets. On the other hand, 
due to favourable exchange rates, Asian debtors felt secured and preferred to borrow funds in 
US dollars. Finally, the low export volumes in the countries affected by the crisis led to the 
devaluation of some Asian currencies and loss of markets.42 
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Some authors indicate additional causes for the crisis, e.g. high and very fast growth of the 
Southeast Asian economies is not necessarily a reliable reference for good performance; rather, 
it obscures factors having pivotal impacts on the regional economy. What's more, the massive 
capital outflow from Southeast Asian countries led to vulnerability in the banking sector. 
Corsetti et al. present two views of the crisis; the unexpected changes in market expectation 
were the key points of the crisis or are in fact structural and policy distortions.43 
2. Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis 
What the modern world learnt from the crisis is not obvious and depends on the perspective of 
the respective affected parties. There are some tentative explanations. Coming back to moral 
hazard issues, i.e. claiming a lack of good sense among bankers, it is worth noting that during 
the crisis the banking system was in the hands of several big borrowers whose debts accounted 
for up to 50% of the entire borrowings. Criticizing the principles of the Bretton Woods’ 
institution and sharpening the need for diversity, flexibility, and common sense, for example, 
Ibrahim encourages cautiousness and prudence 44  in the globalization and liberalization of 
financial markets. This liberalization is likely to play a positive role for economic development 
under certain circumstances and there is no question that the globalization, financial 
liberalization, and deregulation of the financial market enabled economic progress. However, 
if it gets out of control, the crash cannot be warded off. To function in developing countries, it 
is essential to have reliable and secure risk limitation mechanisms. Thus, the government should 
not run a higher risk without having enough collateral. Regardless of that fact, the financial 
liberalization process should go ahead gradually, step by step. Likewise, the need to regulate 
and efficiently manage external debts is clear. Countries in emerging markets in particular 
should be reticent to build up external debts even if they have good export volumes because 
those volumes could sharply slow down. Notably, financially liberalized states are subject to 
sizeable risks. The essential strategy for the governments of emerging markets centres on the 
 
43  S. Young, ‘East Asian Crisis: Causes and Prospects’ in Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
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need to build up and manage external reserves. To this end the government should take short-
term and long-term measures.45 
The banking regulatory sector received a proposal of some measures to be taken. The first 
suggestion concerned the liberalization of domestic financial systems, the second tightening of 
banking rules, the third keeping foreign exchange rates reliable, and finally, having realistic 
financial disclosure. In addition, the need for capital control and a global debt workout system 
grew, notably the possibility of a debt standstill declaration according to the system outlined in 
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. Finally, social justice should in the long term remain 
in the rights and interests of workers.46 
The measures reveal the essence of crisis analysis. However, it seems reasonable to emphasize 
that such a financial crunch can have an unpredictable effect on transnational companies, and 
it can cause cross-border insolvency for which there is no adequate solution as we will see later 
while analysing the Asian Pulp & Paper case. 
There are some regional and global solutions already in existence worldwide, e.g. UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, European Insolvency Regulation, NAFTA, etc. Those 
rules are not directly transferrable because of regional particularities; they can however be 
considered as an aid in drafting proposals for solutions to cross-border insolvencies in Southeast 
Asia. Nevertheless, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 has become the pivotal incentive for 
reforming and harmonizing the insolvency laws in Asia. 
How the financial crisis affected the multinational companies, we will see on the case of Asia 
Pulp & Paper insolvency which is occurred around the turn of the millennium.  
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Section II – Case Study: Asia Pulp & Paper Cross-Border Insolvency in 2001 
In this section, we will look at the saga of the Asia Pulp & Paper insolvency that occurred in 
parallel in several states in Southeast Asia where the debtor had his subsidiaries. This section 
aims to illustrate the existence of urgent cross-border insolvency problems, their complexity 
and extension caused by an absence of adequate transnational insolvency regulation systems. 
1. The Background and Reasons 
AP&P is a public company47 with its headquarters in Singapore known not only as the largest 
producer of paper, making up around 150 companies, but also as the biggest debt defaulter in 
Asia, as well as the largest debtor in the emerging markets. Its subsidiaries with major assets 
are situated in Indonesia, China and India; it also has smaller subsidiaries in other jurisdictions. 
AP&P claimed to be one of the lowest cost producers worldwide. The company generates its 
income by means of management fees it charges its operating subsidiaries. 48  
The group does not have direct interest as a shareholder in its operating subsidiaries; rather, the 
interest of the company in these subsidiaries is through its equities in intermediate holding 
companies. AP&P had accumulated enormous debts originating from the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997. 
 
47 Asian Development Bank, Promoting Regional Cooperation in the Development of Insolvency Law Reforms – 
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AP&P Dependence Structure  
  
2. The Facts of the Case 
On 12th March 2001, AP&P announced a debt repayment standstill via a press release issued 
by its Chief Financial Officer. To continue day-to-day operations, AP&P ceased all payments 
of interest and principally on all holding company debts as well as on debts issued by the 
company's subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries. On the advice of AP&P's financial advisors, 
Credit Suisse First Boston, it intended to give priority to trading partners and to suppliers. 
Disregarding its promise to creditors to draft the debt restructuring plan within a month after 
the press release, AP&P delayed its formulation.49 
The creditors of the AP&P group could not foresee the outcome of the debtor's collapse. Thus, 
they decided to apply for the appointment of a judicial manager in front of the High Court of 
Singapore. 
3. The Petition of Deutsche Bank & BNP Paribas 
The press release showed that AP&P would draw up a restructuring scheme within one month 
of the statement; however, AP&P did not meet that deadline. The petitioners complained that 
AP&P did not hold to its promise. The company debt restructuring plan dated 1st February 2002 
 












was rejected. Creditors' counter proposal from 2nd March 2002 was rejected by AP&P. There 
was no agreement between AP&P and its creditors as to the company's restructuring. This claim 
was contested by a member of AP&P's restructuring committee. AP&P appointed diverse 
advisors with roles regarding the debt restructuring plan, implementation of the disposal of 
assets under said plan, revision of the group's financial position, international issues, legal 
issues in Singaporean and Indonesian law, and Chinese financial and legal matters.50 
During the course of the judgement, the petitioners alleged that AP&P had failed to disclose a 
swap contract with Deutsche Bank worth 220 million US dollars in their 1997-2000 audited 
accounts. It had also failed to satisfactorily explain why Indah Kiat (an affiliate in Indonesia) 
did not disclose the existence of 199.3 million US dollars with BII Cook Islands, a bank owned 
by the Widjaja family, in its audited accounts for the year 2000. Furthermore, AP&P did not 
follow a request to explain the qualification put on Indah Kiat's audited accounts for the year 
2000 by Arthur Andersen on some essential transactions as well as to explain why Arthur 
Andersen resigned as a company auditor in November 2001.51  In addition, the petitioners 
claimed losses resulting from the swap contract with Deutsche Bank and from funds from the 
group accounts that had been removed or unlawfully used for questionable transactions 
involving the Widjaja family. No explanation was given concerning the resignation of 
Deloitte&Touche as auditor of the company in 2001. 
The petitioners further alleged that KPMG had been appointed by creditors to carry out an 
independent audit of the debtor; however, the progress of the audit had been impeded by the 
debtor's reluctance to grant KPMG accountants access to diverse sources of information relating 
to the debtor's business in China, analysis of intergroup debts, internal transactions, and account 
information. As a result, the KMPG auditors did not meet the deadline of July 2001 or the 
subsequent deadlines for January and April 2002. However, without the auditors’ report, the 
petitioners would still be able to weigh up the feasibility of debt restructuring proposals 
submitted by the debtor. The debtor's representative denied the petitioners’ claim, arguing that 
the petitioners and KMPG competed for the fee which KPMG intended to charge the debtor. 
Furthermore, KMPG had to handle a range of queries from the creditors, causing delays. In 
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addition, the petitioners alleged that payments were made in rupiah-denominated bonds during 
a long period of several months after the debt standstill. Those payments began after the 
opposition of international creditors. AP&P paid interest to Chinese creditors in March 2001. 
There was some speculation that the Widjaja family was buying their own rupiah-denominated 
bonds from the third parties to withdraw cash from AP&P. Likewise, it was intended to suborn 
the creditors in their decision on restructuring plans.52 
The petitioners sent their petition for the appointment of a judicial manager in the conviction 
that there was a reasonable possibility of rehabilitation of both the debtor and the AP&P group, 
of preserving its business as a going concern, by placing the company under judicial 
management instead of winding it up. 
4. Judgements53 
The High Court of Singapore did not approve the judicial manager to AP&P; the appointment 
of judicial managers is governed by the Singaporean Company Act. Section 227 A of the Act 
provides that an application for the judicial manager may be filed to the Court, (a) where a 
company is or will be unable to pay debts; and (b) where there is a reasonable probability of 
rehabilitating the company or of preserving all or part of its business as a going concern or that 
otherwise the interests of creditors would be better served than by resorting to a winding up, 
under the conditions of Section 227 B according to which such an application can be made by 
way of petition. The Court will only make such an order if it is satisfied that the company will 
be unable to pay its debts, as mentioned in subsection (a); and, if it considers that the order 
would be likely to achieve one or more of the following aims: first, the survival of the company, 
or the whole or part of its undertaking as a going concern; second, the approval under Section 
210 of a compromise or arrangement between the company and any such persons as are 
mentioned in that section; and, third, a more advantageous realization of the company's assets. 
The Judge dismissed the petition to appoint a judicial manager because at that stage it would 
have merely resulted in more irreversible costs which would be borne by AP&P and its 
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subsidiaries. What's more, the payment of many committees54 was to his mind uneconomical 
and those funds could be spent refunding creditors. These arguments notwithstanding, the 
bigger obstacles were complications relating to the authority of a judicial manager appointed 
by the Singaporean Court and legal impediments which would likely arise in case-related 
jurisdictions such as China and Indonesia where the debtor had its subsidiaries. 
The petition of creditors for the appointment of a judicial manager was contested by the debtor's 
representative because the judicial manager would not smooth the progress of finding a suitable 
solution between AP&P and its creditors. Moreover, it would not promote a better realization 
of company assets. The appointment of a judicial manager would further lead its subsidiaries 
to delay the payment of management fees as well as ring-fencing their own fees and force them 
to engage in further restructuring with their creditors. Finally, once appointed, the judicial 
manager would not be able to gain control of the company's assets as they are abroad. 
Moreover, no agreement concerning the rehabilitation plan was achieved between AP&P and 
its creditors. The Widjaja family proposed a consensual restructuring plan which would allow 
the up streaming of funds from the company's operating subsidiary to the benefit of AP&P's 
creditors, although the creditors' interest was not at the level of operating subsidiaries. Per 
debtor's representative, the appointment of the judicial manager would be meaningless. AP&P's 
main asset was its equity in the operating subsidiaries which were held by Purinusa. Purinusa's 
main creditor was IBRA, which was separately owned by the operating subsidiaries. If the 
judicial manager endeavoured to control the Indonesian operating subsidiaries of AP&P, IBRA 
would likely undertake contraction as a result. The judicial manager would act across legal and 
pragmatic matters while taking control of the management of the operating subsidiaries in 
Indonesia and China. This could worsen the existing delay and produce more costs. 
Furthermore, the operation of the mills owned and run by the operating subsidiaries would need 
specialist knowledge and a degree of sensitivity to local conditions and circumstances. The 
judicial manager would not have such an ability. 
Another problem that would arise is that the authority of court-appointed judicial managers in 
Singapore would unlikely be recognized in Indonesia and China. There is a large uncertainty as 
to whether the court-appointed judicial manager would be able to enforce any rights in the end 
 





and, if so, which rights. Indonesian law would also not recognize the authority of the judicial 
manager to exercise control over the AP&P subsidiaries in Indonesia. Hence, a separate 
application for the appointment of a judicial manager for each jurisdiction would be necessary. 
As for the restructuring process itself, the debtor's representative contested the petitioners' claim 
based on complications with the restructuring plan. Singapore Court of Appeal confirmed the 
first decision and the case was dismissed.55 
This case study shows the whole complexity of cross-border insolvencies. The interests of 
various stakeholders are often disregarded by the different national insolvency regimes because 
they are not handled in same way by different legal systems. A clear identification and common 
understanding of goals and interests of those groups in a cross-border insolvency proceeding 
could be a reasonable step to a legally secure reconciliation of interests. 
Section III – Identification of the Interest Groups and the Scope of Research 
It is not feasible to set up a standard regulation on cross-border insolvency without bearing in 
mind the interests and needs of diverse players in the cross-border insolvency process as well 
as the national insolvency regimes. 
1. Debtors' Rights 
If the debtor is a legal entity, interests of capital and managers fall apart. Managers are willing 
to pursue their own monetary interests and keep company's assets for themselves. This fact 
notwithstanding, the debtor merits a certain level of protection and help throughout the 
proceedings. The debtor might have legitimate interest in continuing his business because he 
knows his transactions better than somebody else.  
2. Creditors' Rights 
In their reasoning, the competent judges would limit the interests of creditors, which should be 
taken into consideration in regulations relating to cross-border collapses. It is self-evident that 
the first and most pressing interest of each creditor is to get back his monetary funds and benefits 
in kind granted to the debtor.  
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AP&P as a debtor intentionally tried to delay the restructuring process. This fact increasingly 
minimizes the creditors' chances of success. However, it is precisely in the interest of a creditor 
to reduce the duration of going ahead as much as possible. As practice shows, those two main 
needs are rarely, if at all, satisfied. 
In addition, the judge in the AP&P case ruled that the company had hindered the review of its 
financial situation and did not cooperate with professional insolvency advisors. Therefore, the 
information disclosure to the debtors should be a key issue in cross-border insolvency cases. 
Unequal treatment of creditors represents a serious hindrance. AP&P gave preference to some 
creditors despite the debt standstill circumstances. It follows that the equal treatment of all 
creditors is a crucial issue for dealing with such cases. AP&P also did not set up a proper 
mechanism for group cash flow controlling. This contradicts the concern of creditors as to the 
future distribution of the company's assets.  
3. Social Interests 
Another group is the employee group. During the insolvency proceedings, they share the 
interests of the creditors. In addition, the employees fear unemployment after the winding up 
of the company or termination of their employment contract because of eventual restructuring. 
On the one hand, the employee needs to be as protected as the creditors; on the other hand, it 
would not be right to put a ceiling on the role of workers, such that this is to the detriment of 
creditors in the insolvency case. This is because the employee is very often much more 
integrated in the debtor company than creditors are. Their interest is to take part in the making 
of business decisions as well as to exert restrictions on those business judgements. Many 
insolvency law professionals support the opinion that insolvency law should protect the rights 
and obligations of employees which existed while the debtor was solvent, such as the 
continuation of employees' contractual rights and various other rights concerning participation 
and consultation of the debtor's management up to the insolvency stage. Many jurisdictions 
recognise the importance of employee participation in proceedings as a separate interest group. 
Thus, employees' claims are often settled before those of the secured creditors. Moreover, 
several jurisdictions provide some public funds to enable overdue payments and supplementary 
advantages to which the employees are eligible. The reason for this is that the employees get 
into a position that is worse even than that of unsecured creditors. Hence, it is customary for 





Another major characteristic of the employee group is their role in controlling management. 
The workers have an official right to take part in the decision-making processes and to influence 
them. Jay Lawrence Westbrook underlines that, even without a lawfully settled right, it must 
be possible for an employee to influence the debtor due to their economic power, which could 
be meaningful in the drafting of the rescue plan of major collapsed companies. Furthermore, 
collective bargaining agreements represent an important aspect of their role in the debtor's 
company management. To sum up, there are two main concerns of employees in the insolvency 
of their employer. First, they require protection of their contractual rights and pensions. Second, 
it is important to have the possibility of affecting the management of the debtor.56 
As we can see, although various legislators have come up with sets of rules regarding employee 
protection in case of insolvency, many questions remain open in relation to cross-border 
collapses. This matter merits serious contemplation in dealing with cross-border bankruptcy 
issues as it remains as urgent as the protections afforded to other interest groups like creditors 
and debtors.  
Insolvency also raises the question of the functioning of the markets, especially in the cross-
border context. However, it is not clear to what extent the market and its participants should be 
protected by simple cross-border insolvency regulation. Nor whether the reckless actions of 
managers and wrongful trading should be punished within the cross-border insolvency process 
or if they merit separate treatment. Nevertheless, there is a spectrum of interest directly linked 
to cross-border insolvency and to a concrete debtor whose business partner, even if they are not 
creditors, act in the market in question.  
4. Transaction Costs 
Creditors face uncertainty regarding their ability to enforce their rights, further costs of 
enforcement, lower levels of professional, judicial competence, inefficiency in the justice 
 
56 Westbrook J. L., Booth C. D., Paulus C. G. and Rajak H. (eds.), A Global View of Business Insolvency Systems, 
Law, Justice and Developments Series (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2010), 183 et seqq. The pension 
funds include money that the employees contributed themselves. Those funds the employer may invest in his 
corporation or confer them to a trustee. However, major corporate collapses might cause the losses of those pension 
funds. A showcase jurisdiction is Germany. In France saving of workplace is the crucial task of insolvency 
proceeding. In general, it is more likely that the employees seek to support the rescue of the debtor´s company 
whereas the creditors are not always eager to do so. Extensive overview of employee right in insolvency, see J. P. 
Sarra, Employee and Pension Claims During Company Insolvency: A Comparative Study of 62 Jurisdictions 





administration, and in some cases corruption. These and other transaction costs hamper cross-
border investments and trade in general. At the same time, cross-border insolvency plays an 
important role in making certain the efficacy of capital markets. The transaction costs 
mentioned could be minimized by means of cooperation between national courts in 
transnational bankruptcy cases. The cooperation between judges in cross-border insolvencies 
could be ensured fulfilled by pursuing proper guideline provisions for judicial aid in civil 
proceedings, in insolvency proceedings, in the preservation of assets and guarantee of highly 
qualitative information exchange, but also to aid in freezing and figuring out claims, preserving 
and realising assets, and obtaining evidence from residents. Lastly, cooperation to aid the 
detection of falsified and inevitable transactions can also be considered. 
5. Multinational Enterprises and Groups of Companies 
Although multinational enterprises structured as a group have gained weight on the 
international stage, legal obstacles remain unsolved with regard to their complexity and 
dynamics. The definition for group of companies is ‘a set of corporations with common 
ownership or control’ as well as a group of companies associated by a common or interlocking 
shareholding.57 The determinants reviewed do not satisfy modern economic needs. They may 
well be applicable for small companies with some subsidiaries abroad; however, essential 
improvements are necessary to govern a big cross-border collapse such as we have seen in the 
case of AP&P. Multinational enterprises need a time-efficient and economical proceeding with 
a fair balance of interests. This interest balance is the hardest puzzle to solve.  
In this Chapter II it has been shown the overview of cross-border insolvency problems in Asia. 
We looked at the main causes of cross-border insolvency cases which are globalization and 
financial crisis. The AP&P case study has underlined the challenges raised by interest conflicts 
in various stakeholders’ groups to cross-border insolvency proceedings. The national Asian 
 
57 S. Gopalan and M. Guihot, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency Law and Multinational Enterprise Groups – Judicial 
Innovation as an International Solution’, The George Washington International Law Review 48 (2016), 549–616, 
at 564 et seq.; for groups of companies within UNCITRAL, see J. Sarra, ‘Maidum's Challenge, Legal and 
Governance Issues in Dealing with Cross-Border Business Enterprise Group Insolvencies’, International 
Insolvency Review 17 (2008), 73–122, at 75 et seqq.; see also United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (ed.), UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law.: Part Three: Treatment of Enterprise Groups in 
Insolvency (New York: United Nations Publication, 2012) proposal for groups of companies by INSOL Europe, 
see I. Mevorach, ‘INSOL Europe's Proposals on Groups of Companies (in Cross-Border Insolvency): A Critical 
Appraisal’, International Insolvency Review 21 (2012), 183–97; for problems of corporate groups, see also R. K. 
Rasmussen, ‘The Problem of Corporate Groups: A Comment on Professor Ziegel’, Fordham Journal of Corporate 





insolvency regimes are unable to set them up. Consequently, this case study was followed by 
the identification of the interest groups which are debtors and creditors rights, social interests 
and transaction costs.  
To this end, it is necessary to determine the intersection of common interests as well as signs 
of potential conflict. This need is clear both from a pragmatic and theoretical perspective; wide-
ranging proposals have been brought forward, ranging from national rules on cross-border 
insolvency and regional cooperation all the way up to global projects. The problem of company 
groups has also been addressed by international institutional bodies such as UNCITRAL and 
the European Commission. Prior to proceed to the global and international projects, we will 






CHAPTER III – SUBSTANTIAL THEORIES AND INTERNATIONAL PROJECTS, AND 
MODELS ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY LAW 
International insolvency cases can appear in various forms: the debtor has his assets in more 
than one country, the debtor only has his assets in one country, but the creditors are foreign, 
and the debtor is in a foreign country while the creditors are domestic.58 Therefore, cross-border 
insolvency is a matter which on the one hand affects numerous countries and on the other hand 
touches on various sectors such as labour, accounting, banking and finance, etc. Once the 
economic facts are available, it is the task of legal professionals to embed them into a proper 
legal framework to unearth a solution to this globalization phenomenon. As already mentioned 
in the introduction, legal theory and practice has developed several relevant legal insolvency 
projects. The following three sections will give an overview of these projects. 
Section I – Basic Concepts and Theories Proven in Multistate Insolvencies 
In substance, this issue is nothing new; nonetheless, it remains a highly debated topic in theory 
and practice. Multiple legislators continue to work on appropriate rules, even if, to some extent, 
the matter of cross-border insolvency is interconnected with international private law. Roughly 
speaking, the cross-border insolvency process consists of two elements. The first is the 
identification of the competent jurisdiction and applicable material law in state A. The second 
is the process of enforcement preceded by eventual recognition in state B. However, in most 
cases there is a major gap between law and business concerning the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign insolvency judgements. The major controversy in dealing with cross-
border insolvencies appears between two traditional theories of territorialism and universalism 
– both extremes of the spectrum of positions. Further theories include cooperative territorialism, 
modified universalism, and contractualism.59  
 
58 J. Altman, ‘A Test Case in International Bankruptcy Protocols: The Lehman Brothers Insolvency’, San Diego 
International Law Journal 12 (2011), 463–95, at 464; for different models of international insolvency law, see D. 
T. Trautman, L. J. Westbrook and E. Gaillard, ‘Four Models for International Bankruptcy’, The American Journal 
of Comparative Law 41 (1994), 573–625 
59 I. Mevorach, Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 
65; see also I. Mevorach, ‘Beyond the Search for Certainty: Addressing the Cross-Border Resolution Gap’, 






Territorialism60 is the first extreme approach to cross-border insolvency – also called a ‘grab 
rule’ – which decides the applicable insolvency law according to the criterion of its 
geographical validity belonging to a concrete jurisdiction.61 The law of the local forum applies 
to all parts of insolvency proceedings62 within the territory of the applying state. It does not 
allow the debtors' assets situated outside of the respective territory to be affected and would 
seize local debtor's assets and distribute them among the local creditors disregarding foreign 
creditors, building on the concept of sovereignty developed by French philosopher Jean Bodin63 
in the 16th century. However, its main feature is the idea of ‘vested rights’. The territoriality 
principle narrows down both inbound and outbound insolvency cases.64 It does not consider 
debtors' assets abroad, nor does it recognize foreign judgements on insolvency.65 In short, each 
jurisdiction deals only with a part of the global business located in its sovereign territory 
according to the so-called ‘state by state’ approach, instead of tackling the debtor's assets 
situated outside of its own jurisdiction. The act of expropriation does not have extraterritorial 
effect. The remaining part of the connected business is not considered, regardless of whether it 
is a subsidiary or a member of the group. Cases where a company acts globally and owns entities 
in multiple jurisdictions are likely to result in more than one insolvency proceeding in more 
than one country. Often it results in multiple parallel proceedings against the same debtor 
 
60 Also, it is called the territoriality principle. See generally L. M. LoPucki, ‘The Case for Cooperative Territoriality 
in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach’, Michigan Law Review 98 (2000), 2216–51, at 218; 
Mevorach, Mevorach 2009, 71 et seqq. 
61 Westbrook, Booth, Paulus and Rajak (eds.), Westbrook et al. 2010, p. 229;J. L. Westbrook, ‘Multinational 
Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, the ALI Principles, and the EU Insolvency Regulation’, American 
Bankruptcy Law Journal 76 (2002), 1–42, at 8 
62 R. Mason, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency Law: Where Private International Law and Insolvency Law Meet’ in P. J. 
Omar (ed.), International Insolvency Law: Themes and Perspectives, Markets and the Law (Aldershot, England, 
Burlington, USA: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 27–60, at p. 42 
63 For further details, see Dunning, Wm. A., ‘Jean Bodin on Sovereignty’, Political Science Quarterly 11 (1896), 
82–104, at 92 
64 Westbrook, Booth, Paulus and Rajak (eds.), Westbrook et al. 2010, p. 230; ibid., p. 229; Westbrook, ‘Westbrook 
2002’, 5 
65 P. von Wilmowsky, ‘Choice of Law in International Insolvencies: A Proposal for Reform’ in J. Basedow and T. 
Kono (eds.), Legal Aspects of Globalization: Conflict of Laws, Internet, Capital Markets, and Insolvency in a 





because each judge applies lex loci, and the foreign creditors continue without enforceable 
rights. This problem raises the issue of forum shopping.66  
2. Universalism 
The opposite approach to territorialism is the universal one or universalism. It speaks of ‘the 
law governing the case’ and does not consider the geographical limitations caused by national 
state borders. Instead, it argues the global applicability of the law governing the case.67 There 
are two core elements of the universalist approach: a single law and a single forum. 
Consequently, it combines the collection and administration of and proceedings regarding the 
debtor's domestic and foreign assets in the long term.68 Professor Westbrook suggests two 
methods for implementing the universalist approach: the first would be to establish a single 
international insolvency law and court system; the second one would be to stipulate a standard 
set of rules for choice of law and jurisdiction. A unified insolvency system has, of course, its 
pros and cons. In universalism's favour is the fact that insolvency administration through a 
single court is likely to ensure value maximization due to cost reduction and an improvement 
in the reorganization process, to effect unified methods of distribution owing to a single set of 
priorities, and to introduce transfer avoidance rules. The main objection to the universalists’ 
solution is the supersession of national policies of individual states. Hence, antagonists of 
universalism argue that even in the long term, the national laws will prevail in international 
insolvency cases if they are still applicable; in addition, universalism is realistically only 
applicable to big multinational companies and groups of companies, but not to middle-sized 
enterprises and consumers.69 Needless to say, universalism is only feasible if all the involved 
states adhere to this approach.70 
 
66  Mason, ‘Mason 2008’, 43; Mevorach, Mevorach 2009, 71 et seq.; for universalism and territorialism 
controversy, see further L. J. Westbrook, ‘Multinational Financial Distress: The Last Hurrah of Territorialism’, 
Texas International Law Journal 41 (2006), 321–37 
67 Westbrook, Booth, Paulus and Rajak (eds.), Westbrook et al. 2010, p. 230; it is also called ‘unity of bankruptcy’, 
Mevorach, Mevorach 2009, p. 65 
68 L. J. Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’, Michigan Law Review 98 (2000), 2276–328, at 
2292; G. McCormack, ‘Universalism in Insolvency Proceedings and the Common Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 32 (2012), 325–47, at 327 
69 Westbrook, ‘Westbrook 2000’, 2292 et seqq. In his article Professor Westbrook applies the word ‘bankruptcy’ 
because he refers to American law. Professor Rasmussen suggests a single insolvency law system, however, not a 
single jurisdictional environment in this issue. 





3. Modified Universalism 
As an interim solution between territorialism and universalism, some authors argue for so-
called modified territorialism. This approach seems to be closer to reality than universalism in 
its original form, which is a long way out71 in a perfect legal environment. This approach 
combines the advantages of universalism in multi-jurisdictional and multi-law environments. It 
requires courts to cooperate and to actively take part in international insolvency management.72 
According to this interim theory, the debtor's assets will be piled up and distributed according 
to a global framework with respect to differences between the national laws on cross-border 
insolvency. At the centre of this approach is an endeavour to identify a single possible place for 
the opening of insolvency proceedings against the debtor. However, this approach does not 
presume any kind of automatic recognition or relief for foreign administrators or representatives 
generally. Difficulties will arise around secondary proceedings because of the problem of 
defining the home country as a result of a lack of objectively ascertainable criteria for doing 
so.73 
4. Cooperative Territorialism 
Cooperative territorialism is a model tracing back to the territorialist approach. Professor 
Mevorach calls it ‘legal realism’. The particularity of this approach is the fact that each country 
would manage the debtor's assets within its own territory. However, it assumes cooperation 
with other jurisdictions by means of bilateral and multilateral agreements, because it may 
require states to change their national laws, though does guarantee a certain degree of flexibility. 
Despite this, it only facilitates influence on the progress of cross-border insolvency cases to a 
minor degree and has only limited significance in practical use.74  
5. Contractualism 
The contractualism approach deals with so-called ‘bargained bankruptcy’ – the unalterably 
applicable insolvency law will be set ex-ante by a negotiated international contract between all 
the parties to insolvency proceedings. The debtor and creditors conclude an agreement and 
 
71 Westbrook, ‘Westbrook 2002’, 8; Mevorach, Mevorach 2009, p. 69 
72 Westbrook, ‘Westbrook 2000’, 2302 
73 Mevorach, Mevorach 2009, 69 et seqq.; for modified universalism, see also L. M. LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in 
International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach’, Cornell Law Review 84 (1999), 696–762, at 725 et seqq.  





select a proper insolvency framework. This inevitably leads to the result that the debtor will be 
encouraged to choose the law mostly appropriate to him, but at the same time it would engender 
concurrence between national insolvency laws and thereby improve the national reorganization 
systems.75 Professor Westbrook has expressed his concerns as to the contractual approach, in 
particular regarding the control of assets and disclosure.76 The contractual approach does not 
take into consideration that the insolvency is a complex process that includes many parties,77 
e.g. employees or creditors who have not participated in the contract negotiations and did not 
give their approval to the new insolvency law applicable. 
As already mentioned above, alongside the cross-border insolvency theories, the nation states 
and international organizations launched various projects in cooperation with legal researchers 
and practitioners. Those projects relate to global and regional approaches to cross-border 
insolvency cases. Current international efforts include the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency which will be reviewed in the next section. Before addressing the 
UNICTRAL contribution, the Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act and Cross-
Border Insolvency Concordat will be considered. 
Section II – Previous International Initiatives 
1. Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act (MIICA) 
The Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act (MIICA) appeared among the work of the 
International Bar Association in 1989. It is one of the first projects on cross-border insolvency 
cases. It includes a proposal for domestic adoption: the national court should aid proceedings 
taking place in foreign jurisdictions. Although this project was not successful in being adopted 
by national states, it proved its workability as a model law system.78  
 
75 Mevorach, Mevorach 2009, 76 et seq.; for further discussion of contractual bankruptcy clauses, see R. K. 
Rasmussen, ‘Resolving Transnational Insolvencies through Private Ordering’, Michigan Law Review 98 (2000), 
2252–75 
76 Westbrook, ‘Westbrook 2000’, 2304 
77 Mevorach, Mevorach 2009, p. 77; for choice of insolvency law in Europe, see H. Eidenmüller, ‘Free Choice in 
International Company Insolvency Law in Europe’, European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) 6 
(2005), 423–47 
78 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (ed.), United Nations Commission on International 
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2. Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat 
On 31st May 1996, the Committee J of the International Bar Association (IBA) approved the 
Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat. This was one of the first initiatives regarding the 
harmonization of international insolvency cases. The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat is a 
set of ten principles combining the universality principle with aspects of soft law, based on 
principles of international law.79 The project was not intended to be used as a treaty or other 
governmental document; however, the insolvency courts were welcome to apply those 
principles in international insolvency cases. 
Principle 180 addresses the universality principle and suggests a single court for coordinating 
multiple insolvency proceedings because of the centre of main interests of the debtor company, 
enabling better control of assets and ensuring fair treatment of creditors.81 This court should 
handle several proceedings for the same debtor. This is, however, not always possible. 
Principle 282 favours equal treatment of creditors of the insolvency proceedings. The main 
forum should handle the coordination, administration, collection, and distribution of all the 
debtors' assets among the creditors.83 
Principle 384 deals with plurality of courts. In this case, the courts are requested to ensure 
transparent communication and seamless coordination of the proceedings and to respect other 
 
79 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (ed.), United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law 2010, 11 et seq. 
80 Principle 1: ‘If an entity or individual with cross-border connections is the subject of an insolvency proceeding, 
a single administrative forum should have primary responsibility for co-ordinating all insolvency proceedings 
relating to such entity or individual.’ 
81 Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat (1996) 
82 Principle 2: ‘Where there is one main forum: a) Administration and collection of assets should be coordinated 
by the main forum. b) After payment of secured claims and privileged claims, as determined by local law, assets 
in any forum other than in the main forum shall be turned over to the main forum for distribution. c) Common 
claims are filed in and distributions are made by the main forum. Common creditors not in the main forum must 
file claims in the main forum but (to the extent allowable under the procedural rules of the main forum) may file 
by mail, in their local language and with no formalities other than required under their local insolvency law. d) 
The main forum may not discriminate against non-local creditors. e) Filing a claim in the main forum does not 
subject a creditor to jurisdiction for any purpose, except for claims administration subject to the limitations of 
principle 8 and except for any offset (under voiding rules or otherwise) up to the amount of the creditor's claim). 
f) A discharge granted by the main forum should be recognised in any forum.’ 
83 ibid. 
84 Principle 3: ‘a) If there is more than one forum, the official representatives appointed by each forum shall receive 






jurisdictions.85 Information relating to insolvency proceedings should be made available to the 
stakeholders involved by one single court. 
Principle 486 addresses the choice of law case if there is more than one competent court or if 
the assets are found in the jurisdictions of several competent courts. The validity of the claim 
should not be affected by the choice of the competent jurisdiction. However, the creditor should 
only be eligible to claim in a single jurisdiction.87 The distribution of the common claims should 
be on a pro-rata basis. 
Principle 588 provides that in case of limited proceedings, after the distribution of assets is made, 
the surplus should be transferred to the next competent jurisdiction. The court of the limited 
 
or similar proceeding may be utilised to implement recognition of the official representative. An official 
representative shall be subject to jurisdiction in all fora for any matter related to the insolvency proceedings but 
appearing in a forum shall not subject him/her to jurisdiction for any other purpose in the forum state. b) To the 
extent permitted by the procedural rules of a forum, ex parte and interim orders shall permit creditors of another 
jurisdiction and official representatives appointed by another jurisdiction the right, for a reasonable period, to 
request the court to reconsider the issues covered by such orders. c) All creditors should have the right to appear 
in any forum to the same extent as creditors of the forum state, regardless of whether they have filed claims in that 
forum, without subjecting themselves to jurisdiction in that forum (including with respect to recovery against a 
creditor under voiding rules or otherwise in excess of a creditor's claim). d) Information publicly available in any 
forum shall be publicly available in all fora. To the extent permitted, non-public information available to an official 
representative shall be shared with other official representatives.’ 
85 ibid. 
86 Principle 4: ‘Where there is more than one plenary forum and there is no main forum: a) Each forum should co-
ordinate with each other, subject in appropriate cases to a governance protocol. b) Each forum should administer 
the assets within its jurisdiction, subject to principle 4 (F). c) A claim should be filed in one, and only one, plenary 
forum, at the election of the holder of the claim. If a claim is filed in more than one plenary forum, distribution 
must be adjusted so that recovery is not greater than if the claim were filed in only one forum.3 d) Each plenary 
forum should apply its own ranking rules for classification of and distribution to secured and privileged claims. e) 
Classification of common claims should be coordinated among plenary fora. Distributions to common claims 
should be pro-rata regardless of the forum from which a claim receives a distribution. f) Estate property should be 
allocated (after payment of secured and privileged claims) among, or distributions should be made by, plenary fora 
based upon a pro-rata weighing of claims filed in each forum. Proceeds of voiding rules not available in every 
plenary forum should be: ALT A: Allocated pro-rata among all plenary fora for distribution. ALT B: Allocated 
for distribution by the forum which ordered voiding. g) If the estate is subject to local regulation that involves an 
important public policy (such as a banking or insurance business), local assets should be used first to satisfy local 
creditors that are protected by that regulatory scheme (such as bank depositors and insurance policy holders) to 
the extent provided by that regulatory scheme.’ 
87 ibid. 
88 Principle 5: ‘A limited proceeding shall, after paying secured and privileged claims, as determined by local law, 





jurisdiction should have the right to administrate and distribute the assets found in this 
jurisdiction to common and secured creditors.89 
Principle 6 90  advocates that if the proceedings runs over multiple jurisdictions, the rules 
applicable in one forum should be susceptible for application by the insolvency administrator 
in another jurisdiction. These provisions can be only applied in a manner expected to be to the 
benefit of all creditors.91 
Principle 792 points out that in multistate proceedings the insolvency administrator may apply 
voidance rules for all contracts and use voidance rules most apt for all creditors.93 
Principle 894 addresses insolvency proceedings of groups of companies. The applicable material 
law should be selected upon analysis of the facts of the case. However, it must be taken into 
consideration that in many jurisdictions the cases will not only be heard in front of insolvency 
courts, but also in front of other courts.95 
Principle 996 is the matter of composition. Not all national insolvency laws provide a concept 
of composition between debtor and creditors on economic and social grounds such as 
maintaining employment and paying social contributions. It is important to bear in mind that 
 
89 ibid. 
90 Principle 6: ‘Subject to principle 8, the Official Representatives may employ the administrative rules of any 
plenary forum in which an insolvency proceeding is pending, even though similar rules are not available in the 
forum appointing the official representative.’ 
91 ibid. 
92 Principle 7: ‘Subject to principle 8, the Official Representatives may exercise voiding rules of any forum.’ 
93 ibid. 
94 Principle 8: ‘a) Each forum should decide the value and allowability of claims filed before it uses a choice of 
law analysis based upon principles of international law. A creditor's rights to collateral and set-off should also be 
determined under principles of international law. b) Parties are not subject to a forum's substantive rules unless 
under applicable principles of international law such parties would be subject to the forum's substantive laws in a 
lawsuit on the same transaction in a non-insolvency proceeding. The substantive and voiding laws of the forum 
have no greater applicability than the laws of any other nation. c) Even if the parties are subject to the jurisdiction 
of the plenary forum, the plenary forum's voiding rules do not apply to transactions that have no significant 
relationship with the plenary forum.’ 
95 ibid. 
96 Principle 9: ‘A composition is not barred because not all plenary fora have laws which provide for a composition 
as opposed to a liquidation, or a composition cannot be accomplished in all plenary fora, as long as the composition 





national states have different concepts of composition which may require certain prerequisites 
and the fulfilment of special conditions by the parties to insolvency proceedings.97 
Principle 1098 underlines that the intention of insolvency law is to guarantee and to protect the 
integrity and workability of international commerce. This is possible by affording an 
appropriate weight to claims from different jurisdictions.99 Divergent priority rules in different 
national states merit special attention.  
Section III – Global Approach – UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency 
In Section III, the focus will be the Model Law project of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) concerning cross-border insolvencies, in particular 
general and historical remarks, goals and approach, main definitions and core subjects of rulings 
that have been proposed by the project.  
1. General Overview of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency100 is a project from the UNCITRAL 
Working Group V on Insolvency in cooperation with the International Insolvency Institute 
(INSOL), and formerly Committee J of the International Bar Association. It was developed as 
a universal insolvency reference source for domestic insolvency law systems in states enacting 
the law and was adopted in 1997 after the thirtieth session of the UNCITRAL held in Vienna 
from 12th to 30th May 1997. National states may also run in an independent and flexible manner 
with regard to the law's enactment. Thus, they shall usually have free choice as to the rules that 
they implement within the Model Law's suggested scope, and so it should be possible to leave 
some proposals out of consideration as part of the legislative process, thereby ensuring the 
essential features and characteristics of the Model Law are preserved. The Secretariat of 
UNCITRAL also prepared and issued more documents supplementary to the Model Law for 
background information, explanations, and guidelines.  
 
97 The term of composition or settlement means a contract by which a dispute or uncertainty of the parties regarding 
a legal relationship is removed by way of mutual concession, see e.g. § 779 section 1 of the German Civil Code. 
98 Principle 10: ‘To the extent permitted by the substantive law of a forum, courts of that forum will not give effect 
to acts of state of another jurisdiction used to invalidate otherwise valid pre-insolvency transactions.’ 
99 ibid. 





Shortly after the adoption of the Model Law, the Guide to Enactment was adopted in 1999.101 
It has been revised several times, most recently on 18th July 2013 and named: ‘UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency’.102 
On 24th June 2004, UNCITRAL adopted the ‘UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency 
Law’ (Parts one and two). 103  The proposal for the Legislative Guide was made to the 
Commission in 1999. The Working Group V developed the first draft in July 2001. In March 
2004, the final meeting took place.104 Parts one and two came to be a reference for national 
authorities and institutional bodes and be an aid in evaluating different approaches in cross-
border insolvency cases.105  
In July 2012, parts one and two of the Legislative Guide were followed by part three, which 
deals with cross-border insolvency in groups.106 Part three addresses the treatment of national 
and international insolvency proceedings involving one or more group members within the 
context of an enterprise group.107 
Another relevant document is the ‘UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency 
Cooperation’.108 This Practice Guide was proposed on commission in 2005 to further develop 
the cooperation and coordination of insolvency proceedings in order to implement Article 27, 
paragraph (d) of the Model Law with a focus on insolvency agreements, referred to in some 
states as ‘protocols’, ‘insolvency administration contracts’, ‘cooperation and compromise 
agreements’, and ‘memoranda of understanding’, in general ‘cross-border insolvency 
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Trade Law 2014, p. 24 
103 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (ed.), UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency 
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106 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (ed.), United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law 2012 
107 ibid., 1 et seq. 
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agreement’ or simplified ‘insolvency agreement’.109 The Practice Guide provides information 
for judges and other insolvency practitioners on cooperation and communication in cross-
border insolvency cases involving multiple states.110 It was adopted on 1st July 2009.111 
2. Objectives of the Model Law 
The objectives of the Model Law are expounded in its Preamble.112 They consist of offering 
functional methods in dealing with cross-border insolvency, in particular, to promote 
cooperation between courts and other authorities in charge of domestic and foreign states, to 
create more regulatory confidence for international investment and trade, to enable an efficient 
and equitable stewardship of cross-border insolvencies which respects all participating 
interests, inter alia those of all creditors and the debtor, to protect and maximize the value of 
the debtor's assets, as well as to facilitate the rescue of businesses in financial trouble with 
respect to investment protection and employment preservation.113 
The Model Law neither intends to unify insolvency laws114 nor does it aim to formulate design 
substantive rights.115 Rather its aim is to enhance the efficiency and coherence of cross-border 
insolvency issues in matters of cooperation between courts, the efficiency of proceedings and 
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111 ibid., iii 
112 Preamble of the Model Law: ‘The purpose of this Law is to provide effective mechanisms for dealing with 
cases of cross-border insolvency so as to promote objectives of: (a) Cooperation between the courts and other 
competent authorities of this State and foreign States involved in cases of cross-border insolvency; (b) Greater 
legal certainty for trade and investment; (c) Fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies that 
protects interests of all creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor; (d) Protection and 
maximization of the value of the debtor's assets; and (e) Facilitating of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, 
thereby protecting investment and preserving employment.’, see for discussion in the UNCITRAL A/52/17, paras. 
136-139 and in the Working Group V on Insolvency: A/CN.9/422, paras. 19-23; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, pp. 4–5; 
A/CN.9/433, paras. 22-28; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, p. 5; A/CN.9/435, para. 100; A/CN.9/436, paras. 37-38; 
A/CN.9/442, paras. 54-56; A/CN.9/738, paras. 14-16; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.103, paras. 54, 51-52, 56; A/CN.9/742, 
para. 23; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, paras. 54, 51-51 A, 56; A/CN.9/766, paras. 21-25.  
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fairness in the treatment of local and foreign creditors as well as other parties involved and, to 
set up of a multistate insolvency framework.116 
3. Scope of Application of the Model Law 
The Model Law addresses two main situations that may occur in cross-border insolvency issues: 
first, the debtor has his assets in more than one state; second, creditors of the debtor are not 
from the state where the insolvency proceeding takes place.117 Consequently, the Model Law 
applies in the following cases: 118  first, if a foreign court or foreign representative seeks 
assistance in the local state in connection with foreign legal proceedings; second, if a local court 
or local representative seeks assistance in a foreign state in connection with local insolvency 
proceedings; third, if foreign and local proceedings are taking place concurrently with regard 
to the same debtor, and finally, if the foreign creditors or other interested persons request the 
commencement of or participation in local insolvency proceedings. 
Per Silverman the accomplishment of the Model Law is threefold: first, the cooperation between 
courts and insolvency administrators; second, foreign insolvency administrators being able to 
actively take part in local proceedings and, finally, local and foreign creditors receiving equal 
treatment.119 
 
116 R. J. Silverman, ‘Advances in Cross - Border Insolvency Cooperation: The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency’, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 6 (2000), 265–72, at 266; A. J. Berends, 
‘The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A Comprehensive Overview’, Tulane Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 6 (1998), 309–99, at 320 
117 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (ed.), United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law 2014, p. 19 
118 Article 1 of the Model Law (Scope of application): ‘1. This law applies where: (a) Assistance is sought by a 
foreign court or a foreign representative in connection with a foreign proceeding; or (b) Assistance is sought in a 
foreign State in connection with a proceeding under [identify laws of the enacting State relating to insolvency]; or 
(c) A foreign proceeding and a proceeding under [identify laws of the enacting State relating to insolvency] in 
respect of the same debtor are taking place concurrently; or (d) Creditors or other interested persons in a foreign 
State have an interest in requesting the commencement of, or participating in, a proceeding under [identify laws of 
the enacting State relating to insolvency]. 2. This Law does not apply to a proceeding concerning [designate any 
types of entities, such as banks or insurance companies, that are subject to a special insolvency regime in this 
State and that this State wishes to exclude from this Law].’, see for discussion in the UNCITRAL: A/52/17, paras. 
141-150; in the Working Group V on Insolvency: A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.44, pp. 6-7. A/CN.9/422, paras. 24-33; 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, p. 5. A/CN.9/433, paras. 29-32; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, pp. 6 and 15, A/CN.9/435, paras. 
102-106 and 179; in the Guide to Enactment: A/CN.9/436, paras. 39-42, A/CN.9/442, paras. 57-66; in the Guide 
to Enactment and Interpretation: A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.103, paras. 57-59, A/CN.9/742, para. 24. 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.107, para. 65, A/CN.9/763, paras. 22. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, paras. 58-59 and 65, 
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The scope of application includes both liquidation and reorganization as part of collective 
proceedings. It can be either judicial or administrative. The assets and business affairs of the 
debtor fall under the judicial control and monitoring.120 However, the Model Law allows for 
the exclusion of certain proceedings, e.g. in relation to banks, insurances, etc.121 
In summary, the Model Law is limited to procedural questions in cross-border insolvency cases 
which should be incorporated into national insolvency laws. 122  It addresses the issues of 
terminology and relief. Local creditors are still entitled to initiate and continue insolvency 
proceedings in the enacting state.123 
4. Approach of the Model Law 
The procedurally focused 124  Model Law is designed for enacting states which have the 
advancement of their national insolvency systems, in particular regarding the handling of cross-
border insolvency cases, as their goal. This law is also pertinent for legal systems with a high 
probability of cross-border insolvency cases. It does provide for some ‘concessions’.125 For this 
project the Working Group V applied a model approach; this means that it is not a treaty. Rather 
it provides functional mechanisms for coordinating cross-border insolvency and is intended to 
be adopted by nation states. The reason for the Model Law approach concerns the narrowness 
of national insolvency laws and national civil procedures. A treaty model would demand more 
time-consuming negotiation work and the adherence of future party states.126 Therefore, far 
fewer national states would be prepared to adhere to such a treaty a priori. The Model Law also 
rules that in case of conflict with any treaty or other exiting obligations on behalf of the enacting 
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121 See Article 1 para. 2 of the Model Law  
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state, those requirements shall prevail. 127 This draws upon the principle of the supremacy of 
international obligation in model laws. However, such a treaty should be explicitly related to 
insolvency issues.128 
From the Model Law we can extrapolate alternative cases where it is justifiably applicable by 
an enacting state. First, in cases where help is sought by a foreign court or a foreign 
administrator with respect to a foreign proceeding or in connection with the proceeding under 
the insolvency law of enacting state. Second, it is applicable in cases of insolvency proceedings 
concerning the same debtor, taking place concurrently under foreign law and the law of enacting 
state. Finally, it should enable creditors and other interested groups from the foreign state to 
request the commencement or their participation in a proceeding under the insolvency law of 
the enacting state.129 
5. Key Definitions within the Model Law 
Article 2 of the Model Law determines some essential definitions.130 
Foreign proceeding means a ‘collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign State, 
including an interim proceeding, pursuant to a law relating to insolvency in which proceeding 
 
127 Article 3 of the Model Law (International obligation of this state): ‘To the extent that this Law conflicts with 
an obligation of this State arising out of any treaty or other form of agreement to which it is a party with one or 
more other States, the requirements of the treaty or agreement shall prevail.’, see for discussion in the UNCITRAL 
A/52/17, paras. 159-162; in the Working Group V on Insolvency: A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.44, p. 11; A/CN.9/422, 
paras. 66-67; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, p. 7; A/CN.9/433, para. 42-43; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, pp. 7–8; A/CN.9/435, 
paras. 114-117; in the Guide to Enactment: A/CN.9/436, para. 46; A/CN.9/442, paras. 76-78; in the Guide to 
Enactment and Interpretation: A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.107, para. 78; A/CN.9/763, para. 26; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, 
para. 78; A/CN.9/766, para. 29. 
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129 ibid., p. 3 
130 Article 2 of the Model Law (Definitions); see for discussion in the UNCITAL A/52/17, paras. 152-158; in the 
Working Group V on Insolvency A/CN.9/419, paras. 95-117, A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.44, pp. 7-10, A/CN.9/422, 
paras. 34-65. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, pp. 5-7. A/CN.9/433, paras. 33-41 and 147, A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, pp. 6-
7. A/CN.9/435, paras. 108-113; in the Guide to Enactment: A/CN.9/436, paras. 43-45. A/CN.9/442, paras. 67-
75; in the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation: A/CN.9/715, paras. 14-15, 17-22, 32-35 and 46, A/CN.9/738, 
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the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for 
the purpose of reorganization or liquidation’.131 
Foreign main proceeding means a ‘foreign proceeding taking place in the State where the debtor 
has the centre of its main interests’.132 
Foreign non-main proceeding means a ‘foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main 
proceeding, taking place in a State where the debtor has an establishment’133 within the meaning 
of subparagraph (f) of this article [Article 2]’.134 
Foreign representative means ‘a person or body, including one appointed on an interim basis, 
authorized in a foreign proceeding to administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the 
debtor's assets or affairs or to act as a representative of the foreign proceeding’.135 
Foreign court means ‘a judicial or other authority competent to control or supervise a foreign 
proceeding’.136 
Establishment means ‘any place of operations where the debtor carries out a non-transitory 
economic activity with human means and goods or services’.137 
6. Miscellaneous Provisions of the Model Law  
In addition to the definitions in Article 2, the Model Law gives some other important general 
information such as terms, interpretation rules and limits, which merit brief consideration. 
First, the Model Law rules which competent court or other authority138 should oversee the 
proceeding. The Guide to Enactment and Interpretation explicitly explains that both courts and 
 
131 Article 2 (a) of the Model Law 
132 Article 2 (b) of the Model Law; for definition of the notion ‘centre of main interest’, see infra.  
133 Article 2 (c) of the Model Law 
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137 Article 2 (f) of the Model Law; other key terminology not officially defined in the Model Law will be given in 
due course.  
138 Article 4 of the Model Law (Competent court or authority): ‘The functions referred to in this Law relating to 
recognition of foreign proceedings and cooperation with foreign courts shall be performed by [specify the court, 






other authorities can be appointed in the enacting state because this would make the Model 
Law's application more flexible and transparent.139 
Second, in Article 5 the Model Law introduces the authorization of the foreign representative 
to act abroad.140 Article 5 is necessary because experience revealed that the absence of this kind 
of legitimation caused difficulties in handling international insolvency cases and created a 
serious obstacle for cooperation. It is not necessary for the State in which the foreign 
representative shall be acting to have enacted the Model Law.141 
Third, the Model Law considers the notion of ‘public policy exception’.142  Public policy 
exception is based on national laws and may differ from state to state. In most states, it is 
founded by basic legal principles anchored in national constitutions in the form of basic right 
guarantees. Consequently, those states will refuse to recognize foreign court decisions which 
are contrary to fundamental principles founded in national law.143 In the case of the Model Law, 
most jurisdictions make a distinction between public policy exception on national and 
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A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, pp. 8–9; A/CN.9/435, paras. 118-122; in the Guide to Enactment: A/CN.9/436, para. 47-
50; A/CN.9/442, paras. 79-83. 
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reorganization of liquidation under the law of enacting state] to act in a foreign state): ‘A [insert the title of the 
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see for discussion in the UNCITRAL: A/52/17, paras. 170-173; in the Working Group V on Insolvency: 
A/CN.9/419, para. 40, A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.44, p. 15. A/CN.9/422, paras. 84-85, A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, p. 16, 
A/CN.9/433, paras. 156-160, A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, p. 9, A/CN.9/435, paras. 125-128; in the Guide to Enactment: 
A/CN.9/436, para. 53, A/CN.9/442, paras. 86-89; in the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation: A/CN.9/715, paras. 
26-30, A/CN.9/738, para. 32. 





international levels. In case of foreign judgements, the notion of public policy exception is 
subject to more restricted interpretation.144 
Fourth, the Model Law also anticipates further aid under other laws.145 Before the introduction 
of the Model Law, the enacting state might already have some laws applicable in cases of 
insolvency. According to the Model Law, those laws shall remain applicable and the foreign 
representative shall obtain assistance pursuant to those laws. The Model Law is not intended to 
supplant those provisions.146 
Finally, the Model Law provides for its own interpretation as part of the General Provision.147 
This provision was based on Article 3 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce. 
The Working Group V advances and emphasizes a harmonized and uniform interpretation of 
the Model Law elucidated in the CLOUT cases.148 
7. Core Elements of the Model Law 
According to the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency, the Model Law provides non-binding solutions to the particularities 
of national legislations in various steps and sections of insolvency proceedings.149 
The Model Law basically handles five main aspects of cross-border insolvency cases, namely 
general provisions, access, recognition, relief (coordination) and cooperation. The major areas 
of guidelines focus on foreign representatives, recognition and consequences thereof, rights of 
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foreign creditors to initiate and to participate in insolvency proceedings in the enacting state, 
effective cooperation between domestic and foreign courts, aid for insolvency administrators 
from abroad, handling of parallel proceedings regarding the same debtor in the enacting and 
foreign state.150 
a. Access of Foreign Representatives and Creditors to Courts in the Enacting States 
Chapter II of the Model Law describes the access of foreign creditors and representatives to 
courts in this state151 and grants foreign representatives and creditors multiple rights.152  
Firstly, the foreign representatives are, in general, entitled to access to the courts in the enacting 
state.153 This principle addresses both inbound and outbound cases.154 The ‘access’ principle 
for foreign representatives is twofold. On the one hand, the foreign representative may directly 
apply for commencement of insolvency proceedings in a foreign state.155 However, no details 
are provided as to which court the proceeding can be commenced in.156 The reason for this rule 
is the fact that many national insolvency laws do not mention foreign representatives as an 
eligible person to apply for insolvency proceedings, hence, this article ensures that a foreign 
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151 The notion of the ‘State’ sees itself as an entity enacting the Model Law and, hence, those enacting entities may 
use another terms for this notion, see ibid., p. 34. 
152 Silverman, ‘Silverman 2000’; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (ed.), United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law 2014, p. 27 
153 Article 9 of the Model Law (Right of direct access): ‘A foreign representative is entitled to apply directly to a 
court in this State’. See for discussion in the UNCITRAL A/52/17, paras. 176-178 and in the Working Group V 
on Insolvency: A/CN.9/419, paras. 77-79, 172-173; A/CN.9/422, paras. 144-151; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, p.9; 
A/CN.9/433, paras. 50-58; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, p.10; A/CN.9/435, paras. 129-133; A/CN.9/436, para. 54; 
A/CN.9/442, para. 93; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.103, para. 93; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, para. 93; A/CN.9/776, para. 31. 
154 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (ed.), United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law 2014, p. 27 
155 Article 11 of the Model Law (Application by a foreign representative to commence a proceeding under [identify 
laws of the enacting State relating to insolvency]): ‘Foreign representative is entitled to apply to commence a 
proceeding under [identify laws of the enacting State relating to insolvency] if the conditions for commencing such 
a proceeding are otherwise met’. See for discussion in the UNCITRAL A/52/17, paras 183-187; in the Working 
Group V on Insolvency: A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.44, pp. 24-25; A/CN.9/422, paras. 170-177; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, 
p. 11; A/CN.9/433, paras. 71-75; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, p. 11; A/CN.9/435, paras. 137-146; in the Guide to 
Enactment: A/CN.9/436, para. 57; A/CN.9/442, paras. 97-99; in der Guide to Enactment and Interpretation: 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.107, para. 98; A/CN.9/763, para. 27; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, para. 98; A/CN.9/766, para. 31. 





representative is legitimated157 in standing158 to apply.159 This right is equally conferred to 
foreign representatives both for main and non-main proceedings. 160  If the conditions for 
commencing insolvency proceedings are given, the insolvency representative may initiate the 
insolvency proceeding in this state. This fact ensures efficient and non-bureaucratic progress. 
On the other hand, a foreign representative is also entitled to take part in proceedings which are 
already ongoing.161 On account of the facilitated access to a court in the enacting state, the 
Model Law also provides for simplified proof requirements for recognition. The foreign 
representative may thereby be entitled to avoid ineffective and unnecessary actions162 such as 
obtaining procedural standing for initiating an insolvency proceeding in the enacting state 
because this right will be automatically conferred to him. According to this rule, foreign 
representatives will have the right to intervene in a proceeding concerning an individual in the 
enacting state affecting the debtor or his assets. 
 
157 In Civil Law countries it is also called ‘procedural legitimation’ or ‘competence’, see ibid., p. 340. 
158 Used term in Common Law, see ibid., p. 340. 
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Secondly, the Model Law grants direct access to insolvency proceedings163 in the enacting state 
not only to foreign representatives but also to foreign creditors.164 First of all, it requires equal 
treatment for local creditors as part of local insolvency proceedings.165 However, the crucial 
challenge for foreign creditors is to obtain equal rights in the ranking of the priority claims.166 
The Model Law ensures that foreign creditors will, at the very least, be treated – with the 
exception of some special cases – equally to unsecured domestic creditors.167 
The direct access of foreign representatives and foreign creditors is qualified by the principle 
of limited jurisdiction.168 The limited jurisdiction is a ‘safe conduct’ rule and means that the 
court in the enacting state will not presume to have any jurisdiction over the assets of the debtor 
solely based on the application of the foreign representative. The jurisdiction of the court does 
not cover matters unrelated to insolvency proceedings.169 
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Insolvency: A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.44, p. 24; A/CN.9/422, paras. 160-166; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, pp. 10-11; 
A/CN.9/433, paras. 68-70; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, p. 10; A/CN.9/435, paras. 134-136; in the Guide to Enactment: 
A/CN.9/436, paras. 55-56; A/CN.9/442, paras. 94-96; in the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation: 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.107, para. 96; A/CN.9/763, para. 27; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, para. 96; A/CN.9/766, para. 31. 





Finally, the Model Law proposes to notify creditors of insolvency proceedings in the enacting 
state.170 The notification has two functions: first, to inform the creditors of the commencement 
of the insolvency proceedings and, second, to set the deadline for filing their claims. The 
notification rule provides, in some cases, for the individual notification of foreign creditors 
should they have no other opportunity to be informed per publication in the local gazette or via 
other means of communication not accessible abroad.171 
b. Recognition of Foreign Proceedings 
Chapter III of the Model Law deals with the recognition requirements for foreign proceedings. 
Primarily, it aims to minimize the lengthy timeframe of cross-border insolvency proceedings; 
in particular, it waives long-winded letters rogatory and other legal documents required for the 
recognition process according to international rules. Although the Model Law does not intend 
to recognize every foreign proceeding,172 this is a precondition to collaboration under the Model 
Law. 173  The recognition is realized under two possible outcomes. The first is automatic 
recognition which arises from the recognition process itself and, second, the recognition results 
upon court order.174 Recognition is granted according to the following steps: application for 
 
170 Article 14 of the Model Law (Notification to foreign creditors of a proceeding under [identify laws of the 
enacting State relating to insolvency]): ‘1. Whenever under [identify laws of the enacting State relating to 
insolvency] notification is to be given to the creditors in this State, such notification shall also be given to the 
known creditors that do not have addresses in this State. The court may order that appropriate steps be taken with 
a view to notify any creditor whose address is not yet known. 2. Such notification shall be made to the foreign 
creditors individually, unless the court considers that, under the circumstances, some other form of notification 
would be more appropriate. No letters rogatory or other, similar formality is required. 3. When a notification of 
commencement of a proceeding is to be given to foreign creditors, the notification shall: (a) Indicate a reasonable 
time period for filing claims and specify the place of their filing; (b) Indicate whether secured creditors need to 
file their secured claims; and (c) Contain any information required to be included in such a notification to creditors 
pursuant to the law of this State and the orders of the court’. See for discussion in UNCITRAL A/52/17, paras. 
193 – 198; in the Working Group V on Insolvency: A/CN.9/419, paras. 84-87; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.44, pp. 19–20; 
A/CN.9/422, paras. 188-191; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, pp. 11–12; A/CN.9/433, paras. 86-98; 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, pp. 12, 16, 20; A/CN.9/435, paras. 157-164; in the Guide to Enactment: A/CN.9/436, 
paras. 63-65, 84; A/CN.9/442, paras. 106-111; 120-121. 
171 ibid., p. 61 
172 ibid., 28, 64 
173 Silverman, ‘Silverman 2000’, 268 





recognition, 175  presumption 176  and decision 177  by the court or empowered authority on 
recognition, effects of recognition of a foreign main proceeding. 178  Despite the option of 
 
175 Article 15 of the Model Law (Application for recognition of a foreign proceeding): ‘1. A foreign representative 
may apply to the court for recognition of the foreign proceeding in which the foreign representative has been 
appointed. 2. An application for recognition shall be accompanied by: (a) A certified copy of the decision 
commencing the foreign proceeding and appointing the foreign representative; or (b) A certificate from the 
foreign court affirming the existence of the foreign proceeding and of the appointment of the foreign 
representative; or (c) In the absence of evidence referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b), any other evidence 
acceptable to the court of the existence of the foreign proceeding and of the appointment of the foreign 
representative. 3. An application for recognition shall also be accompanied by a statement identifying all foreign 
proceedings in respect of the debtor that are known to the foreign representative. 4. The court may require a 
translation of documents supplied in support of the application for recognition into an official language of this 
State.’; for discussion see in the UNCITRAL: A/52/17, paras. 199-209; in the Working Group V on Insolvency: 
A/CN.9/419, paras. 62-69 and 178-189; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.44, pp. 22–23; A/CN.9/422, paras. 76-93 and 152-
159; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, pp. 9–10; A/CN.9/433, paras. 59-67 and 99-104; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, pp. 13–
15. A/CN.9/435, paras. 165-173; in the Guide to Enactment: /CN.9/436, paras. 66-69. A/CN.9/442, paras. 112-
121; in the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation: A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.103/Add.1, para. 112; A/CN.9/742, para. 
40. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.107, paras. 119-120; A/CN.9/763, para. 28; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, paras. 112 and 119-
120; A/CN.9/766, para. 32. 
176 Article 16 of the Model Law (Presumptions concerning recognition): ‘1. If the decision or certificate referred 
to in paragraph 2 of article 15 indicates that the foreign proceeding is a proceeding within the meaning of 
subparagraph (a) of article 2 and that the foreign representative is a person or body within the meaning of 
subparagraph (d) of article 2, the court is entitled to so presume. 2. The court is entitled to presume that 
documents submitted in support of the application for recognition are authentic, whether or not they have 
been legalized. 3. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the debtor's registered office, or habitual residence in 
the case of an individual, is presumed to be the centre of the debtor's main interests.’; see for discussion in the 
UNCITRAL: A/52/17, paras. 204-206; in the Working Group V on Insolvency: A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, p. 13; 
A/CN.9/435, paras. 170-172; in the Guide to Enactment: A/CN.9/442, paras. 122-123; in the Guide to Enactment 
and Interpretation: A/68/17, para. 197; A/CN.9/715, paras. 14-15, 38-41 and 44-45; A/CN.9/738, paras. 22-30. 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.103, Add.1, paras. 122-122A and 123A-K. A/CN.9/742, paras. 41-56; 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.107, paras. 122B, 123A-123G, 123I and 123K-M. A/CN.9/763, paras. 29-48; 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, paras. 122-122B, 123A-D, F-G, I, K and M. A/CN.9/766, paras. 33-40. 
177 Article 17 of the Model Law (Decision to recognize foreign proceeding): ‘1. Subject to article 6, a foreign 
proceeding shall be recognized if: (a) The foreign proceeding is a proceeding within the meaning of subparagraph 
(a) of article 2; (b) The foreign representative applying for recognition is a person or body within the meaning 
of subparagraph (d) of article 2; (c) The application meets the requirements of paragraph 2 of article 15; and (d) 
The application has been submitted to the court referred to in article 4. 2. The foreign proceeding shall be 
recognized: (a) As a foreign main proceeding if it is taking place in the State where the debtor has the 
centre of its main interests; or (b) As a foreign non-main proceeding if the debtor has an establishment within 
the meaning of subparagraph (f) of article 2 in the foreign State. 3. An application for recognition of a foreign 
proceeding shall be decided upon at the earliest possible time. 4. The provisions of articles 15, 16, 17 and 18 
do not prevent modification or termination of recognition if it is shown that the grounds for granting it were 
fully or partially lacking or have ceased to exist.’; see for discussion in the UNCITRAL: A/52/17, paras. 113-
116, 201-202 and 207; in the Working Group V on Insolvency: A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, p. 15; in the Guide to 
Enactment: A/CN.9/442, paras. 133-134; in the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation: 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.103/Add.1, paras. 133-134; A/CN.9/742, para. 63; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.107, paras. 133-134; 
A/CN.9/763, para. 56; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, paras. 133-134; A/CN.9/766, para. 45. 
178 Article 20 of the Model Law (Effects of recognition of a foreign main proceeding): ‘1. Upon recognition of a 
foreign proceeding that is a foreign main proceeding: (a) Commencement or continuation of individual actions 
or individual proceedings concerning the debtor's assets, rights, obligations or liabilities is stayed; (b) Execution 
against the debtor's assets is stayed; and (c) The right to transfer, encumber or otherwise dispose of any assets 






presumption, the court in the enacting state retains its full discretion179 and is entitled to refuse 
the recognition if it is contrary to public policy,180 etc. 
In addition, Chapter III complements intervention by a foreign representative181 in insolvency 
proceedings and prescribes measures for the protection of creditors and other interested 
persons182 by avoiding detrimental acts183  in this regard. As a prerequisite to a successful 
 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are subject to [refer to any provisions of law of the enacting State 
relating to insolvency that apply to exceptions, limitations, modifications or termination in respect of the stay 
and suspension referred to in paragraph 1 of this article]. 3. Paragraph 1 (a) of this article does not affect 
the right to commence individual actions or proceedings to the extent necessary to preserve a claim against 
the debtor. 4. Paragraph 1 of this article does not affect the right to request the commencement of a proceeding 
under [identify laws of the enacting State relating to insolvency] or the right to file claims in such a proceeding.’; 
see for discussion in the UNCITRAL: A/52/17, paras. 47-60; in the Working Group V on Insolvency: A/CN.9/419, 
paras. 137-143. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.44, pp. 15-19. A/CN.9/422, paras. 94-110. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, pp. 13-16. 
A/CN.9/433, paras. 115-126. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, pp. 17–18. A/CN.9/435, paras. 24-48; in the Guide to 
Enactment: A/CN.9/436, paras. 76-79. A/CN.9/442, paras. 141-153; in the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation: 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.103/Add.1, paras. 141 and 143; A/CN.9/742, para. 64. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.107, paras. 144-
146, 149 and 151-153; A/CN.9/763, para. 58. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, paras. 141, 143, 144-146, 149, 151-153. 
A/CN.9/766, para. 47. 
179 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (ed.), United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law 2014, p. 65 
180 ibid., p. 73 
181 Article 24 of the Model Law (Intervention by a foreign representative in proceedings in this State): ‘Upon 
recognition of a foreign proceeding, the foreign representative may, provided the requirements of the law of this 
State are met, intervene in any proceedings in which the debtor is a party.’; see for discussions in the UNCITRAL: 
A/52/17, paras. 117-123; in the Working Group V on Insolvency: A/CN.9/422, paras. 148-149. A/CN.9/433, 
paras. 51 and 58. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, p. 21; A/CN.9/435, paras. 79-84; in the Guide to Enactment: 
A/CN.9/436, paras. 89-90; A/CN.9/442, paras. 168-172; in the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation: 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.107, para. 170; A/CN.9/763, para. 62; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, para. 170; A/CN.9/766, para. 
51. 
182 Article 22 of the Model Law (Protection of creditors and other interested persons): ‘1. In granting or denying 
relief under article 19 or 21, or in modifying or terminating relief under paragraph 3 of this article, the court 
must be satisfied that the interests of the creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor, are 
adequately protected. 2. The court may subject relief granted under article 19 or 21 to conditions it considers 
appropriate. 3. The court may, at the request of the foreign representative or a person affected by relief 
granted under article 19 or 21, or at its own motion, modify or terminate such relief.’; see for discussion in the 
UNCITRAL: A/52/17, paras. 82-93; in the Working Group V on Insolvency: A/CN.9/422, para. 113. 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, pp. 15–16. A/CN.9/433, paras. 140-146. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, p. 21. A/CN.9/435, 
paras. 72-78; in the Guide to Enactment: A/CN.9/436, para. 85. A/CN.9/442, paras. 161-164; in the Guide to 
Enactment and Interpretation: A/CN.9/715, para. 39. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.107, paras. 162-164. A/CN.9/763, para. 
60. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, paras. 162-164. A/CN.9/766, para. 49. 
183 Article 23 of the Model Law (Actions to avoid acts detrimental to creditors): ‘1. Upon recognition of a foreign 
proceeding, the foreign representative has standing to initiate [refer to the types of actions to avoid or otherwise 
render ineffective acts detrimental to creditors that are available in this State to a person or body administering 
a reorganization or liquidation]. 2. When the foreign proceeding is a foreign non-main proceeding, the court must 
be satisfied that the action relates to assets that, under the law of this State, should be administered in the 
foreign non-main proceeding.’; see for discussion in the UNCITRAL: A/52/17, paras. 210-216; in the Working 






recognition process, the Model Law introduces the requirement of subsequent information.184 
The result upon application for185 recognition of186 the foreign proceeding is to grant relief. This 
 
Guide to Enactment: A/CN.9/436, paras. 86-88; A/CN.9/442, paras. 165-167; in the Guide to Enactment and 
Interpretation: A/68/17, para. 197. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.103/Add.1, paras. 165-167. A/CN.9/742, para. 66. 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.107, paras. 165-167; A/CN.9/763, para. 61; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, paras. 165-167; 
A/CN.9/766, para. 50. 
184 Article 18 of the Model Law (Subsequent information): ‘From the time of filing the application for recognition 
of the foreign proceeding, the foreign representative shall inform the court promptly of: (a) Any substantial 
change in the status of the recognized foreign proceeding or the status of the foreign representative's 
appointment; and (b) Any other foreign proceeding regarding the same debtor that becomes known to the foreign 
representative.’; see for discussion in the UNCITRAL: A/52/17, paras. 113-116, 201-202 and 207; in the Working 
Group V on Insolvency: A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, p. 15; in the Guide to Enactment: A/CN.9/442, paras. 133-134; 
in the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation: A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.103/Add.1, paras. 133-134; A/CN.9/742, para. 
63; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.107, paras. 133-134; A/CN.9/763, para. 56. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, paras. 133-134; 
A/CN.9/766, para. 45. 
185  Article 19 of the Model Law (Relief that may be granted upon application for recognition of a foreign 
proceeding): ‘1. From the time of filing an application for recognition until the application is decided upon, 
the court may, at the request of the foreign representative, where relief is urgently needed to protect the assets 
of the debtor or the interests of the creditors, grant relief of a provisional nature, including: (a) Staying execution 
against the debtor's assets; (b) Entrusting the administration or realization of all or part of the debtor's assets 
located in this State to the foreign representative or another person designated by the court, in order to protect 
and preserve the value of assets that, by their nature or because of other circumstances, are perishable, susceptible 
to devaluation or otherwise in jeopardy; (c) Any relief mentioned in paragraph 1 (c), (d) and (g) of article 21. 
2. [Insert provisions (or refer to provisions in force in the enacting State) relating to notice.] 3. Unless 
extended under paragraph 1 (f) of article 21, the relief granted under this article terminates when the application 
for recognition is decided upon. 4. The court may refuse to grant relief under this article if such relief would 
interfere with the administration of a foreign main proceeding.’; see for discussion in the UNCITRAL: A/52/17, 
paras. 34-46. A/CN.9/419, paras. 174-177; in the Working Group V on Insolvency: A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.44, pp. 
22–23; A/CN.9/422, paras. 116, 119 and 122-123; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, pp. 9, 13-16; A/CN.9/433, paras. 110-
114. A/CN.9/435, paras. 17-23; in the Guide to Enactment: A/CN.9/436, paras. 71-75; A/CN.9/442, paras. 135-
140; in the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation: A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.107, paras. 135-140; A/CN.9/763, para. 
57; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, pp. 16–17; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, paras. 135-140; A/CN.9/766, para. 46. 
186 Article 21 of the Model Law (Relief that may be granted upon recognition of main proceeding): ‘1. Upon 
recognition of a foreign proceeding, whether main or non-main, where necessary to protect the assets of the debtor 
or the interests of the creditors, the court may, at the request of the foreign representative, grant any appropriate 
relief, including: (a) Staying the commencement or continuation of individual actions or individual proceedings 
concerning the debtor's assets, rights, obligations or liabilities, to the extent they have not been stayed under 
paragraph 1 (a) of article 20; (b) Staying execution against the debtor's assets to the extent it has not been stayed 
under paragraph 1 (b) of article 20; (c) Suspending the right to transfer, encumber or otherwise dispose of 
any assets of the debtor to the extent this right has not been suspended under paragraph 1 (c) of article 20; d) 
Providing for the examination of witnesses, the taking of evidence or the delivery of information concerning 
the debtor's assets, affairs, rights, obligations or liabilities; (e) Entrusting the administration or realization of all 
or part of the debtor's assets located in this State to the foreign representative or another person designated by the 
court; (f) Extending relief granted under paragraph 1 of article 19; (g) Granting any additional relief that may 
be available to [insert the title of a person or body administering a reorganization or liquidation under the law 
of the enacting State] under the laws of this State. 2. Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, whether main 
or non-main, the court may, at the request of the foreign representative, entrust the distribution of all or part of 
the debtor's assets located in this State to the foreign representative or another person designated by the court, 
provided that the court is satisfied that the interests of creditors in this State are adequately protected. 3. In 
granting relief under this article to a representative of a foreign non-main proceeding, the court must be 
satisfied that the relief relates to assets that, under the law of this State, should be administered in the foreign 






relief may also be afforded on an interim basis.187 A decision on recognition of the foreign 
proceeding facilitates the evidence requirements and helps to avoid the arduous and toilsome 
legalization process of action.188 The court may grant interim relief pending the assessment on 
recognition. As part of the recognition procedure, the court examines whether the foreign 
insolvency pertains to the main or non-main process, whereas the recognition procedure itself 
is a matter for the respective national law and is not subject to provisions under the Model 
Law.189 
The Model Law proposes three recognition options: firstly, by submitting a ‘certified copy of 
the decision commencing the foreign proceeding and appointing the foreign representative’, 
secondly, by submitting a certificate from the foreign court confirming the existence of the 
foreign proceeding and the proper determination of the foreign representative, and lastly, the 
Model Law provides for a so-called ‘catch-all’ method.190 Despite a lack of evidence presented 
under the framework of the two previous options, in this last case the court is entitled to approve 
the recognition if it is persuaded of the legality of the foreign insolvency proceeding or foreign 
representative.191 
c. Relief 
The Model Law offers two kinds of relief. In the first case, it may offer interim relief. This is a 
relief which is filed upon application for recognition of the foreign insolvency proceedings. 
Interim relief is itself twofold: the first subcategory is ‘collective provisional’ relief.192 This 
kind of relief grants a general stay of proceedings, in particular, a stay of execution against the 
 
UNCITRAL: A/52/17, paras. 61-73; in the Working Group V on Insolvency: A/CN.9/419, paras. 148-152 and 
154-166; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.44, pp. 15-19. A/CN.9/422, paras. 111-113. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, pp. 13-16. 
A/CN.9/433, paras. 127-134 and 138-139; A/CN.9/435, paras. 49-61; in the Guide to Enactment: A/CN.9/436, 
paras. 80-83; A/CN.9/442, p a r a s . 154-159; in the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation: 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.103/Add.1, para. 154; A/CN.9/742, para. 65; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, pp. 18–19; 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.107, paras. 154, 156, 158 and 160; A/CN.9/763, para. 59. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112, paras. 
154, 156, 158 and 160; A/CN.9/766, para. 48. 
187 ibid., p. 29 
188 Clift, ‘Clift 2004’, 322 
189 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (ed.), United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law 2014, p. 30 
190 Article 15 (2) (c) of the Model Law 
191 Silverman, ‘Silverman 2000’, 268 





debtor's assets, it hinders commencements or the continuation of current individual actions 
against the debtor's assets, and finally, it prohibits the debtor from disposing of his assets.193 
The second kind of interim relief is known as ‘individual’ relief, which does not hinder the 
creditors in pursuing their individual actions against the debtor.194 Rather the effects of this 
interim relief are to grant a stay of individual actions against debtor or a stay of the enforcement 
of actions against the debtor's assets. The debtor is also automatically suspended from 
transferring, encumbering, or otherwise disposing of his assets to third parties until proper 
actions are initiated for liquidation or reorganization proceedings.195 
The Model Law offers a relief upon recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and 
describes what types of relief may be granted. Though the list in Article 21(1) is not exhaustive, 
it does however enumerate essential case groups. Furthermore the court, in its discretion and 
upon the request of a foreign representative, may order a ‘turnover’ of assets.196 For this kind 
of relief, protection of the local creditors must be ensured.197 Finally, the Model Law narrows198 
the power of foreign non-main proceedings. In short, it means that the relief granted to a foreign 
representative in a foreign non-main proceeding may only affect the assets subject to this 
proceeding.199 
Additionally, the Model Law intends to protect the creditors from any detrimental acts by the 
debtor.200 
d. Cooperation between Foreign Representatives and Courts of Enacting States 
Nowadays, there is a small set of jurisdictions which can enforce an effective legal mechanism 
for a purposeful recognition of foreign insolvency judgements. Chapter IV of the Model Law 
addresses judicial cross-border cooperation between courts and administrators. It is the most 
 
193 ibid., p. 357 
194 ibid., p. 357 
195 Clift, ‘Clift 2004’, 324 
196 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (ed.), United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law 2014, p. 88 
197 Berends, ‘Berends 1998’, 370 
198 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (ed.), United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law 2014, p. 88 
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important chapter of the Model Law.201 The principle of cooperation is based on the principle 
of comity. It is also applicable for countries based on the principle of reciprocity through 
bilateral, multilateral or other agreements. 202  Commensurately, the national courts and 
representatives are required to liaise with foreign ones.203 In essence, the Model Law authorizes 
two types of cooperation, which are applicable independent of the status of the recognition 
process: first, cooperation between foreign representatives and foreign courts and, second, 
cooperation between foreign representatives.204 
Article 27 of the Model Law presents a catalogue of techniques simplifying this 
cooperation.205The courts are completely free to apply them.206 This catalogue is, however, not 
exhaustive.207 
In common law countries, local courts ‘just pick up the phone’ to contact foreign courts, while 
civil law courts are more resistant to this kind of communication.208 Based on the tradition of 
common law, the Model Law promotes direct communication209 to expedite proceedings and 
achieve more satisfactory results.210 
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The principle of cooperation211 is independent from other issues such as the application for 
recognition, the process of recognition and any other actions connected to cross-border 
insolvency.212 
Finally, the Model Law also gives an extensive, but not exhaustive list of cooperative actions.213 
The legislator, in its discretion, may add other ways and means of cooperation in cross-border 
cases.214 
e. Management of Multiple Proceedings 
The final chapter, Chapter V of the Model Law, focuses on the matter of coordinating 
multiple215, parallel local and foreign insolvency proceedings216 which can be configured in 
numerous ways.217 The coordination of concurrent proceedings is another milestone of the 
Model Law. In cases where the foreign main proceeding has been recognized, it does not 
 
211 Article 25 of the Model Law (Cooperation and direct communication between a court of this State and foreign 
courts or foreign representatives): ‘1. In matters referred to in article 1, the court shall cooperate to the maximum 
extent possible with foreign courts or foreign representatives, either directly or through a [insert the title of a 
person or body administering a reorganization or liquidation under the law of the enacting State].2. The court is 
entitled to communicate directly with, or to request information or assistance directly from, foreign courts or 
foreign representatives.’ 
212 Berends, ‘Berends 1998’, 380 
213 Article 27 of the Model Law (Forms of cooperation): ‘Cooperation referred to in articles 25 and 26 may be 
implemented by any appropriate means, including: (a) Appointment of a person or body to act at the direction of 
the court; (b) Communication of information by any means considered appropriate by the court; (c) Coordination 
of the administration and supervision of the debtor's assets and affairs; (d) Approval or implementation by courts 
of agreements concerning the coordination of proceedings; (e) Coordination of concurrent proceedings regarding 
the same debtor; (f) [the enacting State may wish to list additional forms or examples of cooperation].’; see for 
discussion in the UNCITRAL: A/52/17, paras. 124-129; in the Working Group V on Insolvency: /CN.9/419, 
paras. 75-76, 80-83 and 118-133; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.44, pp. 21-22; A/CN.9/422, paras. 129-143; 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.46, p. 17; A/CN.9/433, paras. 164-172; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.48, p. 22; A/CN.9/435, paras. 
85-94; in the Guide to Enactment: A/CN.9/436, paras. 91-95; A/CN.9/442, paras. 173-183; in the Guide to 
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prevent local representatives initiating a local proceeding in the enacting state.218 However, 
there are two restrictions in this regard. Firstly, the extension is only permissible ‘to the extent 
necessary to implement cooperation and coordination under Articles 25, 26 and 27’ and, 
secondly, the relevant foreign assets should be subject to the foreign insolvency proceeding.219 
It does not terminate any proceedings which have already commenced, and it has no impact on 
the recognition process.220 The Model Law gives instructions on how the courts must deal with 
proceedings relating to a debtor who is subject both to foreign and local insolvency proceeding 
at the same time.221 
The coordination of concurrent proceedings allows for adjustment of relief222 as it requires 
consistency between the relief granted to a recognized proceeding and the relief granted to the 
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local one, independent of the time of recognition.223 Nevertheless, the Model Law implicates 
the precedence of local proceedings over foreign proceedings, though avoids hierarchy so as 
not to hinder the cooperative process.224 
Where the debtor is subject to more than one foreign insolvency proceeding in more than one 
state and with more than one foreign representative initiating relief or recognition in the 
enacting state, 225  the Model Law rules that courts in the proceedings should act in 
coordination.226 If there is a foreign main proceeding, the Model Law gives priority to this 
proceeding and in cases where there is more than one non-main foreign proceeding, there is no 
specification as to any priority between these proceedings.227 
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The Model Law introduces further vehicles for facilitating the proceeding. These tools may 
either employ presumption rules228 or the hotchpot rule229 so as to avoid double or multiple 
payments to creditors in concurrent proceedings.230 
Jurisdictions and, in particular, the courts of enacting states are not restricted in commencing 
or continuing insolvency proceedings.231 According to the Model Law, the opening of the local 
proceeding is not a prerequisite for the recognition of the foreign insolvency proceeding.232 
Furthermore, the Model Law allows the courts to recognize a foreign main proceeding in order 
to obtain proof of the debtor's insolvency and then to commence local proceedings.233 This 
option is suitable for insolvency systems requiring factual proof of debtor's inability to pay, e.g. 
for jurisdictions where the debtor's insolvency is a requirement for the commencement of 
insolvency proceedings.234 This presumption applies solely to foreign main proceedings. The 
court of the enacting state does not, however, remain bound by presumption.235 
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The Model Law aims to promote coordination, consistency, and cooperation of relief so as to 
effect the best outcome for both proceedings.236 
In short, there are three possible cases: first, the court grants relief to the foreign representative 
in cases where the foreign main proceeding has already been recognized and the foreign 
representative demands the recognition of the foreign non-main proceeding with the 
consequence that relief for foreign non-main proceedings should be identical in content to relief 
for the foreign main proceeding; the second is the reverse case. In this case, the court will revise 
the relief for the foreign non-main proceeding in order to bring it in line with the foreign main 
proceeding. Finally, there could be a case where the court must deal with two foreign non-main 
proceedings and in this case the court will modify the relief for the first non-main proceeding 
to facilitate both.237 
The Model Law suggests the rule of payment in concurrent proceedings or the so-called 
‘hotchpot rule’. Here the creditor may only receive a percentage of his claim once, even if there 
are parallel proceedings in several countries against the same debtor. This rule does not affect 
the ranking of the claims,238 but avoids situations where a creditor might obtain more favourable 
treatment by receiving payment for the same claim more than once due to parallel proceedings 
in different jurisdictions.239 The calculation method is not provided for in the Model Law. The 
EU Convention describes a method of calculation.240 The Model Law merely ensures equal 
treatment of creditors of the same rank and does not affect the secured debtors with rights in 
rem or with other securities.241 
f. Limits of the Model Law 
The Model Law holds two limits242 for the implementing states. The first limit is that any 
international treaties or other agreements to which the enacting state is legally bound may 
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contradict the regulations of the Model Law.243 The second limit is the public order rule. The 
court or other authority is entitled to refuse any actions as part of cross-border insolvency 
proceedings if, in its opinion, this action is manifestly contrary to the public order of this state.244 
In addition, the Model Law allows for the exclusion of groups of special debtors, e.g. insolvency 
of banks or insurance companies. The reason is that this limitation is a necessity for special 
actions or to protect special groups of creditors, or consumers.245 
Some of the existing national insolvency systems outside of East Asia adopted the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Cross-Border Insolvency. One excellent example of such an adoption has been shown 
in the way in which Japan adopted the Model Law. 
Summarizing this Chapter III, we overviewed the basic theories and global approaches on cross-
border insolvency law. On the one hand, there are five substantial concepts which are 
territorialism, universalism, modified universalism, cooperative territorialism and, 
contractualism. On the other hand, the global approach of the UNCTRAL Model Law following 
the MIICA and Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat, undertakes a practical step in approaching 
those complex insolvencies challenges of multinational companies. Despite the substantial 
solution approaches of the Model Law, there are also various restrictions and limits. The Model 
Law standard meets some obstacles such as contradicting local laws or a public order rule.  
In addition to global solutions, there are also several regional attempts that have been 
undertaken by regional political organisation and bodies. Some essential solution approaches 
addressing regional cross-border insolvency issues we will analyse in Chapter IV.  
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CHAPTER IV – REGIONAL APPROACHES 
Though the UNCITRAL Model Law is a global intention seeking to accompany cross-border 
insolvencies all over the world, and has also been approved and recommended for 
implementation by notable international organizations such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, in effect it remains a kind of first step in international cooperation. 
The next stage of international cooperation is at a regional level. Such cooperation has a 
different nature from that of the UNCITRAL Model Law because it sets out a common 
framework of rules for a certain number of countries. The European Insolvency Regulation No. 
1346/2000 and the Recast Regulation No. 2015/848 and the Transnational Insolvency Project 
of the American Law Institute are worthy of mention in this regard and will be expounded in 
the following sections. 
Section I – Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 from 29th May 2000246 and 
Recast Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
from 20th May 2015 on Insolvency Proceedings 
Although amended by the Recast Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 20th May 2015 on insolvency proceedings, 247  the European Insolvency 
Regulation 1346/2000 on cross-border insolvency from 29th May 2000 was the first regional 
legal document dealing with cross-border insolvency cases within the EU and was directly 
binding for Member States. In recent times, it has undergone some amendments248 which will 
hereafter be discussed. The European Union was the first international body to introduce an 
initial functioning regional insolvency regulation which was binding for all the Member States 
of the European Union with the exception of Denmark.  
1. Scope of Application 
The EU Regulation is applicable to collective insolvency proceedings involving the partial or 
entire forfeiture of the debtor's assets and the nomination of an administrator249 in the Member 
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States of the European Union. It is not applicable in insolvency proceedings related to other 
debtors such as credit and investment institutions or insurance companies.250 
2. Competent Forum and Applicable Laws 
The EIR provides two types of jurisdictions. On the one hand, the court of the Member State 
within the territory in which the centre of a debtor's main interest is situated has the authority 
to open insolvency proceedings. According to the EIR, this refers to the location of the 
registered office of the debtor, if a company or legal person, unless upon proof to the contrary.251 
This is the so-called main proceeding.252 On the other hand, the courts of another Member State 
are only entitled to open an insolvency proceeding against that debtor under the condition that 
he has assets within the territory of that other Member State. The effects of such proceedings 
will be restricted to the debtor's assets situated in this Member State253 – this is a so-called 
secondary proceeding and is compulsory as part of winding-up proceedings.254  Secondary 
proceedings255 are also proceedings which have been opened subsequently to the proceeding 
under Article 3(1) of the EIR.256 The secondary proceeding may only be opened prior to the 
main proceeding if either the insolvency proceeding under Article 3(1) cannot be opened257 or 
if the commencement is requested by a creditor who has his domicile, habitual residence or 
registered office in the Member State where the secondary proceeding will take place.258 
The applicable law is the law of the State in which proceedings are opened.259 The EIR requires 
that the law of this State determines the opening conditions for those proceedings and provides 
a non-exhaustive catalogue of regulatory issues.260 
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3. Recognition of Proceedings 
The recognition principle of the EIR states that any judgement opening insolvency proceedings 
awarded by a court in one of the Member States pursuant to Article 3 of the EIR shall be 
recognized in all other Member States as of the moment when this judgement becomes effective 
in the Member State where the proceeding has been opened. Furthermore, it should also be 
applicable where insolvency proceedings against the debtor are not feasible in another Member 
State.261 
The judgement has the same effect as it has in the awarding Member State under the insolvency 
law of this State.262 No further formal steps are required. 
4. Secondary Insolvency Proceedings 
The opening of the main insolvency proceeding enables the opening of the secondary 
insolvency proceeding. This action does not require an examination of the debtor's insolvency 
conditions in the Member State of the secondary insolvency proceeding; however, the effects 
in the latter Member State shall be restricted to the assets of the debtor situated in said Member 
State. 263  The law of the Member State where the secondary proceeding takes place is 
applicable.264 The opening of territorial proceedings can be initiated either by the liquidator of 
the main proceeding265 or by any other competent private or public person, authorized to request 
the opening of insolvency proceedings under the law of the Member State where the secondary 
proceeding is to be commenced.266 
‘Synthetic secondary proceedings’ are a practical invention from the restructuring of 
companies. Instead of the formal opening of insolvency proceedings, local creditors are 
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promised that they will be treated in the same way as if a ‘real secondary proceeding’ had been 
initiated.267 
5. Information of Creditors and Lodgement of Claims 
Chapter IV of the Regulation deals with lodging claims and providing information to creditors. 
It allows any creditor with habitual residence, domicile, or registered office in a Member State 
other than the State in which proceedings are opened to lodge insolvency claims in writing.268 
After the opening of insolvency proceedings all creditors should be individually notified by the 
court or liquidator of all documents269 required for the lodging of the claim.270 
6. The EU Commission Amendments from 12th December 2012  
The European Commission was charged with presenting a report on the application of the 
Regulation to the European Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee 
and – should such a situation arise – accompanied this with a proposal to amend the EIR no 
later than 1 June 2012, and every five years thereafter.271 On 12th December 2012, the European 
Commission published its report with a proposal for the amendment of the EIR.272 The Proposal 
amended Regulation 1346/2000.273  
The main elements for proposed actions pertained to the scope of its application, jurisdiction, 
secondary proceedings, and publicity of proceedings, lodging claims, and groups of companies.  
a. Scope of the Insolvency Regulation  
The EIR should apply in hybrid pre-insolvency and debt discharge proceedings. It was also 
proposed to allow proceedings which do not require the nomination of a liquidator but rather 
put the debtor's assets and affairs under the control of the court. This option is favourable for 
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situations where the debtor remains in possession of his assets and for personal insolvency 
proceedings.274 
Furthermore, it would allow pre-insolvency proceedings where the debtor could reach some 
out-of-court agreements with his creditors. Pre-insolvency proceedings entailing a moratorium 
which prevents creditors from filing for insolvency proceedings already exist in many national 
jurisdictions among the Member States without public notice. These proceedings give the 
debtor an extended timeframe in order to cope with difficulties he faces. The problem of such 
proceedings is achieving recognition in Member States that do not have corresponding 
proceedings in their insolvency systems, in particular, because of non-public scheme.275 
b. Jurisdiction for Opening Insolvency Proceedings 
The European Commission came to the conclusion that the centre of main interest (COMI) 
concept is difficult to put into practice.276 While national courts are inclined to take rather a 
wider interpretation, the ECJ follows a somewhat narrower definition of COMI.277 Nonetheless, 
the proposal maintains this concept with supplementary documents. Notably, it makes clear 
conditions for presuming the COMI278 in accordance with the ECJ's definition in the ‘Interedil’ 
Case: ‘For the purposes of determining a debtor company's main centre of interests, the second 
sentence of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1346/2000 must be interpreted as follows: 1) a debtor 
company's main centre of interests must be determined by attaching greater importance to the 
place of the company's central administration, as may be established by objective factors which 
are ascertainable by third parties. Where the bodies responsible for the management and 
supervision of a company are in the same place as its registered office and the management 
decisions of the company are taken, in a manner that is ascertainable by third parties, in that 
place, the presumption in that provision cannot be rebutted. Where a company's central 
administration is not in the same place as its registered office, the presence of company assets 
and the existence of contracts for the financial exploitation of those assets in a Member State 
other than that in which the registered office is situated cannot be regarded as sufficient factors 
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to rebut the presumption unless a comprehensive assessment of all the relevant factors makes 
it possible to establish, in a manner that is ascertainable by third parties, that the company's 
actual centre of management and supervision and of the management of its interests is located 
in that other Member State; 2) where a debtor company's registered office is transferred before 
a request to open insolvency proceedings is lodged, the company's centre of main activities is 
presumed to be the place of its new registered office’. 
Prior to the opening of insolvency proceedings, every national forum should prove its 
competence ex officio, thereby ensuring an auspicious procedural framework. In addition, it 
guarantees that all foreign creditors are able to file insolvency cases, and finally, it minimizes 
cases of forum shopping.279 
The court opening insolvency proceedings should also be eligible to take direct action, such as 
the avoidance actions.280 This rule is derived from the ECJ decision in the ‘DekoMarty’ Case 
C-330/07. 
c. Synthetic Insolvency Proceedings 
Essentially, there are several core issues requiring amendment. Firstly, the competent court of 
the Member State where the debtor has an establishment should be able to reject the opening of 
the secondary insolvency proceeding on request of the liquidator if it is unlikely to protect the 
debtor, and if the latter together with creditors is likely to avoid the winding-up of the debtor's 
company through an agreement. Secondly, the Commission proposes a so-called ‘synthetic 
secondary proceeding’. In accordance with this proceeding, the competent court should 
continue on from the commencement of the proceeding if the local creditors are given a promise 
by the liquidator to be treated in the same way as if the secondary proceeding had been opened 
with a guarantee of all the relevant creditors' rights. This is a situation where the liquidator 
promises creditors that they will be treated as if the secondary insolvency proceeding had been 
opened in their home country, i.e. with regard to all their rights as creditors. This practice was 
introduced by English courts in the cross-border cases Collins&Aikman, MG Rover and Nortel 
Networks, but is not possible under the laws of many other Member States.281 
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By extending the communication and cooperation between the principal and secondary 
proceedings, the European Commission aims to strengthen the coordination between the 
competent courts.282 
Thirdly, the court should be obliged to hear the liquidator of the main proceeding ex officio.283 
Finally, the Proposal abolishes the requirements for winding-up proceedings in cases of 
territorial proceedings and improves the cooperation between main and secondary proceedings 
owing to the broadening of cooperation requirements between the courts.284 
d. Lodging of Claims and Publicity of Insolvency Proceedings 
The Proposal obliges Member States to publish judgements in transnational insolvency issues 
via an electronic register accessible to the public, ensuring interconnection between national 
insolvency registers. It also imposes a unified system for the lodging of claims.285 Such a 
register should be accessible for free to the public via the interconnection of the national central, 
commercial and company registers over the European e-justice portal. The Proposal also 
defines compulsory common criteria for publication. This should only be applicable to 
corporate, but not to consumer insolvency.286 
The Proposal changes the lodging of claims, leading to some advantages for small creditors by 
introducing standard European forms for notifying the creditor and for lodging claims. These 
forms are available in all official languages. The deadline for claim lodging is specified as 45 
days. In addition, the assistance of a liquidator will be no longer necessary. These amendments 
aim to reduce the creditors' costs because no costs for translation or the lodging of claims by 
the administrator will be incurred. The Proposal maintains the existing entity-by-entity 
approach. However, it ensures an effective communication between liquidators and the court 
of the group members. It should function in the same ways as proposed in the main and 
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territorial proceedings through better information exchange between the courts and 
liquidators.287 
7. Overview of the Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25th May 2015 on Insolvency Proceedings (Recast) 
In his paper, Pedro Hose F. Bernado underlines that existing rules are unlikely to guarantee 
value maximization of the company and predictability of various interest groups of companies 
because of a high degree of discretion afforded to the national insolvency authority in the 
determination of the COMI on the one hand, and, due to the fact that such regimes are unable 
to resolve the issues of multinational corporate groups on the other hand.288 Those are some of 
the challenges that have been addressed in course of amendment of the EIR 1346/2000. After 
the amendment proposal from 12th December 2012, the European Commission adopted a report 
on the application of Council Regulation No. 1346/2000. The recast EIR No. 2015/848 entered 
in force on 26th June 2017 and replaced the EIR No. 1346/2000. It applies to all cross-border 
insolvency proceedings that are opened after this day. 
Similar as the EIR 1346/2000, the EIR 2015/848 does not rule substantive law. It focuses further 
on proceeding. Substantive insolvency law remains the matter of the Member States. The 
application of the COMI principle remains the essential regulatory area of the recast EIR. Also, 
it rules cases falling under the conflict of laws and contains rules on recognition of decision in 
proceedings or their impacts on running proceedings. 
The main novelties of the EIR 2015/848 are: first, applicability to interim proceedings, second, 
it rules international insolvency proceedings of groups of companies, and thirds, impediment 
of forum shopping. 
In accordance with Article 1 of the EIR 2015/848, it shall apply to interim proceedings. This 
novelty extends the temporal scope of the law. The interim proceedings serve just to prevent 
opening of the insolvency proceedings. It shall be conducted and recognized in all Member 
States. 
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In the EIR 2015/848 a new frame for international insolvencies for groups of companies has 
been set. Articles 56-60 of the EIR 2015/848 rule cooperation and communication between 
different participants on insolvency proceedings involving two or more members of a group of 
companies. Those rules concern cooperation and communication between insolvency 
practitioners, between courts, and between insolvency practitioners and courts. The new law 
gives some additional powers to insolvency practitioners in proceedings concerning members 
of a group of companies. In addition, the EIR 2015/848 introduces a possibility of coordination 
of insolvency proceedings of a group of companies if the national substantive insolvency laws 
of Member States provide for this. Coordination of the group insolvency proceedings is ruled 
by Articles 61-77 EIR 2015/848. 
Finally, the EIR 2015/848 impedes the forum shopping in Europe and reforms the COMI 
concept. The more detailed evolution of the COMI concept will be discussed in the following 
paragraph. 
8. Centre of Main Interests (COMI) – Key Concept for Cross-Border Insolvency Cases 
The concept of COMI is at the heart of the EIR. The COMI is crucial for definition of the scope 
for debtor's competent jurisdiction. As already briefly introduced in this section, the concept of 
COMI has experienced some fundamental changes. Originally, the main insolvency 
proceedings might be opened in the Member State where the debtor had his centre of main 
interest (COMI). This is the place in a Member State where a debtor conducts his economic life 
and is closely connected to this legal system and insolvency proceedings correspondingly. In 
its Article 3 (2) the EIR rules that ‘where the centre of a debtor's main interests is situated within 
the territory of a Member State, the courts of another Member State shall have jurisdiction to 
open insolvency proceedings against that debtor only if he possesses an establishment within 
the territory of that other Member State. The effects of those proceedings shall be restricted to 
the assets of the debtor situated in the territory of the latter Member State’. This rule is a 
rebuttable presumption. The COMI was supposed to be defined for each subsidiary, even if a 
parent company controls the debtor's business choices. This has been affirmed by European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in Eurofood Case (C-341/04).289 On 2nd May 2006, the ECJ passed a 
sentence in the case of Eurofood. This decision stems from a referral made by the Supreme 
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Court of Ireland. Initially, the Supreme Court submitted five questions related to the European 
law on the European Insolvency Regulation to the ECJ. The Court had to decide concerning a 
pending appeal in the Dublin High Court as to the opening of main insolvency proceedings in 
the case of Eurofood IFSC Ltd. At the same time there was a parallel proceeding regarding an 
Italian company, Parmalat SpA, in Parma. Both the Court in Ireland and the Court in Italy each 
decided it was competent because, according to the opinions of the courts in both countries, the 
centre of main interests of Eurofood was in Ireland and Italy respectively. The European Court 
of Justice defined legal criteria for definition of COMI by defining two sets of factors. First, is 
the location where the debtor regularly administers his own interests and country where it is 
incorporated. Second, is the location of the parent company which is able to control policy 
decisions of the subsidiary. Those criteria must be both objective and ascertainable by the third 
parties.290 The EIR 1346/2000 appoints hence in its Recital 13 that the centre of main interests 
should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration of [its] interests 
on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties. 
As many cases show, there were challenges in definition of a relevant time for determination 
of COMI, e.g. Interedil Case (C-396/09)291 the Court ruled that the COMI will be determined 
on the day of filing of insolvency proceedings.292 The cases became more complex when a 
debtor moved his business in another Member States (of his choice) just before filing the 
insolvency proceedings. This phenomenon received the name forum shopping. This problem 
attempts to be resolved by the new regulation EIR 2015/848. It seeks to prevent the abusive 
COMI by forum shopping of a debtor company. The law introduces a temporal restriction in 
Article 3 of the EIR 2015/848: ‘…the presumption that the centre of main interests is at the 
place of the registered office …’ of the debtor unless ‘… the debtor has relocated its registered 
office or principal place of business to another Member State within 3-month period prior to 
the request for opening insolvency proceedings…’.293 Whether this regulation will have any 
effects remains to be seen. However, the new Regulation now expressly specifies that the 
competent courts must ex officio control their international jurisdiction. Furthermore, the 
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opening jurisdiction can now be challenged by creditors. Apart from the cross-border 
insolvency cases, how Europe deals with cross-border cases will be shown in a short overview 
in following paragraph.  
9. Other Related Regulations in Regional Cross-Border Context in Europe 
The European Union is strongly progressive in sense of cross-border rules which have resulted 
in essential European regulations. Thus, the Regulation (EG) No. 1215/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12th December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgement in civil and commercial matters (recast)294 addresses a jurisdictional 
regime. This law regulates the international jurisdiction of the courts vis-à-vis a defendant 
domiciled in an EU Member State as well as the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters from other Member States.  
EFTA295 Member States adopted likewise a treaty, the Lugano Convention in 2007, which 
replaced the old Lugano Convention of 1988. The Lugano Convention corresponds with the 
Brussels I and allows other Member States of EFTA to accede. 
The European Union also seeks strengthening of prevention of insolvency. Hence, the European 
Parliament and the Council adopted Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 20th June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on discharge of debt 
and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning 
restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt, and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 
(Directive on Restructuring and Insolvency). 
Finally, due to significant business impact of the USA in the world economy, the Chapter 11 
(Bankruptcy Code) and its points of convergence with the European insolvency law shall be 
mentioned because Chapter 11 has been influential in the development of pre-insolvency 
proceedings globally. One of the formal convergences is the possibility the reorganization 
bankruptcy. Thus, the EIR enables the ‘debtor-in-possession’ role in its Art. 2 (3). ‘Debtor in 
possession’ means a debtor in respect of which insolvency proceedings have been opened which 
do not necessarily involve the appointment of an insolvency practitioner or the complete 
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transfer of the rights and duties to administer the debtor's assets to an insolvency practitioner 
and where, therefore, the debtor remains totally or at least partially in control of its assets and 
affairs. Like this, Section 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code places the debtor in possession in the 
position of a fiduciary. This fiduciary shall have the rights and powers of trustee of the Chapter 
11. The rationale of the both rules is the value of the business is greater if it is sold or 
reorganized rather than allocate assets between the creditors. The debtor-in-possession rule 
allows troubled companies to continue running of the business.  
Section II – Transitional Insolvency Project and other Projects of the American 
Law Institute  
1. General Overview 
The American Law Institute296 dedicated five years to drafting the work, the Transnational 
Insolvency Project.297 Similar to the EU Regulation on Cross-Border Insolvency, the TIP is an 
American reaction to the increase in transnational insolvency issues in North America and 
Mexico and was designed by ALI.298 According to ALI, a regional insolvency solution is the 
most appropriate means for coping with highly technical and complex questions of insolvency 
law in a transnational context. It was designated to apply within the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA)299 in order to develop policies and methods for dealing with defaults of 
multinational companies which have their centre of main interests in one country, and debtor's 
assets, business, and creditors in more than one of the NAFTA countries.300 In contrast to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, the ALI Principles were already 
predestined for specific countries already listed.301 The ALI Principles are a cooperation project 
meaning that in effect there are no changes in national law – as in the case of harmonization – 
but are a system addressing national insolvency laws so that they function together more 
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effectively in cases of multinational defaults.302 Unlike the EU Regulations on insolvency law, 
the principles of the ALI are just recommendations and do not have legal force.  
The intention of the TIP was to guarantee market symmetry303 and to supply legal professionals 
such as lawyers and judges with some guidelines on cooperation in specific cross-border 
cases.304 Professor Westbrook underlines that if the market becomes global, bankruptcy law 
must become global too.305 
2. Core Elements of the Transnational Insolvency Project  
The ALI Principles are divided into three parts: general principles, procedural principles, and 
legal recommendations.  
a. General Principles 
General Principles specify seven core matters in the project: cooperation, recognition, 
moratorium, information, sharing of value, national treatment, and adjustment for 
distributions.306 It explains the principles of cooperation, which are, at the same time, the 
method and goal. Furthermore, it includes near automatic recognition of court decisions among 
the NAFTA countries as well as an extensive and fast-acting moratorium.307 It provides for the 
free sharing of information as well as the adjustment of distribution values or the so-called 
‘hotchpot rule’.308 
b. Procedural Principles 
The Procedural Principles specify and address key points, mechanisms, and rules of cooperation 
with illustrative examples.309 The Procedural Principles consist of three typical bankruptcy 
stages: initiation, administration, and resolution. However, it does not address all aspects of an 
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insolvency case, but rather focuses on specifics cross-border cases – such as achieving 
consensus between at least two of the three NAFTA Member States with some advice provided 
in ‘Country Notes’.310 
During the first insolvency stage, the TIP mainly addresses questions of access to the court and 
information exchange311 between the courts and parties, recognition, as well as cases of fraud 
and stay of proceedings.312 Information disclosure is one of the main concerns of the TIP.313 
The administration of the proceedings provides for the transfer of assets across the border, 
financing the debtor and the distribution of assets to creditors in another jurisdiction. Finally, it 
addresses the handling of corporate groups.314 
c. Legislative Recommendations 
The Legislative Part aims for the Model Law's reception in NAFTA countries. However, it 
recommends that they adopt aspects of the TIP which a particular country cannot implement 
under existing domestic legislation. It is also suggesting that countries can expand the scope of 
the ALI Principles despite national legal limitations.315  Some recommendations have been 
adopted by NAFTA jurisdictions such as Guidelines applicable to Court-to-Court 
communications. In some cases, between USA and Canada reference is made to Court-to-Court 
Guidelines which is a part of the TIP, e.g. Case In re PSINet: Between Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice, Toronto, Case No. 01-CL-4155, (10th July 2001), and United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the Southern District of New York, Case No. 01-13213 (10th July 2001). The reference 
is made in particular to Principe 1 of the ALI NAFTA Principles (Cooperation) stating ‘Courts 
and administrators should cooperate in a transnational bankruptcy proceeding with the goal of 
maximizing the value of the debtor's worldwide assets and furthering the just administration of 
the proceeding’. 
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d. Global Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases316 
Following the TIP, the ALI drafted in 2012 a global work on transnational insolvency ‘Global 
Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases’317 and ‘Global Guidelines for 
Court-to-Court Communications in International Insolvency Cases’.318 These Global Principles 
and Global Guidelines are supposed to be used in both civil law and common law jurisdictions. 
Section III – Court-to-Court Communication Project on Cross-Border Cases 
The Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communication in Cross-Border Insolvency 
Cases is a product of the American Insolvency Institute in cooperation with the International 
Insolvency Institute during the course and as a part of the Transnational Insolvency Project. 
The Guidelines were adopted on 16th May 2000 by the American Law Institute, and on 10th 
June 2001 by the International Insolvency Institute. The significance of the court-to-court 
communication can be seen on variety of related projects in recent years. Some examples on it 
are given below. 
In 2007, the European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-Border 
Insolvency were issued by INSOL Europe. 
In 2012, the American Insolvency Institute launched a new project, Global Principles for 
Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases. These Guidelines include 37 Global Principles 
for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases and 18 Global Guidelines for Court-to Court 
Communication in International Insolvency Cases. Both parts are non-binding suggestions for 
both civil and common-law jurisdictions.  
In 2014, the EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles (‘EU JudgeCo 
Principles’) and EU Cross-Border Insolvency Communication Guidelines (‘EU JudgeCo 
Guidelines’) were issued by the European Commission and International Insolvency Institute. 
Those Principles are bases on the Global Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency 
Cases. Both texts are not binding and have a recommendation character. The aim to reduce the 
duration of proceedings by improvement of case management by courts and facilitate 
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communication between courts in cross-border cases. They shall help judges to understand the 
contemporary challenges of international insolvency law and to work more productive.319  
This development was continued by the Judicial Insolvency Network Guidelines for 
Communication and Cooperation between Courts in Cross-Border Insolvency (‘JIN Guidelines’) in 
Spring 2017. 
In 2012, the International Insolvency Institute issued Guidelines for Coordination of 
Multinational Enterprise Group Insolvencies. This incentive addresses insolvency cases in 
group of companies where different types of creditors with different types of claims and 
priorities operate under different insolvency rules. It is assumed that the maximization of the 
debtors value can be more likely reached if its insolvency is administered from a central 
location.320 The handling of groups of companies in cross-border insolvency become relevant 
with globalization of businesses and gain more and more attention of further legislative bodies 
and institutions. 
Section IV – Handling of the Groups of Companies in Insolvency 
Despite advanced preparation of international and regional legal texts, there were no binding 
rules governing insolvency in groups of companies for decades. The European Commission in 
its amendment picked up on the topic of insolvencies in corporate groups in cases of 
transnational insolvency because the EIR from 2000 did not address this question.321 
Consequently, the European Commission undertook legislating steps – as describes in Section 
I – to regulate future insolvencies in corporate groups which resulted in the recast of the EIR 
1346/2000. The insolvency of groups of companies is now ruled in EIR 2015/848. 
Also UNCITRAL examined this topic in its Legislative Guide. Part three of the Legislative 
Guide 322  issued by the UNCITRAL Working Group V addresses insolvency in company 
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groups. While the provisions of the Model Law address the individual debtor having his assets 
in different states, part three attempts to take a further step and raises the question of how to 
address the situation of multiple debtors possessing assets in different states, that is to say, in 
the case of corporate groups. The limits of the Model Law are realized in cases of groups. 
Alongside national groups, it handles international issues with a focus on cooperation between 
the courts and those involving representatives and promotes the application of insolvency 
agreements. According to UNCITRAL, an ‘enterprise group’ is ‘two or more enterprises that 
are interconnected by control or major ownership’.323 Thus, the Model Law defines the group 
under two key elements – control and ownership. On both accounts, the Legislative Guide 
provides some defining factors. While the aspect of ownership is discernible on the basis of the 
percentage possession of parts of the company, the aspect of control remains more elusive. The 
Legislative Guide gives some factors to aid in its definition, such as different group members' 
capacity to govern the composition of the board of directors or governing bodies; the ability of 
different group members to appoint or remove all or a majority of the directors or governing 
body members; the ability of different group members to influence the greater part of the votes 
cast at board or governing body meetings; and finally, the capacity to influence a majority of 
the votes which are likely to be cast at a general meeting of group members, regardless of 
whether that ability arises through options or shares.324 
Part Three of the Legislative Guide also promotes the implementation of rules on insolvency 
agreements to facilitate international proceedings.325 
According to Professor Eidenmüller, there are three options for insolvency in groups of 
companies. First, there is a so-called ‘substantive consolidation’, which is a feature of US 
insolvency law. In special cases, a competent court would permit the pooling of assets and 
liabilities within a group of companies.326 The second option is a ‘procedural consolidation’ 
meaning that ‘one insolvency court would be designated in charge of multiple (main) 
insolvency proceedings over the assets of multiple debtors within the group setting’. To be more 
specific, this means that the whole proceedings are also controlled by one court and one 
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administrator and, thus, remain in one set of hands. Handling in this way has also been discussed 
by the German Ministry of Justice for national insolvency of company groups. Finally, there is 
the model of ‘procedural coordination’ – a situation in which ‘the communication and 
cooperation regime in place with respect to main and secondary insolvency proceedings 
regarding the same debtor would be extended to multiple main proceedings over the assets of 
distinct debtor companies that are all part of a corporate group’.327 According to Professor 
Eidenmüller, the adoption of so-called ‘substantive consolidation’ practices by US insolvency 
courts would spell adverse economic consequences because it would complicate the pricing of 
credit risks.328 
The UNICTRAL Working Group V and International Insolvency Institute329 also designed 
proposals to this end. UNCITRAL issued a Draft Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency 
in its fifty-fourth session (A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.161). 330  In this draft UNCITRAL addresses 
questions regarded the definition of the group COMI and how the group COMI shall be defined.  
According to Professor Paulus, regionalism is the future trend in cross-border insolvency 
regulations and will enjoy widespread recognition and usage because of its close historical, 
economic, and legal background.331 
Section V – Other International Projects on Handling of Cross-Border Insolvency 
Cases 
In addition to the special projects that explicitly regulate cross-border insolvencies, there are 
also cross-border elements in other projects, such as The World Bank Principles for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor / Debtor Regimes and UNCITRAL Model Law on Recognition and 
Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgements. 
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1. The World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor / Debtor Regimes332 
In its work the World Bank addresses some aspects of cross-border insolvency issues. Thus, in 
accordance with The World Bank, in cross-border transactions transparency and corporate 
governance are needed in all stages of investments. 333  The World Bank emphasizes the 
importance of a framework for cross-border insolvencies with recognition of foreign 
proceedings if an insolvency system seeks to be effective334 Further, the key factors to effective 
handling of cross-border matters are given, which are: a clear and speedy process for obtaining 
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings, relief to be granted upon recognition of foreign 
insolvency proceedings, foreign insolvency representatives to have access to courts and other 
relevant authorities, courts and insolvency representatives to cooperate in international 
insolvency proceedings, and non-discrimination between foreign and domestic creditors.335 In 
Addition, the World Bank gives some recommendations of handling international insolvency 
groups involving following points: access to court and recognition of proceedings, cooperation 
involving courts, cooperation involving insolvency representatives, appointment of the 
insolvency representative, cross-border insolvency agreements.336 
2. UNCITRAL Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related 
Judgements337 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related 
Judgements has been adopted in July 2018 and seeks to address special situations and where 
enforcement and recognition of foreign insolvency judgements is necessary. It provides national 
states which enacted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with a procedure 
for recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgements. The UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgements is complementary to 
the Articles 7 and 21 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. 
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Like for the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, the UNCITRAL provides 
national states enacting UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with a Guide to 
Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-
Related Judgements. The Guide is directed to the governments and legislators undertaking 
legislative revisions. Also judges and other legal practitioners can use this Guide.338 
In this Chapter IV, the focus had been put deeply into the structures of regional approaches on 
cross-border insolvency such as the European Insolvency Regulation, Transnational Insolvency 
Project and further regional solutions on how an appropriate communication and cooperation 
might look like. Success of cross-border insolvency proceedings depends consequently not only 
on a good legal basis. Rather, this requires a clear implementation strategy. Having reviewed 
the most significant projects on cross-border insolvency on international and regional levels, 
we will now move on to the Asian region in order to look at its political and legal structures 
and, into its historical background. Shaped by its cultural diversity and plurality of legal 
systems, Asia made the first step forward to regionalism by building the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). There have also been some projects on insolvency solutions 
proposed by international institutions which faced similar obstacles as other projects on cross-
border insolvency law. In Chapter V, we will look at national insolvency regimes in the 
countries of ASEAN and impact of tradition. 
  
 





CHAPTER V – NATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAWS AND TRADITIONAL IMPACT IN 
ASEAN AND ASEAN+3  
As already mentioned in Chapter I, the need for cross-border insolvency regulation in ASEAN 
is crucial. The AP&P case shows how the emergence of cross-border insolvency regulations 
was complicated by insolvency in company groups. This Chapter V shall analyse the 
development of, and challenges presented by insolvency laws in Asia to find out to what extent 
the Member States of ASEAN are prepared to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency, or whether regionalism is a better option. 
Thus, having analysed existing projects attempting to handle cross-border insolvency cases 
worldwide on international and regional levels, we will now take a deeper look into cross-
border insolvency situation in Asia. For this purpose, Section I introduces the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which is a multistate organization comparable to some 
extent with the European Union. Section II presents an overview of the initiatives on cross-
border insolvency law in Southeast Asian region. Section III gives an overview of the national 
insolvency regimes in the countries of ASEAN and shows their rudimentary relation to 
regulation of cross-border insolvency issues. Sections IV and V investigate historical and 
traditional impacts on the insolvency laws in countries of ASEAN. 
Section I – Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Numerous policy makers ask the question of to regulate cross-border insolvency in Southeast 
Asia so as to escape new APP-type cases in the future. The Indonesian government has 
expressed the need to establish a common cross-border insolvency framework within ASEAN. 
To ascertain whether ASEAN is a suitable basis for such a framework, we shall first take a short 
overview of ASEAN's structure. 
1. Foundation and Structure 
ASEAN339 is a union of Southeast Asian States in the Pacific consisting of ten Member States 
with its head office in Jakarta, Indonesia. It was founded on 8th August 1967. Its first members 
were Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Singapore which have since then been followed by 
Cambodia, Brunei, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Laos. 
 





The aims of ASEAN are manifold: firstly, the acceleration of social progress, economic growth 
and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and 
partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of 
Southeast Asian Nations; secondly, the promotion of regional peace and stability through 
respecting justice and the rule of law within countries of the region and adhering to the 
principles of the United Nations Charter; thirdly, the promotion of active collaboration and 
mutual assistance on matters of common interest in social, economic, scientific, technical, 
cultural and administrative issues; fourthly, the extension of assistance to one another in the 
form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and 
administrative spheres; fifthly, the promotion of more effective collaboration for greater 
utilization of agriculture and industries, the expansion of trade, including examining the 
problems of international commodity trading, improving transportation and communication 
facilities and raising the living standards of their peoples; the promotion of Southeast Asian 
studies; and finally, the maintenance of closer and more beneficial cooperation with existing 
international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, thereby exploring all 
avenues for even closer cooperation among one another.340 
With regard to the aims of ASEAN countries to expand trade and provide each other with 
mutual assistance in economic issues, as well as to follow the principle of effective regional 
cooperation, it seems that a regional regulation on cross-border insolvency within ASEAN 
would fall neatly within these aims and principles of intraregional collaboration.  
2. Regionalism in ASEAN as a Trend 
The ASEAN Economic Community is a growth-oriented institution with the target of 
establishing an economic framework within ASEAN by 2020. Its goals include building: a 
single market and production base; a highly competitive economic region; a region with 
equitable economic development; and a region fully integrated into the global economy. A 
single market and production base comprise five elements: the free flow of goods, services, 
capital, labour, and investment. The implementation of this target should be affected by the 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement.341 From historical point of view there are the legal norms 
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building the foundation of ASEAN countries: regional autonomy and collective self-reliance, 
peaceful settlement of disputes, principle of non-interference, bilateral defence cooperation.342 
A highly competitive economic region necessitates the development of fair competition rules, 
IPR,343 infrastructure, taxation, e-commerce and consumer protection. An equitable economic 
development requires a small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) development.344 
In addition to the ASEAN Economic Community, there is also a series of regional agreements 
between the Member States of ASEAN. Finally, integration into the global economy entails 
such common ground as a coherent approach toward external economic relations.345 In the last 
years, European Union developed its vision from the norm exporter to a partner of the ASEAN. 
The European Union recognizes now the ASEAN as one of the most ambitious regional 
organizations with respect to its geographical context, own objectives and dynamics. This 
recognition hast been also documented it the EU Policy Report 2017 and came out in increasing 
of the funding resources.346 
3. The ‘ASEAN Way’ 
The ‘ASEAN Way’ is called the functioning method of the ASEAN347 and is an unambiguous 
set of rules governing regional cooperation.348 The Member States developed their own distinct 
approach to lead internal relations within the organization, consisting of several interchangeable 
factors.349 The ‘ASEAN Way’ follows a minimalistic organizational order,350 which is reflected 
 
342 I. C. Xuechen, ‘The Role of ASEAN's Identities in Reshaping the ASEAN-EU Relationship’, ISEAS @ 50 
Special Issue: Young Scholars in Southeast Asian Studies, Contemporary Southeast Asia (2018), 222–46, at 228 
343 Intellectual Property Rights 
344 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ed.), Association of Southeast Asian Nations 2008, p. 24 
345 ibid., p. 25 
346 Xuechen, ‘The Role of ASEAN's Identities in Reshaping the ASEAN-EU Relationship’, 234 et seqq. 
347 V. Reyes and C. Tan, Political Values in Asia, the ASEAN Political Security Community, and Confucius' 
Philosophy, PLS Working Papers Series, No. 11 (2014), p. 4 
348 A. Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian 
Regionalism’, International Organization 58 (2004), 239–75, at 249 
349 R. Stubbs, ‘ASEAN: Building Regional Cooperation’ in M. Beeson (ed.), Contemporary Southeast Asia: 
Regional Dynamics, National Differences, 2nd (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 216–33, at p. 222 





in its avoidance of strict institutionalization and priority of informal methods.351 This method 
is described by three features: first, the respect of sovereignty, second, consultation on a 
regional level, and, third, the primacy of political pragmatism.352 ASEAN Members respect 
their autonomy and confer on each other the capacity to resist external influences.353 There is 
no specific procedure for consultations and achieving results, however, it is certainly a process-
oriented rather than product-oriented approach, with its focus in decision-making processes 
firmly on consensus, tracing back to Javanese village society.354 The decisions are, on the one 
hand, non-hostile, but on the other hand there is a pronounced difference between consensus 
and unanimity. While the former does not necessitate total assent in decision-making, the latter 
requires absolute agreement of all the parties.355 The Member States agree not to interfere, even 
in the case of force being used, due to the regional history of inter-state conflicts before the 
foundation of ASEAN.356 
Section II – Initiatives on Cross-Border Insolvency in Southeast Asia 
On a regional level, there are some valuable initiatives making headway with regard to cross-
border insolvency in Southeast Asia. In essence, these initiatives try to raise awareness of the 
problem by explaining its detrimental effects in the past and by apprising different players of 
its global impact in the future. Not all movements directly address cross-border insolvency 
issues, but dealing with economic and financial issues, they touch on transnational insolvency 
cases in an indirect manner. A variety of projects and incentives to solve the problems 
implicated by a cross-border bankruptcy have been launched worldwide. Researchers, national 
governments, international organizations, and other interested players have attempted to 
formulate methods and rules for cross-border insolvency law in Asia. In general, these efforts 
fall into one of two categories. The first is those which directly address the question of cross-
border insolvency law in Asia. The second is those that are not directly involved in, but still 
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have an indirect influence on the development process of this issue. In both cases, the lion's 
share of the work has been accomplished by institutional contributions. 
1. Asian Development Bank Proposals  
The pioneer in addressing of the questions relating to cross-border insolvency law in Asia is the 
Asian Development Bank.357 In 1997, it conducted a comparative review of eleven Asian 
countries358 over the course of two years.359 Inspired by the G22 Working Group's360 report on 
the ‘International Financial Crisis’, 361  in October 1998 it started the regional technical 
assistance 362  project RETA 5795 dealing with insolvency law reforms in Asia. 363  On 3rd 
December 1999, the RETA Screening Committee approved the technical assistance under the 
title ‘Developing Cross-Border Insolvency Solutions’. The scope of the RETA 5795 was 
twofold: in Part A it addresses cross-border insolvency and international cooperation, and in 
Part B it focuses on international good practices in informal restructuring processes. In October 
1999, the ADB completed the project ‘Insolvency Law Reform in the Asian and Pacific Region: 
Report of the Office of the General Council on TA-5795 Reg.: Insolvency Law Reforms’ and 
reported it in 2000 in the ‘Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank’. The ADB 
developed a project of ‘ADB Standards’ for insolvency law application in every country.364 In 
2000, the ADB presented 16 principles of insolvency law.365 
2. Principles of Insolvency Law of Asian Development Bank 
The ADB proposed 16 Good Practice Standards for the RETA economies: 
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• Clear distinction between personal and corporate insolvency law;366 
• Same insolvency regime for private and state-owned corporations;367 
• ‘One law, two systems principles’ should reflect both reorganization and liquidation;368 
• Debtor should have easy access to proceedings by simple proof of insolvency criteria; the 
creditor must produce proof for evidence of insolvency;369 
• In cases of reorganization, the power of management should continue under the supervision 
of the insolvency administrator, while in the case of liquidation those powers must be 
terminated and entirely transferred to the insolvency administrator;370 an automatic stay or 
suspension of actions should be immediate for liquidation proceedings and as wide as 
possible for reorganizations;371 in the case of reorganization, the law should afford higher 
priority to ongoing and urgent business needs;372 
• Efficient time frames for reorganization and liquidation proceedings;373 
• The liquidation proceeding should be a public responsibility and creditors should be 
informed of the relevant stages of proceedings;374 
• The law should provide information related to the debtor as well as a careful and full 
evaluation;375 
• Involvement of creditors in rescue and liquidation process; provision of voting rights and 
minimum requirements for the approval of the rescue plan; provision of voting for classes 
of creditors; protection against any manipulation of the voting system; effect of voting 
should be binding for all creditors of that class;376 
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• The law should not prescribe criteria for commercial decisions; the analysis of the plan 
should be undertaken by an independent adviser; the plan should be nominally provided by 
a debtor in the space of a certain time frame;377 
• In rescue processes, the court should have a general supervisory role and is entitled to set 
aside the rescue plan should it contradict the interests of creditors;378 
• The execution of the plan should be supervised and controlled by an independent person; 
the plan should be amenable if this is in the interest of creditors; liquidation should be 
possible if the plan is not executed;379 
• Equal treatment of all creditors and limitation of priority claims;380 
• Avoidance of transactions should be possible;381 
• Civil sanctions against fraudulent conduct of management;382 
• Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law.383 
RETA 5975 was another incentive to promote regional cooperation and the development of 
insolvency law which targeted the interaction between insolvency law regimes and secured 
transactions. The major outcomes and findings of the project, TA-5975 Reg, appeared in the 
Report ‘Promotion Regional Cooperation in the Development of Insolvency Law Reforms’ in 
2008 because of RETA 5795 and 5975 work. 
3. Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform 
The Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform (FAIR) is an initiative on cross-border insolvency in 
Asia created by the OECD, ADB, and APEC. Its general purpose is to unify common forces 
and expedite work on cross-border insolvency challenges in the Asian region. 
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FAIR primarily aims to maintain sustained communication among Asian countries, to support 
the implementation of laws in local economies, to determine the concerns and interests of 
national legislators as well as to assist them in country-specific questions of legal transplants. 
Section III – National Insolvency Laws and Lack of Common Rules on Cross-
Border Insolvency 
Only few Member States of ASEAN have cross-border insolvency legislation, e.g. Singapore, 
Myanmar. This shows the high importance of a framework for cross-border insolvency in 
ASEAN. In the following sections the national insolvency proceedings of the ASEAN Member 
States and ASEAN+3 Member States will be presented; however, this will be limited to a short 
historical overview of insolvency law legislation, a brief description of the insolvency law as is 
and an exploration of cross-border insolvency cases by jurisdiction.384 
1. Brunei  
The Insolvency law of Brunei is incorporated in the Bankruptcy Act of 1984 ed. Chapter 67 
Bankruptcy (B.L.R.O.385 1/1984).386 This law has been amended several times, most recently 
on 4th December 2012 by the Bankruptcy Act (Amendment) Order (communication No S 78/12) 
and Insolvency Order S1/2016. After the last revision, the Bankruptcy Act contains the 
following parts: Part I: Preliminary, Part II: Voluntary Arrangements, Part III: Receivers and 
Managers, Part IV: Judicial Management, Part V: Winding up of Companies Registered under 
Company Act, Part VI: Winding up of Unregistered Companies, Part VII: General Provisions 
Applying to Companies Which are Insolvent or in Liquidation, Part VIII: Insolvency 
Practitioner and Their Qualifications, Part IX: Public Administration, Part X: Executive 
Manager, Part XI: General, Part XII: Repeals and Consequential Amendments, Part XIII: 
Transitional and Savings Provisions.387 No rules on cross-border issues are provided.  
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At first, the Cambodian Insolvency law was ruled insufficient by the Law on Banking and 
Financial Institutions dated 1999, only containing provisions for liquidation proceedings.388 
Later the National Assembly adopted the Law on Bankruptcy (Royal Kram 
NS/RKM/1207/031) on 16th October 2007 at its 7th session in 3rd legislature period with the 
approval of formal and legal concepts granted by Senate on 21st November 2007 in its 7th 
plenary session of the 2nd legislature period. It was finally promulgated on 7th December 
2007.389  
The Law on Bankruptcy contains 14 Chapters and 84 Articles governing the following 
insolvency issues: Chapter 1: General Provisions, Chapter 2: Opening of Insolvency 
Proceedings (Subject, Grounds and Petition), Chapter 3: Decision on the Petition to Open 
Insolvency Proceedings, Chapter 4: Effect of the Opening of Insolvency Proceedings (General 
Effects, Safeguarding and Enhancement of the Estate, Claims), Chapter 5: Plan of Compromise 
(Planning, Approval of a Plan of Compromise), Chapter 6: The Opening Creditor's Meeting, 
Chapter 7: Liquidation and Satisfaction of Claims, Chapter 8: Termination of Insolvency 
Proceedings Following Liquidation, Chapter 9: Resumption of Insolvency Proceedings Which 
Were Terminated After Liquidation, Chapter 10: Administrator and Creditors (the 
Administrator, Creditors), Chapter 11: Service of Documents, Chapter 12: Penalties, Chapter 
13: Transitional Provisions, Chapter 14: Final Provisions. 
More insolvency provisions are stipulated in the draft of the Cambodia Civil Code.390 Hence, 
no express rules on cross-border insolvency issues are provided. The Law on Bankruptcy only 
allows for the opening of proceedings against persons or legal entities whose assets are situated 
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within the territory of the Kingdom of Cambodia and then only if those persons have their office 
registered within the territory of the Kingdom of Cambodia.391 
3. Indonesia 
Indonesian insolvency and bankruptcy law traces back to a Special Bankruptcy Ordinance 
introduced by the former government of the Netherlands – Indies for European and Chinese.392 
This Ordinance was known as Regulation of Bankruptcy (Faillissements Verordening), 
published in the State Gazette in 1905, No. 217 and in the State Gazette in 1917, No. 12.393 The 
bankruptcy law came into force on its promulgation in 1906 and is embedded into the 
Commercial Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Dagang) of Indonesia.394 Indonesians were 
not subject to this law until the country's independence in 1945.395 Law No. 4 of 1998 and Law 
No. 37 of 2004 rule bankruptcy & suspension of dept payment obligation.  
Filing for bankruptcy in Indonesia always remains an issue which disturbs the preservation of 
harmony, as in Indonesia people tend to avoid conflict.396 Therefore, creditors attempt to avoid 
direct confrontation with the debtor regarding his financial hardship because it may amount to 
humiliation. As Professor Tomasic notes, Indonesia is a ‘non-confrontation society’. Hence, 
bankruptcy regulations were simply used, explaining the backwardness of insolvency 
proceedings.397 
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As such, it would be difficult to explore international insolvency cases. Indonesian Insolvency 
Law does not recognize foreign judgements in cross-border cases. Consequently, the assets of 
the debtor situated within the Indonesian state may not be affected by foreign judgements or 
enforced. However, this topic is increasingly being discussed with the aim of reform, at the very 
least on the back of the AP&P case. 
4. Laos 
Lao insolvency law is quite rudimentary. It consists, among other things, of the Law on 
Bankruptcy, the Secured Transaction Law, and the Business Law together with the Decree 
concerting its implementation. The major law is the Law on Bankruptcy of Enterprises No. 
06/1994.  
The National Assembly adopted this law by Resolution No. 010 on 14th October 1994 of the 5th 
ordinary session of the 3rd legislature period. The Law was promulgated by Decree No. 52/PO 
on 5th November 1994 in accordance with Chapter 5, Article 53, point 1 of the Constitution of 
the Lao People's Democratic Republic which provides for the promulgation of the Constitution 
and of laws which are adopted by the National Assembly.398 
The Law on Bankruptcy is applicable to all companies incorporated under Lao law; both debtor 
and creditor are entitled to file the insolvency petition. However, the Law on Bankruptcy does 
not have any provisions dealing with personal bankruptcy. The Law on Bankruptcy of 
Enterprises contains 9 Chapters and 56 Articles governing the following insolvency issues: 
Chapter 1: General Provisions, Chapter 2: Filing of a Petition or Request for Bankruptcy, 
Chapter 3: Consideration of a Petition or a Request for Bankruptcy, Chapter 4: Rehabilitation 
of the Enterprise, Chapter 5: omitted, Chapter 6: Bankruptcy and Liquidation, Chapter 7: 
Measures Against Violators, Chapter 8: Termination of Liquidation and Consequences of 
Bankruptcy, Chapter 9: Final Provisions. This law has been replaced by the new Enterprise 
Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Law (№ 75/NA, 26th December 2019).399 
Issues concerning cross-border insolvency have not yet arisen in Laos, and current legislation 
does not reveal to any degree how this might work in practice. It remains unclear whether or 
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not Lao courts would recognize foreign judgements on insolvency. In the case of Secured 
Transactions Law issues, Lao law provides for the recognition of foreign judgements in Laos 
under the precondition that the Lao court recognizes them; however, this is with uncertain 
enforceability.400 
5. Malaysia 
Malaysian Insolvency Law is incorporated in the Malaysian Companies Act of 1965 and has 
been in force since 15th April 1966.401 The English Company Act of 1948 and Australian 
Uniform Companies Act of 1961 both served as a model for this law. The Act 360 Bankruptcy 
Act was first enacted in 1967 and then revised in 1988. The Bankruptcy Rules date back to 
1969. 
The Act 360 Bankruptcy Act consists of the following parts: Part 1: Proceedings from Act of 
Bankruptcy to Discharge, Part 2: Disqualification and Disabilities of Bankrupt, Part 3: 
Administration of Property, Part 4: Director General of Insolvency, Part 5: Constitution, 
Procedure and Powers of Court, Part 6: Small Bankruptcies, Part 7: Fraudulent Debtor and 
Creditors, Part 8: Supplemental Provisions. 
There are two issues relevant to cross-border insolvency in Malaysia: first, the policy of 
recognizing foreign insolvency judgements and court orders as well as proceedings related to 
assistance of courts in foreign jurisdictions. Malaysian insolvency law does not differentiate 
between local and foreign creditors in insolvency proceedings, and as such, there are no special 
rules for the admission of foreign claims. In cases of the satisfaction of a foreign claim, approval 
by a Controller of Exchange Control in accordance with the Exchange Act 1953 is required.402 
One particularity of assisting foreign courts is the rule in Section 104 of the Act 360 Bankruptcy 
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Act 1967.403 This rule was initially introduced for the auxiliary assistance of the High Court of 
Singapore. Other designated countries within Section 104 are the ASEAN Member States.404 
6. Myanmar 
The first insolvency law enacted in Myanmar was the Yangon Insolvency Act of 1908 and was 
followed by the Myanmar Insolvency Act of 1920405 and subsequently the Burma Insolvency 
rules in 1924.406 The major elements of Myanmar insolvency law are described in Courts 
Manual published by the Supreme Court of Myanmar. Companies and corporations registered 
under Myanmar law are exempt from insolvency proceedings; however, the company can be 
wound up under the Myanmar Company Act 1913.407 Myanmar is one of the few Member 
States of ASEAN how adopted UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency on 14th 
February 2020. The government replaced the Yangon Insolvency Act of 1909 and Myanmar 
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Insolvency Act of 1920. The draft of the new law took place in cooperation with Asian 
Development Bank (ADR). 
7. The Philippines 
As with many other ASEAN countries after the Asian financial crisis, the Philippines also 
became aware of the need to revise its laws on insolvency. The history of Philippine insolvency 
law began in 1906 with the Insolvency Act, which, however, did not contain any provisions on 
corporate insolvency. In 1980 this was amended in Presidential Decree No. 902 – A (PD 902 - 
A) which confers jurisdiction on Philippines courts to hear cases of corporate rehabilitation and 
suspension of payments without provisions of enforcement by creditors.408 In 1999, in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the debtor-friendly 409  SEC Rules of Procedure on 
Corporate Recovery were issued.410 The SEC Rules came into effect formally on 15th January 
2000.411 The SEC Rules served for a certain period of time as a mechanism for resolving 
corporate insolvency cases, but in principle, there are two valid insolvency laws, first, the 
Presidential Decree No. 902 – A and, second, the SEC Rules. 
The new draft law ‘Corporate Recovery and Insolvency Act’ unifying all bankruptcy and 
insolvency rules has been proposed by the House of Representatives. This law refers, among 
other things, to cross-border insolvency cases and accounts for the following particularities: 
being subject to reciprocity and foreign representatives participating in foreign insolvency 
proceedings being entitled to apply for a judicial order to hinder Philippines creditors to act 
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unilaterally in relation to assets based in the Philippines.412 UNCITRAL Model Law has been 
adopted in the Philippines in 2010. 
8. Singapore 
Singaporean insolvency law is ruled by the Company Act of Singapore 1967, which is in turn 
based on the Malaysian Company Act of 1965. Being an archetype of Australian and English 
law, it has often been revised in the direction of the Singaporean system. The Company 
Amendment Act of 1987 introduced the system of judicial management. The New Bankruptcy 
Act of 1995 implemented more business-oriented measures, e.g. differentiation of bankruptcy 
causes such as misfortune or business failure.413 
However, it is worth noting that Singapore did make some efforts to introduce cross-border 
insolvency law based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. In 2010, the Singaporean government 
began a review of its national insolvency law. The Review Committee of the Ministry of Law 
also spoke out about cross-border insolvency law referencing UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency and gave a set of recommendations for implementation. However, it 
did not expressly recommend implementing the principle of reciprocity because it had 
unsurmountable doubt in the effectiveness of such a provision until Singapore amended its 
Company Act in 2017. Also, the UNCITRAL Model Law was finally adopted in 2017.  
9. Thailand 
Insolvency Law in Thailand is incorporated into commercial law with a focus on rehabilitation 
by restructuring.414 It already had its insolvency regime in Ayutthaya period dating back to 843. 
The first Bankruptcy Act was enacted in 1909, the second in 1911, the third in 1981 with 
amendments made in 1927 and 1933. 415 Before the Asian financial crisis occurred, there was 
only the fourth Bankruptcy Act, which dated back to 1940 and applied in cases of liquidation 
proceedings; however, after the onset of the crisis, the number of bankruptcies in Thailand 
almost doubled. In April 1998, the government made the first amendment to Bankruptcy Act 
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and introduced rehabilitation/reorganization416 proceedings. Later, in 1999 bankruptcy law was 
also modified to make it more efficient. In addition, a special bankruptcy court was set up in 
Thailand.417 The Bankruptcy Court Act was ratified on 8th April 1998.418 Despite all efforts, the 
handling of insolvency cases became more lenient; hence, the Bank of Thailand and other 
associations established the Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee (CDRAC), 
which often applied informal workouts.419  
Thailand faces problems in rehabilitation and liquidation proceedings if the debtor's property is 
situated abroad. Currently, there is neither any firm proposal to enact UNCIRAL Model Law 
in Thailand nor is Thailand party to any international treaty or convention on insolvency law.420 
However, there have been some tentative efforts to facilitate insolvency proceedings with 
foreign elements, e.g. for inbound cases the rights of foreign creditors are supported by section 
91 of the Bankruptcy Act where the foreign creditor has to fulfil the requirements of section 
178 of the Bankruptcy Act; in particular, the foreign creditor has to prove that he would also be 
entitled under the laws of the country of residence, but Thai insolvency law does not recognize 
an insolvency administrator appointed under a foreign insolvency law.421 
Judgements, with exception of arbitration awards, rendered by foreign courts are unlikely to be 
recognized by local Thai courts; however, those judgements may be used as evidence. In the 
case of contracts, foreign law may only be recognized by the Thai Court if it not contrary to 
morals and public order of Thailand.422 Foreign bankruptcy proceedings still have no effect on 
the assets of the debtor situated in Thailand. Only if foreign creditors can prove that local Thai 
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creditors would have an entitlement to claim the same rights in the foreign jurisdiction, they 
can claim the repayment of their debts in Thailand423 pursuant to section 177 of the Bankruptcy 
Act.424  
10. Vietnam 
Although the bankruptcy law in Vietnam has various Western elements, up until now it remains 
underdeveloped. In 1993, the new Law on Business Bankruptcy was enacted in Vietnam and 
was subsequently replaced by the Bankruptcy Law No. 21/2004/QH11 dated 15th June 2004.425 
However, those laws did not improve the treatment of non-performing loans in Vietnam, 
specifically because of the lack of court order enforcement and the misreading of creditors 
rights.426 The latest Bankruptcy Law No. 51/2014/QH13 was adopted on 19th June 2014 by the 
National Assembly of Vietnam. This law replaced Bankruptcy Law No. 21/2004/QH11 dated 
15th June 2004 as from 1st January 2015.427 The main insolvency issues pertain to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and state-owned banks (SOBs).428 
As for cross-border insolvency cases, it not surprising that Vietnam is not party to any 
international or regional treaties on insolvency law. Nevertheless, there were various attempts 
to consider foreign elements in the Draft to Bankruptcy Law in 2002 with a focus on merchants 
having business operations within Vietnamese territory and for those acting abroad. This draft 
was however not implemented into the Bankruptcy Law of 2004. Interestingly, Article 4 of the 
Law of 2004 provides that the bankruptcy is applicable to all enterprises doing business in 
Vietnam, hence, there is no language excluding or including foreign debtors.429 There is no 
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official recognition of a foreign insolvency judgement in Vietnam, which is why foreign 
creditors are required to initiate local proceedings to obtain an insolvency judgement.430 
11. ASEAN+3: Insolvency Laws and National Cross-Border Rules 
Although the focus of this thesis concerns cross-border insolvency legal solutions within 
ASEAN countries, ASEAN+3 has a decisive impact on their development, implementation and 
long-term success because of their economic and political power in the region. What's more, it 
is worthwhile to examine the structure of insolvency laws in China, South Korea, and Japan as 
well as to bear in mind that gaps in progress in the insolvency law of these states impacts the 
future cooperation between ASEAN states and ASEAN+3. What follows is an overview of the 
insolvency systems in Japan, China and South Korea. 
a. Japan 
Japan has well-structured national rules regarding cross-border insolvencies. It is divided into 
consumer 431  and corporate bankruptcy law. Corporate insolvencies are governed by the 
Corporate Reorganization Act of 2002 and the Bankruptcy Code of 1922.432 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency was successfully enacted in several 
jurisdictions.433 The success of its enactment depends, of course, on its methods as well as its 
legislative and institutional framework.434 Historically, Japanese insolvency law centred on the 
territoriality principle,435 i.e. it not only refused to recognize the effects of foreign insolvency 
proceedings, but Japanese proceedings were also not recognized by foreign courts. 436 Because 
 
430 Clifford Chance, A Guide to Asia Pacific Restructuring and Insolvency Procedures (2013), p. 141 
431 Consumer bankruptcy is not a subject of the research. 
432 S. Steely, ‘Insolvency Law in Japan’ in R. Tomasic (ed.), Insolvency Law in East Asia, 3rd edn. (Hampshire: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013), pp. 13–62, at p. 18 
433 For example, Australia (2008), Canada (2005), Chile (2014), Colombia (2006), Eritrea (1998), Greece (2010), 
Mauritius (2009), Mexico (2000), Montenegro (2002), New Zealand (2006), Poland (2003), Republic of Korea 
(2006), Romania (2002), Serbia (2004), Slovenia (2007), South Africa (2000), Uganda (2011), United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. British Virgin Islands (2003), Great Britain (2006) 
434 B. Wessels, ‘Will UNCITRAL Bring Changes to Insolvency Proceedings Outside the USA and Great Britain? 
It Certainly Will!’, International Corporate Rescue 3 (2006), 200–6, at 201 
435 For definitions, see supra 
436  H. Hirokoshi, ‘Perspective Article: Guide to Japanese Cross-Border Insolvency Law’, Law and Business 
Review of the Americas 9 (2003), 725–39, at 729; S. Takagi, ‘Japanese Insolvency Laws’, Annual Survey of 





of this territorial approach, Japan's treatment of cross-border insolvency cases was criticized by 
foreign legal professionals.437 
Alongside other countries, the Japanese government continued to reform insolvency laws in the 
country in order to comply with the standards of the new international model.438 After a long 
legislative process, which started in 1996, 439  Japan successfully adopted the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency in 2000 under the Law of Recognition and Assistance 
for Foreign Insolvency Proceedings (LRAFIP).440 Japan itself was one of the 36 UNCITRAL 
members of the Working Group V on Insolvency Law.441 Japan accepted the key points of the 
reform in their entirety, though made some adjustments in accordance with the particularities 
of its national legislation. However, according to Japanese governmental decisions, foreign 
insolvency proceedings are only recognized to a certain extent. 442  Professor Yamamoto 
accounts for these deviations explaining that the Model Law is fundamentally impinged upon 
by common law. Hence, as a civil law country, it would not be feasible for Japan to implement 
the Model Law443 without carrying out some amendments. According to Professor Yamamoto, 
the difficulties are technical problems.444 
New Japanese Cross-Border Insolvency Law 
Some of the issues introduced by the new Japanese insolvency law are of great significance. 
These issues are the access and participation of foreign representatives and foreign creditors in 
insolvency proceedings falling under the Japanese jurisdiction, including cooperation with 
foreign courts, concurrent proceedings, and the termination of proceedings. 
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Japanese insolvency law allows for foreign representatives to apply for the commencement of 
insolvency proceedings on behalf of foreign creditors. What's more the foreign representative 
is entitled to participate in the insolvency proceedings in Japan, i.e. he will be given legal 
standing to undertake procedural actions, such as making submissions, requests, petitions etc., 
which concern the preservation or distribution of the debtor's assets. The foreign representative 
may also file an appeal against decisions taken by a Japanese court. In addition, Japanese 
insolvency law treats foreign creditors in the same way as local creditors pursuant to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law's non-discrimination principle. However, Japan links this principle to 
principles of reciprocity, i.e. only if the native state of the foreign creditor applied the same 
non-discriminatory rule would this rule likely be applied by a Japanese court. This principle 
was called the reciprocity principle, was particularly criticized by foreign lawyers and hence 
has been abandoned under the new Japanese law. It takes the equality principle into account by 
notifying foreign creditors in the same way as it does domestic one. Japan has refused the 
automatic recognition of foreign judgements affecting cross-border insolvency cases. Instead, 
the Japanese government produced a set of requirements for successful recognition. Firstly, the 
state where the debtor has his place of business has a jurisdiction over the commencement of 
an insolvency proceeding. However, Japanese law does not accept judgements rendered by a 
court in a jurisdiction where the debtor owns assets but does not have his place of business 
because this is insufficient to link the debtor and the jurisdiction of the insolvency proceedings. 
Secondly, a competent Japanese court may refuse recognition if the foreign judgement is 
contrary to public policy or good customs in Japan. Thirdly, the foreign representative must pay 
fees for said recognition determined by the competent Japanese court. In addition, there are also 
following considerations: if recognition relief may be not necessary for other reasons; if the 
foreign judgement may not allow for its effects to extend to the debtor's assets situated in Japan; 
if the competent court may refuse recognition even if the foreign representative does not 
communicate the information required to the competent court in Japan or applied for 
recognition in bad faith.445 
The Tokyo District Court is exclusively competent for recognition of foreign proceedings and 
has the power to request assistance from other district courts in Japan who may be more familiar 
with the case. Japanese law allows foreign representatives to apply for the recognition of foreign 
 





judgements in Japan, but it does not apply for interim proceedings. Japanese law allows foreign 
representatives to appoint middlemen such as a Japanese lawyer in order to smooth the 
communication process between foreign representatives and the Japanese court. 446  It also 
foresees the need for temporary measures from Japanese courts, even if with a lesser degree of 
discretion, before the recognition of foreign judgements. These may be in the form of a stay or 
continuation of actions, a ban on the payment of debts or transfer of assets, the appointment of 
an interim trustee. 
The decision regarding recognition differs from the UNCITRAL Model Law because it is not 
intended to be rendered ‘as soon as possible’. According to Professor Yamamoto, the Japanese 
court has enough powers to assess evidence and to make the decision within its own discretion. 
The Japanese court will rescind recognition, as Japanese law does not provide for automatic 
recognition.447 Finally, the new Japanese cross-border insolvency law does not provide rules 
for concurrent proceedings proposed by Articles 28-30 of the Model Law. 
Within the five years following the enactment of the LRAFIP, two cases were filed claiming 
assistance and recognition.448 The new law was applied in the case of Think3 Inc. in 2012.449 
Think3 Inc.-Case No. 1757 of 2012 
The Model Law enables enacting states to interpret the Model Law – as is usual in these treaties 
– such that the enacting state would have an interest in producing a harmonized interpretation. 
The Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT) aid with these issues.450 The Japanese Court 
has already made a decision regarding cross-border insolvency issues in the case of Think3 Inc. 
in accordance with the enacted UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.  
To be specific, Japan differs on some articles of the Model Law. Article 20 of the Model Law, 
for instance, was not adopted.451 Japan does not admit the direct effect of foreign insolvency 
judgements in Japan. Therefore, the government introduced a framework for the recognition of 
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foreign judgements on the decision of Japanese courts. 452  The Tokyo District Court is 
exclusively competent in handling the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and, inter 
alia, has the exclusive jurisdiction to transfer the issue to another district court with jurisdiction 
over the insolvent debtor.453 The capacity to apply for recognition is solely possessed by a 
foreign representative.454 However, it does not provide for any kind of communication between 
Japanese and foreign courts.455 According to Professor Yamamoto, there is no need for a 
provision such as this because it only would be applicable in cases of concurrent proceedings.456 
The new Japanese Insolvency Law does not provide the option of procedural consolidation as 
is the case in the US Bankruptcy Code.457 After application, the competent court in Japan may 
grant an interim relief as a result of which the transfer of the debtor's assets in Japan will be 
prohibited.458 
b. China 
Bankruptcy proceedings in China are not unified under one bankruptcy law; rather they depend 
upon the type of corporation facing insolvency and as well as being handled by regulatory and 
governmental institutions, such as the Ministry of Commerce, without limited involvement of 
the courts. 459  In addition, the Chinese courts do not generally have specialist bankruptcy 
knowledge.460 Creditors merely have recourse or other participation rights at their disposal in 
insolvency proceedings, something that is reflected in the poor recovery outcome of 
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proceedings. 461  The old Chinese bankruptcy law of 1986 did not sufficiently address the 
complexity of bankruptcies in the fast developing Chinese economy.462 
To improve the handling of insolvency cases the Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
Law463 also known as the Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law (DBL) was launched in June 2004. 
Remarkably, this law does not require grounds for filing an insolvency case against the debtor; 
however, the new law is applicable within a limited universality model.464 The Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law was promulgated at the 23rd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth 
National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on 27th August 2006 and went 
into effect as of 1st June 2007.465 Its success depends, however, on the technical competence 
and experience as well as availability of the courts.466 While in the past only corporations had 
capacity to declare bankruptcy, the new law extends to private persons.467 The new law makes 
two formal procedures available: reorganization and settlement.468 
The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law does not provide rules for cross-border cases with the 
consequence that when insolvency proceedings touch upon cross-border elements, problems 
arise without a proper solution. However, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law contains two 
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provisions relating to the initiation of insolvency proceedings outside of China as well as 
enabling local judges to recognize foreign insolvency decisions and judgements.469  
c. South Korea 
Insolvency law in South Korea was governed by the Corporate Reorganization Act, Bankruptcy 
Act, Composition Act and Individual Debtor Rehabilitation Act. While the Corporate 
Reorganization Act was applicable for corporations, the Composition Act allowed debtors in 
difficulties to continue business operations; both legal regulations were designated to deal with 
insolvency problems.470 The real bankruptcy cases were experienced by South Korea in 1997 
during the Asian economic crisis.471 On 1st April 2006, those laws were unified under the 
Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (DRBA).472 South Korea was a strong proponent of 
the territoriality principle in cases with a foreign element.473 All the regulations predating the 
Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act did not provide for the handling of cross-border 
insolvency cases nor issues associated, with the consequence that foreign insolvency 
judgements did not have any impact on debtors' assets situated within the South Korean 
territory. Nevertheless, after its introduction, the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act 
takes cross-border insolvency cases into consideration. The new law adapted the principle of 
equality between Korean and non-Korean creditors.474 Part V of the Debtor Rehabilitation and 
Bankruptcy Act governs international bankruptcy, in particular, Article 628 (Definitions), 
Article 629 (Scope of Application), Article 630 (Jurisdiction), Article 631 (Application Filed 
for Approving Foreign Bankruptcy Procedures), Article 632 (Decision to Approve Foreign 
Bankruptcy Procedures), Article 633 (Effect of Approval for Foreign Bankruptcy Procedures), 
Article 634 (Application by Representative of Foreign Bankruptcy Procedures for Commencing 
Domestic Bankruptcy Procedures, etc.), Article 635 (Order, etc. Prior to Approval), Article 636 
(Support for Foreign Bankruptcy Procedures), Article 637 (International Bankruptcy 
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Custodians), Article 638 (Simultaneous Proceedings of Domestic Bankruptcy Procedures and 
International Bankruptcy Procedures), Article 639 (Multiple International Bankruptcy 
Procedures), Article 640 (Authority for Custodians to Carry Out Activities Overseas), Article 
641 (Cooperation), and Article 642 (General Rules Governing Dividends). 
Section IV – Historical Heritage as a Grid for Regional Insolvency Framework 
In the past, the ‘Asian Values’ route into philosophical and religious traditions was impacted 
by other factors. However, these values are still in the process of development due to social, 
historical, political and economic change and as such should be evaluated from the modern 
perspective.475 
1. Values Debate and its Impact on Legal Development in Southeast Asia 
What is the definition of ‘values’? According to the Collins dictionary, values are ‘the moral 
principles and beliefs or accepted standards of a person or social group’. Depending on different 
interpretations, this term may include beliefs, ways of thinking, customs and traditions, or 
purpose, and hence may be differentiated by various categories such as religion, social 
expectations, morals, aesthetics, or politics. Summarized under single terms, values can mean 
a desire for honesty, harmony, patience, respect, wisdom, common will, etc. In Asia, there is 
no distinction between religious and secular values. Although some values are easily 
identifiable, some other ethnic groups do not distinguish between values and a code of conduct. 
It is not only important to know which values govern life in Asia, but also which outcomes are 
to be expected when they are put into practice.476 
2. International Law and Cultural Relativism 
An awareness of culture's impact on law is crucial. ASEAN launched the ASCC Group to 
determine principles of national and regional identity. The ‘Asian Values’ debate is an integral 
part of Asian economic growth. According to Professor Tomasic, the success of the 
implementation of insolvency reforms in Asia in terms of their effectiveness depends first on 
social, historical and cultural elements. He underlines that there has been a gradual shift away 
from a pronounced cultural attitude to insolvency law in Asia and remarks on a gradual 
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stagnation of cultural issues regarding insolvency and a move to more pragmatic thinking 
towards the market approach. However, this tendency is likely only among insolvency 
professionals. Despite this cultural context remains significant in the operation of an insolvency 
system within the Southeast Asian legal system. This negates an unconsidered effort to copy 
and paste an insolvency regulation from any capitalistic legal system into that of a developing 
nation.477 Justice JJ Spigelman underlines the fact that cultural disputes are the major factors 
impacting the issue of bankruptcy. 478  According to Ron Harmer, there is also a general 
framework that highlights some common needs in commercial affairs which are characteristic 
of every legal tradition. These needs are certainty and predictability, stability and order, fair 
and equitable treatment, as well as transparency.479 
What are these ‘Asian Values’ and what influence do they have on the legal system? These 
questions have been extensively discussed by distinguished scholars and practitioners. The 
economic crisis of 1997 shone a light onto the international discussion about the ‘Asian 
Values’480 and revitalized active discussion both within Asia and the world in general. Despite 
its origins in human rights discourse,481 this topic is of equal relevance in other legal issues such 
as cross-border insolvency in Asia because its roots can be traced back to cultural and traditional 
values, aspects which may differ by region.  
Although there is no concrete definition of ‘Asian Values’, they are part of the Confucian aim 
for ‘greater peace’. 482  Mark R. Thompson 483  describes ‘Asian Values’ as ‘a doctrine of 
developmentalism’ which ‘can be understood as the claim that, until prosperity is achieved, 
 
477 R. Tomasic, ‘Diversity and Convergence in Insolvency Law in East Asia’ in R. Tomasic (ed.), Insolvency Law 
in East Asia, 3rd edn. (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013), pp. 1–12, at 2 et seq. 
478 J.J. Spigelman, ‘International Commercial Litigation: An Asian Perspective’, Hong Kong Law Review 37 
(2007), 859–891, at 870 
479 Tomasic, ‘Tomasic 2013’, 4 
480 M. R. Thompson, ‘Pacific Asia after 'Asian Values': Authoritarianism, Democracy, and 'Good Governance'’, 
Third World Quaterly 25 (2004), 1079–95, at 1079 
481 See for example Langlois, Anthony J., ‘The Asian Values Discourse’ in The Politics of Justice and Human 
Rights: Southeast Asia and Universalist Theory pp. 12–45 
Nghia, Hoang Van, ‘The ‘Asian Values’ Perspective of Human Rights: A Challenge to Universal Human Rights’, 
Vietnamese Institute of Human Rights (2009) 
482 W. A. Manan, ‘A Nation in Distress: Human Rights, Authoritarianism, and Asian Values in Malaysia’, Journal 
of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 14 (1999), 359–81, at 363 
483 Mark R. Thompson is professor of political science at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg and a visiting 





democracy remains an unaffordable luxury’, contributing to growth and cultural traits.484 Hard 
work and discipline are also typical characteristics of ‘Asian Values’. 
One of the essential properties of ‘Asian Values’ is a world view that the idea of Asia as a 
cultural whole is in direct contrast to the West.485 Another central element of ‘Asian Values’ is 
the fact that the interest of the community exists above that of the individual. This makes for 
greater group consciousness, loyalty and sacrifice of personal greater goods. 486  The pre-
eminence of the group over the individual was introduced into society by Confucianism. In this 
philosophy priority is given to hierarchical structures such as family and society and this factor 
is reflected collective elements in business too. In addition to the two main dogmas of 
collectivism and hierarchy, Confucianism's main values are humility, loyalty, harmony, filial 
piety, benevolent authority, education and self-education, trust, courtesy, respect of traditions 
and sincerity.487 In Asia these values are common across the whole region and are values 
intrinsic to individual countries. The following values can be regarded as common ‘Asian 
Values’ valid across the whole Asian region. Firstly, holism and dialectics – in fact, there are 
no black and white thoughts; everything casts its own shadows (yin/yang). Secondly, there is 
the concept of family with its various obligations (financial, moral and ritualistic). Thirdly, 
respect is afforded to age and seniority expressed via the mode of filial piety. Fourthly, the 
cultivation of personal networks is of great significance, especially common in Japan (ningen 
kankei) and China (guanxi). Fifthly, there is the building trust which, according to Francis 
Fukuyama, can be low (China) or high (Japan).488 Sixthly, there is the importance of ‘face’, e.g. 
in China (mianzi) – the face is associated with human dignity, social status, respect and 
standing, and face can be lost, restored, or taken away. This is of upmost importance in terms 
of networking. Seventhly, the avoidance of conflict is one of the typical features of Asian 
society and is driven by the need for harmony achieved by relying on indirect speech and 
patience. Harmony is a fundamental value in collective societies. Eighthly, there is the 
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importance of rank and status, and finally the value of the contractual obligation, which, in 
contrast with the West, is not stable and sure and may be renegotiated.489 
The Asian way of thinking is characterized by a holistic approach, which is remarkable not only 
in the way of thinking but also in the behaviour and structures in society. Meanwhile the 
European Weltanschauung is influenced by the Cartesian concept, which only considers part of 
the whole, though views it as a whole.490 China maintains a predominant place in Asia and is 
influential in terms of its Confucian values not just East Asian countries like Japan and South 
Korea, but also in Southeast Asian states.491 Confucian dynamism sets out the core values: 
persistence, relationship by status, thrift, and a sense of shame. 492  It also requires 
conformism.493 
Advocates of ‘Asian Values’ criticize the individualistic approach of the West.494 At the same 
time, they insist that government and elite groups should manage the economy of the state.495 
Although based mainly on Confucianism, ‘Asian Values’ contain other non-Confucian 
elements. 496  Confucianism contain many elements detrimental to economic development, 
firstly, centralised control without freedom or diversity, secondly, the priority of emotional 
values over logical ones, and finally, Confucianism prescribes different obligations depending 
on the level of personal relations.497 
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3. The Role of Human Rights  
Although there is no common definition, there are two extensive models describing the concept 
of ‘Asian Values’ – the Singaporean and the Malaysian.498 The Singaporean model has been 
promoted by Lee Kuan Yew, the latter by Malaysian political leader, Mahathir Mohamad. 
While Lee argued that ‘Asian Values’ derived from ‘Confucianism’,499 Mohamad insisted that 
‘Asian Values’ are ‘Universal Values’ and that ‘European Values’ are ‘European Values’.500 
According to Lee, the idea of ‘Asian Values’ is the fundamental separation of West and East 
into notions of individualism and communitarianism. It presumes that the ‘Asian cultural 
particularity justified the rejection of liberal democracy was matched by impressive economic 
results’.
501
 Hence, in its essence it hinges on this position of social and economic success.
502 
The pivotal argument of ‘Asian Values’ theory is that while individualism advocates the 
existence of individual rights and promotes democracy, communitarianism defends the pre-
eminence of the group interest above the interests of the individual within hierarchical order of 
society and political leadership.503 Lee claims that East Asian values do not view the individual 
as an self-determining entity in society, but rather a member of it much like a member of a 
family.504 The hierarchical structure demands servility and deference to those of higher rank 
and age.505 The West and East are intrinsically different, and thus what is good for West may 
not be appropriate for the East.506 This schema of ‘Asian Values’ finally states that economic 
growth is not compatible with democracy.507 
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Mahathir Mohamad defines ‘Asian Values’ as generally belonging to the East, but more 
specifically to Southeast Asia in particular.508 
The notion of ‘Asian Values’ is a considerable aspect of a group's identity. However, this notion 
lost its importance in the wake of the first Asian financial collapse of 1997.509 To conclude, 
both political thinkers advocated Asia's position at the centre of the world. However, their 
advocacy faced harsh global criticism, firstly as many argued that ‘Asian Values’ pave the way 
for authoritarianism510 and secondly that ‘Asian Values’ are unrelated to tradition and is rather 
a purely political ideology preaching strength and power.511 It has also been argued that the 
international prominence of ‘Asian Values’ has been undermined by the financial crisis in its 
aftermath.512 
In short, the Singaporean and Malaysian models have two elements in common: firstly, that 
values are different in the East and the West; and secondly, that democracy and human rights 
are not necessarily conducive to economic success and growth, but rather lead to greater 
disorder.513 
4. Characteristics and Roots  
‘Asian Values’ have a long evolutionary history, although this belief has been contested from 
time to time. The two fundamental principles of Asian society, namely hierarchy and 
collectivism, are strengthened by common values across the Asian region, such as family, the 
holistic and dialectic nature of the Eastern mindset, respect for age and seniority, personal 
networking, trust, importance of ‘face’, conflict avoidance, avoidance of physical contact, 
smiling, importance of education and protocol, as well as the sanctity of contract. Family is the 
basic unit of society with the male as the principle figure. The sanctity of contract stands in 
contrast to Western contract theory. With the exception of Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong, 
the contract is not binding but rather represents a form of gentlemen's agreement.514 That 
 
508 Vickers and Fisher, ‘Vickers et al. 1999’, 386 
509 ibid., p. 383 
510 Öjendal and Antlöv, ‘Öjendal et al. 1998’, 527 et seq. 
511 ibid., p. 538 
512 Thompson, ‘Thompson 2001’, 154 
513 Manan, ‘Manan 1999’, 362 





notwithstanding, there are remarkable differences in Asian cultural affairs. Hoon summarizes 
four basic claims concerning the ‘Asian Values’ debate: firstly, human rights cannot claim 
universality and globality of application; secondly, the central unit in Asian tradition is family 
and not the individual; thirdly, the economic and social interests take priority over those of the 
individual; fourthly, the nation's interests are above the interests of the individual.515 
According to Lee, ‘Asian Values’ are family-oriented whereas Western society is indifferent to 
family and irresponsible. 516  Zialcita observes that before European influence, Asia was 
community-oriented, putting individual rights behind the interests of community.517 
‘Asian Values’ can be generally divided into two categories: firstly, there are social values 
which are attached to social collectivism and concern interpersonal matters such as the authority 
of seniority, priority of the community over the individual, predominance of collective over 
individual freedoms and, secondly, political values which primarily address the family, morals, 
anti-adversarial politics and demographic differences.518 
In this thesis, only the social part of ‘Asian Values’ will be analysed.  
5. Traditional Aspects in National Insolvency Systems in ASEAN Countries 
Despite the global approach to ‘Asian Values’, it is possible to examine different local 
idiosyncrasies which may be essential for the successful implementation of cross-border 
insolvency rules on the national and regional level. The 1980s saw the rise of the ‘Third Way’ 
(Blairite), that is ‘the ability to have a notion of collectivism in the face of apparently triumphant 
free-market and transnational capitalist forces’. It is also called the ‘new centre’.519 
Corporate insolvency law in Singapore is settled in the Singaporean Companies Act and traces 
back to the Malaysian Insolvency model, based on principles of Australian and English 
 
515 C. Y. Hoon, ‘Revisiting the 'Asian Values' Argument Used by Asian Political Leaders and Its Validity’, The 
Indonesian Quarterly 32 (2004), 154–74, at 155 
516 Wai-Teng Leong, Laurence, ‘From 'Asian Values' to Singaporean Exceptionalism’ in L. Avonius and D. 
Kingsbury (eds.), Human Rights in Asia: A Reassessment of the Asian Values Debates, 1st edn. (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 121–40, at p. 122 
517 F. N. Zialcita, ‘Is Communitarianism Uniquely Asian? A Filipino's Perspective’, Journal of Social Issues in 
Southeast Asia 14 (1999), 313–31, at 315 
518 C.-M. Park and D. C. Shin, ‘Do Asian Values Deter Popular Support for Democracy in South Korea?’, Asian 
Survey 46 (2006), 341–61, at 345 





corporate insolvency law. In his survey, Professor Tomasic cites one interviewee saying that 
cultural attitudes ‘do not influence the law because we have remnants of English law. However, 
in practice you use culture to your advantage, such as to pressure to debtor’.520 Cultural attitudes 
play an important role in dealing with a Chinese company, whereas UK and Australian law 
based on judicial management is not affected by local conditions at all. On the other hand, 
Tomasic points out that according to some interviewees Singaporean courts try to push parties 
in insolvency litigation cases to compromise and negotiate. Some of his interviewees call it the 
Asian approach because it combines efficiency, promotion, and cultural attitudes. However, 
within court itself cultural factors can only really play a minor role, this is also true for large 
non-familial companies, whereas for smaller companies they are likely to fall in the face of 
cultural attitudes. According to Professor Tomasic, Indonesian insolvency administration of 
corporate debtors is shaped to a significant extent by cultural and religious attitudes such as 
non-confrontation and harmony. Consequently, approaches along these lines have led to 
negotiation and compromise solutions in corporate insolvency. According to his survey, 
Indonesian bankers are very reluctant to engage in direct confrontation with debtors, meaning 
it may take many months before the bank contacts the debtors. ‘Indonesian society has 
traditionally been close and compact, and as a result, people have tried to compromise’. Hence, 
the litigation solution to insolvency issues in Indonesia barely comes into question because 
people prefer to arrive at a compromise instead of going to court. However, due to the growth 
of modern society, this common approach among insolvent debtors has gradually broken down, 
given that it concerns large debtor companies with separate ownership and control rights. 
Hence, social values and social harmony are being substituted in part for economic virtues. 
Aside from cultural attitudes, Professor Tomasic explains this reluctance towards litigation by 
an enormous lack of confidence in judicial and court practices, because the Indonesian court 
system is very old, costly, unpredictable, and unreliable. Of lesser influence on Indonesian 
insolvency law is religion. The Islamic and Confucian backgrounds do not have any 
deterministic effect on banking policy in Indonesia. Instead, it is the Javanese tradition of 
avoiding conflict which has impacted on dispute resolution and avoidance.521 
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‘Asian Values’ do have this mutual Confucian background; however, they vary from country 
to country in Southeast Asia due to their movement from China to other countries,522 also 
known as tributary states. In Malaysia, cultural norms are breaking down as well. This is due 
to increasing levels of education and business awareness among the Malaysian youth and the 
importance of social and governmental connections in the country. However, this decrease in 
cultural impact is not valid to the same degree all over Malaysia. In his survey, Professor 
Tomasic emphasizes the difference between Malaysian and Chinese groups. Chinese 
communities were likely to support their business partner in economic and financial trouble 
more than Malaysian communities were willing to do so, this is because the protection of family 
and business is central to Chinese values and cultural traits and business are generally based on 
‘faith and relationship’. Malaysia falls back upon a privileged system of governmental support. 
Furthermore, there are other factors in Malaysia limiting insolvency proceedings. Among them 
racial diversity as well as social and political connections are more pronounced in Malaysia 
than in Indonesia or China, hence, bankers always face difficulties in case of action against 
politically connected people with high social status.523 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Myanmar are countries where the democratic 
establishment requires more time to become established. This has the consequence that in these 
countries the recourse to ‘Asian Values’ is more prevalent than in other Asian countries.524 
Section V – Traditional Implications in Member States of ASEAN and ASEAN+3 
This section will provide some examples of the notion of ‘Asian Values’ in ASEAN countries 
which in part differ from those described by Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad. Though 
seemingly old news, this topic has not completely disappeared owing to its cultural traits.525 
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The term ‘communitarianism’ is found in each Southeast Asian country but with its own 
interpretation and local influence.526 
Although Brunei527 shares some cultural traits with other Southeast Asian nations, Bruneian 
values are unique in Southeast Asia, representing a blending of Malay and Islamic values.528 
One must first turn to Brunei's Malays who concentrate in their traditions on values such as 
power distance, avoidance of uncertainty and abasement of individualism. This means that the 
distribution of authoritative power is accepted without question and power distance identifies 
clear hierarchical structure between different social classes. The low regard for individualism 
is characterized by striving towards collective ideas and goals. 529  The power in avoiding 
uncertainty is often based on an unwillingness to make decisions even in the face of clear 
evidence. This explains the prevalence of the fear of losing face which is more severe than in 
other Southeast Asian countries.530 Bruneian society is group and family-oriented with a focus 
on interpersonal relationships founded on Malay-Islamic values.531 
The ‘Asian Values’ debate in Cambodia is connected with its discourse around democratization 
and human rights.532 Hierarchy is essential in Cambodia. Implicit in this hierarchy are varying 
moral and legalistic hereditary and non-hereditary obligations, which include obedience to the 
elderly, even outside of the family.533 Nevertheless, family remains the major social structure 
in the Cambodian society, in particular the idea of the nuclear family, where all family members 
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live together; the village community also belongs to this closer circle.534 Prior to its socialist 
regime, society was divided into an upper class of elites and a lower peasant class.535 However, 
these elites were not particularly interested in the maintenance of indigenous values because of 
their sympathy for colonialism and its protectorate. 536  Buddhism is the core religion in 
Cambodia to which more than 90 percent of the Khmer population belong.537  Traditional 
Buddhist values gained some significance on the village level, which was reflected by values 
such as respect for the elderly, e.g. old men and women were treated differently in terms of 
language and behaviour. Virtues such as honesty, generosity, mercy, conflict avoidance and 
piety gained an ameliorated image within society.538 Like other Asian nations, Cambodians are 
concerned with losing face. They are characterized by a strong feeling of pride toward their 
village, district, or other communities.539 When a person is being corrected in the presence of a 
third party and when this person is unable to perform the assigned work, hence, this person lost 
her face. 
Indonesia has not been included in the discussion surrounding ‘Asian Values’, however some 
elements of ‘Asian Values’ are still typically Indonesian.540 As the biggest state in ASEAN, 
Indonesia has grasped this idea. The New Order regime was the most interested in this question 
of ‘Asian Values’ because in 1995 Indonesia disseminated the idea of the ‘Third World’ and 
the ‘Non-Aligned Movement’, which was the forerunner to ‘Asian Values’. One of the leading 
advocates of authoritarian developmentalism in Indonesia was General Suharto, father of the 
‘Non-Aligned Movement’, who argued that ‘Pancasila Democracy’ consisted of indigenous 
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values.541 However, some of these values had been ‘sponsored’ by the West.542 The New Order 
regime abandoned individual rights for the sake of development and defined one important 
feature of ‘Indonesian Values’ in particular – indigeneity.543 
In contrast to Singapore and Malaysia, in Indonesia all the principles of the state drew on 
cultural roots. These core principles and Indonesian values form the basis of the interpretation 
of the traditional ideology, Pancasila, and consist of an inherent notion of society and state in 
Indonesia, communitarianism over individual rights and the dominance of obligations over 
rights, consensus over conflict, a respect for hierarchies, the ‘family principle’ (kekeluargaan) 
with its hierarchical and functional specificities, and mutual assistance (gotong royong). 
Modern Indonesian society is based on several different layers, inter alia Islamic and Western 
influences.544 It also faces some difficulties if ‘Asian Values’ are defined as a successor to 
Confucian doctrine, in particular because of the long period of anti-Chinese movements.545 
Vickers and Fisher conclude that ‘Asian Values’ were to some extent foreign to Indonesia even 
within the framework of ASEAN because it did not accept broader citizenship and non-
indigenous people.546 
In many respects, the Lao peoples are not collectivist when compared with other Asian societies 
because it is a very diverse nation containing around 65 minorities with their own languages 
and customs. 547  Even though there are no explicit individualist tendencies, with some 
researchers proposing the theory of a loose culture which in Thailand means a diversity of 
individual behaviours, it was finally rejected as applying to Lao society.548 Furthermore, the 
Lao people follow a very strict social hierarchy where authority of the elderly plays a major 
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role. In the particular case of Laos, the hierarchy of the village is of special significance.549 
Further Lao values include responsibility and decision-making, with a preference for 
authoritarian leaders who give people the right direction; again another key value is the fear of 
losing face.550 Face shapes and maintains a defined image in the family and society and wields 
great power and influence.551 For the sake of saving face, individuals are always eager to avoid 
conflict and look for pleasant-natured communication.552 Relationships are also an issue in Lao 
society and business spheres.553 Family relationships imply hierarchy in of themselves because 
in Lao villages, all the inhabitants belong to one family. 554  This social dimension has a 
paternalistic structure.555 The quasi-feudal structure of the family in the village does not tolerate 
any deviation from an appointed social position within the village hierarchy.556 
Malaysia was one of the first proponents of ‘Asian Values’ in the last decade. It employed this 
notion in manifold contexts, e.g. politics, religion, human rights and economics. Mahathir's 
model of ‘Asian Values’ are ‘Universal Values’ whereas ‘European Values’ are ‘European 
Values’. The main argument remains that community interests take precedence over individual 
rights, which promotes more of a group-consciousness, discipline and self-sacrifice for the 
common goal. This is based on the Confucian philosophy of striving for a ‘greater peace’ 
(taiping).557 
Malaysian values comprise such elements as community spirit, budi (moral system of behaviour 
or social and personal relations) including courtesy, responsibility, respect for elders, harmony 
within society and family. In business, Malays appreciate trust, sincerity and loyalty.558 
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In Myanmar, social values were impacted by an authoritarian regime. Hence, the central 
Confucian value of harmony is lacking here.559 Prior to the authoritarian regime, Myanmar 
society was highly influenced by Buddhism.560 The kings of Burma were considered direct 
descendants of the Buddha.561 
The Philippine case is proof that there are different sets of ‘Asian Values’ though they have 
many things in common.562 The Survey on Contemporary Philippines values revealed that the 
notion of public good is defined by family and not by the individual.563 The Philippines in 
contrast to Singapore has a strong civil society.564 
In the second half of the twentieth century, there was great discussion about Philippine values. 
The Philippine set of values can be summarized as follows. There are eight levels of interaction 
between individuals and groups, and one of the most important values is pakikisama, which 
means social acceptance.565 Another widespread value in the Philippines is pakikipagkapwa-
tao – a positive contribution to the nation's welfare.566 It stands for the recognition of humanity 
and its sharing by others.567  These values consist of baynihan (cooperation), pakikiramay 
(condolences to others in case of their experiencing hard luck) and pagtitiwala (trust). Another 
set of values can be positive as well as negative: kanya-kanya is a value described by the denial 
of public duties and a focus on individual interests and family, pasulot (favour for friends and 
supporters), matiisin (patience), porma (lack of self-reflection), ningas cogon (lack of 
consistency). A further set of values falls under the category of public values: maka-Dios (God-
fearing), maka-bayan (national or community consciousness), maka-tao (orientation to the 
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needs of others). In addition, there are some behavioural values named utaang-na-loob 
(balanced reciprocity), hiya (loss of face), and delicadeza (avoiding shaming others). Also, 
makiramay (communalism) is widespread.568 
Due to its prevailing economic position it is not surprising that Singapore was the leader in 
defending ‘Asian Values’; the ‘Singaporean School’ also employs this term in explaining the 
flourishing economy which includes notions of discipline, communitarianism over individual 
rights, respect for elders and the state.569 In 2007, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong, expanded the notion of ‘Asian Values’ to include cultural patterns and denied the 
individualistic path taken in the West.570 Singaporean Exceptionalism describes this as ‘unique’ 
and differing from others, assuming the positive influence of being different, meaning 
adherence to international treaties and, as a consequence, rejecting the ‘West’.571 Singaporean 
Exceptionalism contains some principles of ‘Asian Values’, developing them into a form of 
Asian Exceptionalism in opposition to the West. Asian Exceptionalism is far from a single 
entity while Singaporean Exceptionalism is a single country speaking only for itself and not for 
another ASEAN Member.572 
Singaporean society consists of different races and comprises three ethnic groups: Indian – 
Hindu, Chinese – Confucian and Malay – Muslim.573 However, according to Chua, Singapore 
is not an amalgamation of Chinese, Malay, and Indian values. Rather, it is their common 
essence, resulting in shared values which focus on collectivism.574 Communitarian values with 
a reciprocal and family-oriented set of social relations are based on the ideas of Confucianism 
disseminated by the Chinese.575  By 1982, Singapore was regarded as a highly Confucian 
society.576 In the late eighties, it had been hurled into the ‘Asian Values’ debate.577 Collective 
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thinking is based on the well-being of the family and is translated onto the institutional level 
such as in business and governmental structures. 578  Singapore has the highest level of 
codification of these social values and, hence, established communitarianism as its national 
ideology. This ideology was explored by means of the shared values by the People's Action 
Party (PAP) in 1991 in the ‘White Paper on Shared Values’ declaring the ‘common good’, 
‘nation before community, community before self’, community regard for individual members, 
family as a basic building block of society, and consensus instead of contention as the basis for 
resolution of social issues and regard and community support for the individual. This document 
has an uncertain legal status but enjoys persistent ideological effect by means of its 
institutionalization as a ‘collective well-being’.579 
The ‘Singapore School’580 always relied on ‘Asian Values’. Being a vigorous follower,581 
Singapore does not yet speak on behalf of other Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand or 
Indonesia.582  Following the ‘Singaporean School’, the economic prosperity as well as the 
financial crunch of 1997 can be explained by ‘Asian Values’, viewing them as a weakness.583 
Singaporean Exceptionalism584 claims that its tradition is individual, unwavering, undeviating 
and uninfringeable. Singaporean politicians also claimed to be superior in comparison to other 
Southeast Asian states such as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and others. However, 
its neighbours were not always agreeing with this positioning calling Singapore a ‘little red dot’ 
comprising racism, corruption, etc.585 
There are many similarities between ‘Asian Values’ and Thai values. Due to the manifold 
social, economic, and ethnic statuses of Thai regions, it is scarcely possible to pin down a set 
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of Thai values as such. There is a proposal to divide Thai values into rural (lower education, 
passiveness, love for recreation, materialism, respect for benevolence, face-saving, refraining 
from causing others inconvenience, submission to the powerful, informality and strong kinship 
obligations) and urban (rationality, competition, materialism, face-saving and promoting, 
Westernization, respect for legitimate authority, lack of discipline, disregard for public 
property, paying lip service instead of practical action, jealousy and selfishness). From this 
comparison, it follows that materialism, a respect for order and the holders of power are 
common across Southeast Asia. Cross-cultural management experts reiterated the fact that Thai 
society is in general highly collectivist. Thai scholar Surin Maisrikrod explains this by 
referencing Thailand's strong notion of hierarchy and explaining that strong hierarchy is 
necessary in their interactions with one another. Age is a key factor in this process. For example, 
terms such as Phi (elder brother or sister) and Nong (younger brother or sister), knowing your 
place and liking it, respect for elders and loyalty and obedience are used. Hierarchy is 
intrinsically linked with ideas such as indebted goodness and restraining one's desire or interest 
which could cause conflict or displeasure to others’.586 Despite the strong adherence to the 
collectivist approach, on the whole Thai society accepted Westernization and democracy as an 
alternative to colonialism.587 
As in many other Asian countries, Thailand is a conflict-avoiding society with scores of 
unwritten rules governing personal and social behaviour; the concept of kreng chai (a concept 
of social etiquette) teaches a reluctance to act if the action would hinder someone's convenience. 
Avoidance of conflict guarantees harmony both on the familial and societal level. Jai yen 
(keeping calm) is always summoned in Thailand in of frustration or conflict. The basic Thai 
values are status, face, courtesy, seniority, humility and the cultivation of personal 
relationships.588 
The term ‘Asian Values’ first appeared in Vietnam, as it did in many Southeast Asian countries, 
in the context of human rights. The polarizing nature of this dispute around ‘Asian Values’ 
reached its zenith in Vietnam after the introduction of the ‘Asian Values’ debate at the Bangkok 
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Regional Preparatory Meeting to the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993.589 
The Vietnamese utilized ‘Asian Values’ to resist the imposed Western concepts.590 Vietnamese 
values are not based on cultural conceptualism; instead questions of ethics take precedence over 
those of law. In the main, it is Buddhism and Confucianism which impact on Vietnamese 
society, and it is these that have given rise to individual rights and freedoms in Vietnam since 
ancient times. 591  Confucianism influenced Vietnamese society and was accepted as the 
country's moral and ethical bedrock, holding strong over the course of several Vietnamese 
dynasties.592 Although communist, Ho Chi Minh introduced some Confucian ideas to modern 
Vietnamese society which later galvanized the fight for liberty.593 
Gradually, economic rights, which were not part of human rights mechanisms, also made it 
onto the agenda.594 In those days, there were two opposing schools of thought. On the one hand, 
the conservatives generally denied individual rights; complaints against the state were outlawed 
with an encouragement for everyone to contribute to the Vietnamese State. The reformist 
movement promoted individual rights and argued for a ‘level playing field’ across both the state 
and private sector.595 However, one Vietnamese values remained central – the duty to one's 
country: every citizen has a duty to serve their country, which is an archetypical idea among 
‘Asian Values’. 596  Vietnamese values’ are derived from this conservative thinking and 
encapsulate ideas of collectivism, social hierarchies and duties, as well as obligations.597At the 
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same time, some voices criticized ‘Asian Values’, citing them as a Pandora's box capable of 
undermining governmental control598 over the state and populace. 
The geographic and economic proximity of ASEAN to East Asian countries like Japan, South 
Korea and China necessitates and exploration of ‘Asian Values’ in those countries too. 
Relational hierarchy, interpersonal harmony and traditional conservatism are values that are 
likely to be associated with East Asia.599  
Japanese values are based on collective thinking and conflict avoidance practices: the individual 
exists because of the group.600 Confucianism was introduced to Japan in the fourth century and 
in the eighth century played a major role in politics and later impacted various Japanese reforms 
right up to Japanese modernization in the nineteenth century.601 Confucianism plays a central 
role in societal, business and legal practices.602 For example, ningen kankei (the establishment 
of hierarchical order in society) instructs that the individual cannot be considered isolated from 
the community, thus complete integration is required for total harmony. In modern language, it 
is understood as networking. Another feature of Japanese society is implicit communication. 
Likewise, business structures in Japan are based on cultural traditions and values, e.g. 
newamashi (consensus-building) is a guiding principle in negotiations and decision-making 
processes within Japanese companies because it underscores the importance of harmony and 
informally secures support from all parties affected before the formal decision is made.603 
As already mentioned, ‘Asian Values’ are based on Confucian doctrine. Collectivism in China 
is also based on the tradition of rice cultivation. The institution of family retains the highest 
priority in Chinese society with pre-eminence also afforded to the concept of the clan. The 
Chinese are keen to maintain harmony and to this end use a subtle pattern of indirect 
communication, avoiding saying 'no' and respecting the age and status of the communication 
 
598 Ai, ‘Ai 2003’, 102 
599 Y. B. Zhang, M.-C. Lin, A. Nonaka and K. Beom, ‘Harmony, Hierarchy and Conservatism: A Cross-Cultural 
Comparison of Confucian Values in China, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan’, Communication Research Reports 22 
(2005), 107–15, at 108 
600 Bogart, ‘Bogart 2000’, 145 
601 Baoyun, ‘Baoyun 2000’, 92 
602 Bogart, ‘Bogart 2000’, 145 





partner. 604  Following Chinese yin/yang thinking, the world originated in harmony and 
everything traces back to this natural order, 605  explaining the concept of the ‘indirect’. 
Harmonious values must be present in all aspects of moral and aesthetic decision-making within 
the family and community and are consequently of the highest priority.606 Family and harmony 
values are reflected in Chinese business, which is itself family based. These values are also 
based on low trust, i.e. the Chinese would first trust a family member and any other external 
person is secondary. The value of information sharing is also crucial. As already mentioned, 
the Chinese use ‘guanxi’ as a major value in building trust within personal relationships with 
mutual duties and for networking. Finally, it is important to mention the significance of protocol 
related to status and seniority, which is essential in the case of negotiations.607 
The influence of Confucianism in China is present in three types of values: moral-ethical values, 
social values and spiritual values.608 Moreover, the Chinese way of thinking is monistic which 
is influenced by concept of yin/yang, while Europeans follow a dualistic way of thinking.609 
The Chinese way of thinking also incorporates this principle of saving or losing face.610 
Confucianism has a long history in Korea beginning in 682 and was not only introduced into 
society but also among the courts, based on the concepts of the ‘kingly way’ and ‘humane 
government’, which led to the successful economic development in today's South Korea.611 
South Korea, surely, differs in its values, e.g. social order will be prized less than in other Asian 
countries.612 Alongside this fact, empirical studies have shown that Koreans attach importance 
to personal achievements and individual rights rather than respect for authority and social 
order. 613  However South Korea remains attached to ‘Asian Values’ in various senses, in 
particular, social harmony, authority, predominance of group interests over personal interests 
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which is valid both within the family and society.614 Interpersonal relationships are determined 
by loyalty, filial piety and human emotion – not taking into consideration a cost-benefit analysis 
– which forms the basis for a family state.615 These values were elaborated by Confucius and 
Mencius and later on by Chu Hsi.616 
It is not surprising that many scholars and practitioners denied the cultural background of ‘Asian 
Values’ and as such do not accept it as a valid argument. 
In the Christian Philippines, ‘Asian Values’ are not able to survive because the ‘corrupt Western 
influence’ gradually individualizes, and as such disregards the interests of the community.617 
Chua claims that the ‘Asian Values’ discourse is more historical than cultural because of the 
late development of the Southeast Asian region and merits discussion in a global political 
context.618 Many other authors contest the use of ‘Asian Values’ because the diversity of Asia 
in terms of religion, politics and history.619 Professor Langguth emphasizes that the notion of 
‘Asian Values’ was destroyed by the crisis of 1997 because this was the main impetus and 
guarantor of the ‘Asian Miracle’.620 In particular, he denies the exclusivity of ‘Asian Values’ 
because some of these values are also present in Europe, e.g. familial role.621 In addition, in 
Asia there are no such similarities as those in Europe (language, politics, etc.). In his opinion, 
the discussion overlooks empirical data, because there is no unified writing system, no common 
cultural development. 622  However, the idea of ‘Asian Values’ is a workable tool for the 
integration of Asian society623 within the context of ASEAN. This common notion of ‘Asian 
Values’ is also incompatible with the myriad languages, religions, and political streams in Asia 
as well as the fact that the ‘Asian Values’ discourse is different for each country depending on 
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its religion and cannot be reduced to mere Confucianism.624 Finally, the importance of the 
question around ‘Asian Values’ remains in the near and far future.625 
Zialcita contests three presumptuous points in the ‘Asian Values’ debate: firstly, the meaning 
of ‘community-orientedness’ which is supposed to be a common ‘Asian Value’, secondly, the 
total opposition of Asia to the West does not assume the existence of common Asian tradition, 
and finally, ‘Asianization’ and ‘Indigenization’ are not to be treated as equal.626 
The objection that ‘Asian Values’ have been merely constructed to advocate authoritarian 
regimes in multiple Asian countries, e.g. Cambodia, Myanmar, etc., and thus these were not 
compatible with democracy thoughts is another position worthy of note.627 
Another point of criticism against ‘Asian Values’ is the influence of globalization, because this 
has the potential to influence traditional values. According to a study from Kansas University, 
most influenced by globalization is interpersonal harmony, followed by relational hierarchy; 
least affected was traditional conservatism as a means of opposing consumerism.628 
The fundamental principles of the ASEAN are based on the so-called ‘ASEAN Way’, which 
identifies the following principles of mutual cooperation: acceptance of the sovereignty, 
equality, territorial integrity, independence and national customs of all Member States, the right 
of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or 
coercion, non-interference in internal affairs, settlement of differences or disputes in a peaceful 
manner, renunciation of the threat or use of force and effective regional cooperation. Although 
those principles are international, in Asian context they can be traced back to cultural and social 
values through the Asian history. 
Whether ASEAN and ASEAN+3 are likely to be a subject for a regional cross-border 
insolvency regulation and what criteria are likely to impact this will be discussed in the next 
chapter. The influence of a cultural grid such as ‘Asian Values’ will be considered in the further 
analysis. Although having a structure of trade and economic union in ASEAN, the national 
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insolvency regimes of its members do not, with exceptions of Singapore, etc., have national 
insolvency rules for dealing with cross-border issues. 
Regarding those implications, it can be concluded that ‘Asian Values’ give on the one hand the 
sense of the national confidence and differentiation between the national states. On the other 
hand, the server as antagonist indicators against the Western approach and showing 
distinctiveness within the region. They show the contrary approach of the Asian region in 
comparison to Western countries. Group-based social identity in Asia reduces the willingness 
to open conflicts while Western approach is individualistically based. Also, the fear of losing 
face is deeply anchored in the society. Being insolvent means in many ways losing face. Finally, 
the left behind development of the legislation process in national states shows it on the regional 
level: there is no substantial regional basis yet for working regional framework that would make 
a collaboration in cases of cross-border insolvency easier. 
In this Chapter V, we made a deeper approach to ASEAN as a subject to a regional regulation 
on cross-border insolvency law. After the introduction of the ASEAN as a regional organization 
of national states, we made an overview of regional solution proposals on how to fix cross-
border insolvency topics in Asian region made by Asian Development Bank and Forum for 
Asian Insolvency Reform. In two further steps, a short overview of the national insolvency 
regimes in the countries of ASEAN has been made, followed by an overview of the traditional 
heritage and historical aspects in countries of ASEAN and their impact on national approach 
on insolvency laws. For example, the fear of losing face is a serious obstacle to admit an 
insolvency law while principle of harmony might further the readiness of debtors to conflict 
resolution in earlier insolvency stages. This leads one to the question how those values can 
encourage a Regional Insolvency Framework in ASEAN. 
Based on foregoing research, Chapter VI will present the most significant criteria for a Regional 
Insolvency Framework in ASEAN considering legal and traditional aspects of Asian society. 
The assessment of criteria will base on existing cross-border insolvency projects. In addition to 
the mentioned criteria, this Chapter VI will consider the world-wide progressive digitalization 






CHAPTER VI – CRITERIA FOR A REGIONAL INSOLVENCY FRAMEWORK IN 
ASEAN AND ASEAN+3 
A Regional Insolvency Framework could be a reasonable solution in these times of 
globalization and transnational business development. This would establish a tangible basis for 
the legal security of international companies within ASEAN. The goal is to achieve the same 
legal consequences as the European Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation or another regional 
entity aims to provide, however with different credentials because it would facilitate the 
handling of cross-border insolvency proceedings in ASEAN. These should be refined on the 
basis of more criteria and particularities appropriate to ASEAN countries. These criteria, as we 
have seen above, are the ‘Asian Values’. 
The previously explored analysis corroborates the non-negligible role that ‘Asian Values’ ought 
to play in designing a Regional Insolvency Framework. It follows then that Western global 
lawmakers should change perspective and consider global regulations such as UNCITRAL 
from the Asian viewpoint.  
A ‘copy-paste method’ does not work for the potential drafting of a cross-border insolvency 
regulation for ASEAN. The European Insolvency Regulation was designed with European 
democratic principles advocating individual rights and interests at its heart. However, it can 
serve a basis or guideline on what criteria and areas that shall be rules by the new law.  
Hence, rules should be chosen which reflect the multidimensional situation and include this 
cultural aspect of 'Asian Values’. This culture-sensitive perspective will create a three-
dimensional model and thereby establish a new approach in the new cross-border insolvency 
project. 
The starting point is to realize that arriving at different approaches to cross-border insolvency 
in every country intrinsically incurs a slight inequality. As mentioned above, an ASEAN 
insolvency rule cannot correspond to the European equivalent even though this would lead to 






In their survey, Tomasic et al. claim that traditional values have become less important for 
insolvency administration.629 However, they remain an invisible but very powerful component 
of contemporary legislation and the praxis of insolvency law. Their consideration during the 
law-making process is likely to simplify and ease its later application. 
Although the European Insolvency Regulation is a valuable and remarkable model for a stable 
insolvency framework, its ‘one-size-fits-all’ method is not workable.630 The reason for that is – 
as mentioned above – a different cultural and historical approach in Asia in comparison to 
Western countries. In further sections, we will look how existing projects can be applied of a 
regional cross-border insolvency solution in ASEAN. Section I presents the cross-border 
insolvency elements in context of ‘Asian Values’ while Section II shows the impacts of 
different existing approaches to cross-border insolvency laws in Asian context. 
Section I – Cross-Border Insolvency Elements in the Context of ‘Asian Values’ 
The RETA project addressed the following areas of application: first, the link between corporate 
debts and the debtor's insolvency in the given regions; secondly, tailor-made advice for regional 
problem-solving regarding insolvency and debt recovery; and finally, making related sources 
and studies publicly available. Insolvency law systems must be regarded as being part of a 
global system with a concerted consideration of its legal, economic, social, commercial and 
cultural factors.631 The following influential cultural factors must be considered in the drafting 
of a new regional rule. The multiple interests present at insolvency proceedings require a solid 
structure, effective and systematic legally-based organization; nevertheless, cultural elements 
in the form of ‘Asian Values’ have a considerable impact. There is a palpable reluctance 
towards court-based proceedings, for example, there is a noted degree of non-confrontation and 
conflict aversion in Thailand and Indonesia with the consequence that most conflicts are 
resolved by negotiation without involving an ordinary court. It is a non-written rule in those 
countries to engage in negotiation before filing a case in front of a court, which was a sign of 
breaching a business relationship, also explaining the low insolvency statistics in Southeast 
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Asian countries. 632  This is a marked consequence of the Confucian harmony principle 
manifested in conflict avoidance. This raises the possibility of informal ‘work-out’ proceedings. 
Singapore and Malaysia have rules recognizing inbound and outbound cases. However, these 
rules are only applicable to individual insolvencies and not in corporate cases.633 
Section II – Adoption of the International Projects on Cross-Border Insolvency by 
the Member States of ASEAN 
In Section II, an assessment of the international rules on cross-border insolvency will be 
conducted and their application in the case of ASEAN will be analysed. 
1. Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency by Asian 
Countries 
In 1994, a colloquium on UNCITRAL was held to develop a solution for cross-border 
insolvency issues, followed by the creation of the Working Group V on cross-border 
insolvency. Among the members of the group were representatives from China, South Korea, 
Singapore, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. 
All nation states in Southeast Asia are encouraged to introduce the UNCITRAL Model Law.634 
Whether or not the adoption of the Model Law would be beneficial in Asian jurisdictions is 
unclear from the outset. As such, there are a number of sustainable arguments both in favour 
and against the adoption of the Model Law in Asia. As a matter of fact, any insolvency law is 
specifically drafted to resolve domestic insolvency cases. Many jurisdictions have drafted 
principles and guidance to reach the appropriate results. Foreign courts and insolvency 
administrators do not have any counsel on applications from foreign courts and other insolvency 
parties seeking assistance and recognition. To overcome these challenges associated with 
globalization, courts expect to have measurable criteria for handling those requests since 
multiple proceedings would accumulate greater costs. This situation requires improvement, 
especially with regard to the facilitation of cooperation between courts in different jurisdictions. 
Such cross-border inter-court cooperation is possible in cases where certain guidance regarding 
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jurisdiction-specific cases is provided explaining how to deal with such cases. As a rule, this 
kind of cooperation is not included in the court system and the absence of these guidance courts 
would give the false impression that they are unable to cooperate in such cases. 
a. Arguments in Favour of the Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
The Model Law is a completed legal product. A satisfying equilibrium must be reached between 
recognizing foreign proceedings whilst protecting national interests. There is no need to 
harmonize aspects such as access, recognition, relief, and judicial cooperation with local laws 
nor other steps that would impact on domestic insolvency rules. The fact is that there are various 
obstacles which impede the adoption and integration of the Model Law. One such obstacle is a 
tendency towards the territorial organization of national insolvency laws, that is if any 
organization exists. In addition, legislators might make mistakes in the implementation of the 
Model Law. For this reason, no government is likely to be the first entity to ratify the measures. 
Although the adoption of the Model Law could be slow, this does not necessarily mean that it 
is thereby weakened. As previously indicated, in Asia most cases are resolved without litigation 
and handled by parties themselves.  
The COMI question complicates matters significantly. However, there are already a plethora of 
rules for correctly determining the COMI. An essential element of this process is the location 
where the business administration is carried out. This criterion can be determined by creditors 
if they request opening of the insolvency proceedings. There are many further factors which are 
likely to be afforded court attention in order to enable it to reasonably determine where the 
COMI is. However, it is up the court alone to independently and honestly verify where the 
COMI is. 
The adoption of the Model Law buoys confidence among international traders and consequently 
among investors and creditors in the local or regional legal system. The Model Law should be 
adopted for this reason, as when a creditor goes to another country and seeks relief, this law 
reassuringly guarantees the stability of the commercial process. 
The Model Law contains rather general provision which would allow national states to 
implement it taking into consideration social, historical and cultural aspects which have a 





who they wish to incorporate it. It can be also seen on examples of the Philippines, Singapore, 
and Myanmar. 
UNCITRAL undertook additional efforts to support national states in implementation process 
by issuing Guide on Enactment, Legislative Guide, and Practice Guide on Cross-Border 
Insolvency Cooperation. UNCITRAL also provides technical assistance in countries planning 
implementation. This would help the Member States of ASEAN to build enough confidence in 
their own legislative power and to build trust towards UNCITRAL. 
In addition, the increasing number of national states have been adopting UNCITRAL Model 
Law since 1997.  
Asia is increasingly reliant on international trade and globalization, a reliance that is only set to 
continue in the future. Consequently, the need for a Model Law will also be a matter of ever 
more apparent urgency. Cross-border investment is growing, but probably not to the extent that 
the world requires and laws such as the Model Law stimulate rather than hamper cross-border 
investment. For these reasons, the adoption of the Model Law by economies engaging in 
globalized trade ought to be seriously considered.  
As previously mentioned, the prime example of the successful adoption of the Model Law is 
illustrated by Japan. Although modified, Japan has adopted the Model Law. There have already 
been cases that Japanese courts have decided on the application of the adopted Model Law. 
Why should other Asian countries adopt the Model Law? Japan expects that its bankruptcy 
judgements will be recognized abroad, and the adoption of the Model Law would also allow 
other countries to expect their judgements to be recognized by Japan based on the principle of 
reciprocity. If foreign debtors were to endeavour, to preserve and to recover assets in Japan, 
this might have a longer-term impact on foreign investment in and by Japan. The Japanese 
government and lawmakers have recognized this trend and have taken efficacious action in 
implementing the Model Law. Equal, effective, and efficient bankruptcy administration likely 
does not benefit all participants in proceedings; however, the inefficiency of insolvency 
proceedings often leads to decline in debtors' assets. The advantages of the Model Law are 
perceptible for all participants in the cross-border insolvency cases, including Japan and any 
other Asian country. The security of the funds is considered a major factor among international 





The Model Law can help to achieve idea that the adopting country is suitable for international 
business and trade. 
b. Arguments Against the Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in Asia 
Despite the favourable reaction to the Model Law, there are voices among legal scientists and 
practitioners expressing their opposition to the adoption and implementation of the Model Law. 
The fact is that the Model Law intends to create an appropriate legal environment for participant 
of the insolvency proceedings to handle insolvency cases and requires adequate national 
insolvency laws. The legal reality in Asia is different from this idealistic scenario. Asian 
jurisdictions may be not ready now or in the foreseeable future for the Model Law. Even in 
countries which already trust each other such as Singapore and Malaysia, judges who are 
already inclined to communicate and provide them with the better mechanisms face some 
difficulties, e.g. the United States and the United Kingdom in the Maxwell Case.635 These 
jurisdictions communicated with each other, however, it should be pointed out that both 
communicated in the same language and have a common law background. If the Maxwell case 
worked, would it also work for an insolvency case between Cambodia and Indonesia? This is 
another obstacle to consider – the fact that between Asian countries there are wide language 
and cultural differences which do not exist between countries that have already adopted the 
Model Law, and which are hard to overcome. The overarching question is not to clarify whether 
to adopt the Model Law or not, it is of far greater importance to determine the result, i.e. what 
advantages all interest parties will benefit from.  
Most countries which have already adopted the Model Law share English as a common 
language; those are countries which share cultural, historic, and legal common ground. With 
the exception of Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, the legal infrastructure in Asia is more 
underdeveloped than in other states. One could argue that national insolvency laws must first 
be developed before the Model Law could make a qualitative difference and bring about the 
aforementioned benefits. For example, bankruptcy law in China is carried out before court 
because judges do not have the necessary experience required to address domestic insolvency 
cases, let alone international cases. This is a kind of imposing solution but provides a critical 
blueprint. A result-oriented solution in Asian jurisdictions should be an intergroup approach 
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with judges, courts and insolvency practitioners. In the beginning, some modern and 
appropriate infrastructures for legal institutions should be established. In addition, the domestic 
insolvency laws should undergo improvements. The valuable impact of the Model Law will 
increase if modern insolvency laws that are pertinent to the modern economy develop.  
Another objection to the adoption of the Model Law in Southeast Asia centres on the long 
history of distrust between the Asian legal systems. Before the Model Law can deliver any 
beneficial results, this wariness must be remedied. The local understanding of fairness which is 
also address by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency in the country of 
proceedings is not necessarily the same notion of fairness in the home country of the investor. 
In a number of jurisdictions, local politicians always award priority to local creditors, e.g. 
Thailand and Singapore without the assistance of judges. If a local judge is called, it depends 
which parties are involved. This is at odds with the nature and intent of the Model Law. With 
regard to this question of fairness that varies from country to country in Asia, one must consider 
if this is because they are developing countries and have not yet reached the developed stage 
economically, politically and in sense of a legal system. In the end, the central issue is not the 
implementation of the Model Law itself but whether there are incorrupt judges who possess the 
necessary insolvency experience to apply the law and make the parties understand and follow 
it. The question for investors to ask is not whether there are any laws in a certain Asian country, 
but rather whether those laws work effectively. 
The discussion regarding the regulation of insolvencies in company groups is still ongoing and 
remains an open issue because the overwhelming majority of foreign investments in Asia are 
undertaken via subsidiary companies. In fact, Japan and South Korea have adopted the Model 
Law and even then, Japan adopted a modified version, not ratifying the Model Law as is. In 
Singapore, the Model Law was recommended for adoption and incorporated in 2017. The fact 
is that the countries in Asia do not perceive noticeable results from adopting the Model Law. 
Indeed, across the globe, few countries perceive these results because only 48 states in 51 
jurisdictions have adopted the Model Law.636 There are various international insolvency cases 
which utilize Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code, but until countries in the Asian region 
 





improve their infrastructure and enforce the Model Law where it can make any difference, there 
will be no major benefit from adopting it in this region. 
The definition of public policy might differ from country to country, and with regard to legal 
consequences, this might be reflected in the unequal treatment of foreign creditors. This might 
build further obstacles to the adoption of the Model Law. The issue of public policy is in fact 
the basis for understanding fairness, equity and the consequences of sovereignty. Nevertheless, 
the term ‘public policy’ will be determined by the country where the investor operates. If the 
government is involved, public policy is likely to be strong. 
Although ASEAN exists as a body, the Southeast Asian region is not particularly homogenous, 
not in laws, politics or languages. For the Model Law to work, there is no reason to harmonize 
religions or languages, but there is certainly a need to this across the region's institutions. The 
benefits will come not as a result of the Model Law. It would rather be a result of an effective 
and structured legislative work. A further point of mention is that many concessions and 
amendments will have to be made to the Model Law for any Asian country to reasonably adopt 
it. These concessions will make the Model Law ineffective because the presence of the law 
does not guarantee the presence of its enforcement. 
c. Mediating Approach 
There are various pros and cons in relation to the adoption of the Model Law in Asia. It is not 
the fast-changing economic and financial environment, globalization or technological 
development which decide whether to implement the Model Law, rather the decisive factor is 
far more to use the contra arguments as warnings and indicators for its future adoption. 
A standardized insolvency system which offers a link to international proceedings gains 
multiple advantages. First, it would it more attractive for foreign investments. Second, it enjoys 
a higher level of trust from all market participant which might be later participants to insolvency 
proceedings. Finally, by using a trustworthy insolvency system a Member State can build a 
long-term jurisprudence giving predictability and confidence into the insolvency mechanisms 
which is crucial not only for local but also for foreign participants to insolvency proceedings. 
Although offering persuading advantages, for tradition-based national states adoption of the 
Model Law relates to difficulties. One the one hand, some Member States do not have a 





on the other hand, it might lack of experience in applying new rules for judges, but also for 
other insolvency practitioners. 
These drawbacks should be areas which spur the amelioration of the legal situation, but not be 
obstacles to its implementation. Of course, Japan, Singapore or Myanmar cannot be taken as a 
sole measure with which to compare other Asian countries among the Members of ASEAN, 
but it can serve as a reference of the possibility of success. Switching from the UCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, in the next paragraph we will take a closer look at the 
European solutions on cross-border insolvency law and their implications for ASEAN cross-
border insolvency cases. 
2. The European Insolvency Regulation 
The European Insolvency Regulation EIR 1346/2000 is a successful instrument in handling 
cross-border insolvencies within the European Union that has been replaced by EIR 2015/848. 
As a regional solution, it indisputably simplifies the handling of cross-border insolvency cases 
arising among the European Union Member States where this Regulation is of direct legal 
effect. Although being an integral part of the European legal system, it cannot be directly 
translated to ASEAN for historical and technical reasons. In a nutshell, the EIR is based on a 
mature political system of European Union which has a long tradition and strongly sophisticated 
legislative process, training mechanisms and case law. Already W. Alan J. Watson who 
indicated the moving of a rule or a law system from one sovereign state to another and invented 
the notion of ‘legal transplant’. According to his diffusionism-based arguments, most changes 
in a legal system are based on borrowings from other legal systems637 which became universal 
in the last thirty years.638 However, the borrowing argument has not been always shared by 
leading scholarship and arguing that the degree of inspiration by foreign system may vary which 
leads to the end that some laws are not suitable for a certain local context.639 Nevertheless, the 
Member States of ASEAN should consider at least analysing elements of the regulation and 
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reframing them into a new structure which is tailored to the nature, functions, purposes, and 
methods surrounding the legitimation of this interstate body because first, those sophisticated 
methods has been already approved by applying them in a regional community such as the 
European Union, second, at least consideration of those elements would lead the ASEAN 
Member States to new insights on placing of the foreign elements in a regional insolvency 
regulation.640  In a nutshell, the integration of new factors and re-integration of borrowed 
elements for the adjustment of the customized regulation should be a further step. 
3. Good Practice Standards of the Asian Development Bank 
In 2000, the Asian Development Bank drafted ‘Good Practice Standards’ for the RETA 
economies,641 applicable in cases of corporate insolvency proceedings.642 These Standards do 
not reflect individual insolvency proceedings. Although various legal systems bring with them 
a number of differences, the ‘Good Practice Standards’ are based on basic principles and 
approaches that are common to the RETA economies, in particular concerning the global 
economic environment, economic expectations and commercial needs, such as the possibility 
to eliminate and remove an indebted company from the market, enabling creditors' enforcement 
powers, need for predictability, stability, order, equitable treatment, efficiency, transparency, 
and the need to meet non-commercial expectations, such as labour and social issues.643 
The Asian Development Bank recommends that the legislation on insolvency law in RETA 
countries shall be based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, e.g. Good 
Practice Standard 16 says: ‘An insolvency law regime includes provisions relating to 
recognition, relief and cooperation in cases of cross-border insolvency, preferably by the 
adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency’. 
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Section III – Criteria for Scope of the Governing Structure of the Common ASEAN 
Insolvency Framework 
What elements must be considered in designing a common regional cross-border insolvency 
framework within ASEAN? Such a framework supersedes defective national insolvency laws 
or the lack thereof, fulfils a need for rules on cross-border insolvency cases. Alongside a legal 
structure, it must consider cultural traits and systems of values in order to make the law more 
realizable. In addition, other impacts require analysis and consideration. These impacts are 
technology and innovation factors, which are left aside by legislators in insolvency proceedings. 
1. Legal Criteria 
Various legal impacts require essential consideration in drafting a cross-border insolvency 
regulation in ASEAN. However, some necessary aspects of such a regulation do not speak in 
its favour. On the one hand, it is a strong intervention in the sovereignty of a national state and 
yet none of the countries in Southeast Asia currently has a functioning mechanism to resolve 
insolvencies in a cross-border context. The European Insolvency Regulation was tailor-made 
for the Member States of the European Union and cannot be directly applied in a non-European 
context; however, some of its sustainable criteria should be considered for a functional system 
of handling cross-border insolvency cases. 
a. Centre of Main Interests (COMI) 
The European Insolvency Regulation applies the COMI principle to define which jurisdiction 
within the European Union (with exception of the Denmark) takes priority should there be 
several insolvency proceedings in different Member States. Any conflict of COMI might be 
solved on a temporary basis, e.g. first come, first served because the competent jurisdiction is 
where the company seat of the debtor is registered. Whether or not this would be an applicable 
rule for Asia is unclear before its introduction. Nevertheless, the application of the COMI 
concept in a regional frame could sustainably converge issues of jurisdiction within ASEAN 
because it would provide rules on how to define competent jurisdiction. At the very least, the 
rules governing the identification of the COMI would ease the definition of a competent court. 
The legislators of the Member States of ASEAN might, however, go a step further and define 





b. Central Insolvency Proceedings Court 
A central insolvency proceedings court is a slightly different model of the main forum. The 
introduction of a central insolvency proceedings court in ASEAN could be a suitable solution 
for several reasons. Although national courts are supposed to ensure a secure, fast and 
transparent proceeding, this often fails due to lack of resources. Hence, central insolvency 
courts might deliver pragmatic solutions. Firstly, it facilitates transparency for both debtors and 
creditors in cases of cross-border insolvencies and enables the same level of information 
exchange between the parties to insolvency proceedings. This model would ensure more trust 
and confidence in the judicial authority and for good reason given the low level of confidence 
in justice and governmental bodies across Southeast Asia caused by numerous corruption 
scandals. Secondly, the feasibility of effective proceedings would increase. The disclosure of 
information would be equal across all participants in the insolvency proceedings. Finally, the 
sole insolvency court would be better informed because it will be the only court receiving this 
information from the entire proceedings and consolidate it, positively affecting its efficiency 
and effectiveness. In addition, such handling of proceedings would fasten and standardize 
insolvency proceedings throughout ASEAN. This would, hence, increase the predictability and 
reduce duration of the proceedings which also means reduction of the costs. 
c. Central Insolvency Proceedings Register 
The European Insolvency Regulation suggests furnishing the public with all information about 
the insolvency proceedings in the Member States. Registers containing information on cross-
border cases should be introduced and interconnected on the European level. This avoids 
parallel cost-intensive insolvency proceedings in Member States.  
With the aim of avoiding at least some technically unsurmountable obstacles in cross-border 
insolvency cases, ASEAN could consider creating a central administration authority for cross-
border insolvency cases. Its scope of competencies and tasks would be defined by the Member 
States. Despite its impingement of the sovereignty of nation states and especially of their 
respective courts, this structure might be a cost-reducing alternative for some complicated 





This authority could form part of a Regional Insolvency Framework. The composition of this 
body would require national judges with expertise on national insolvency law to qualify the 
place proceedings are to be convened, etc. 
The following functions would be suggestions for a Central ASEAN Insolvency Authority: 
addressing insolvency filings, appointing competence for the international (leading) insolvency 
administrator as well local administrators, performing central administration, and finally 
distributing the debtor's assets. In addition, this body would advise, control, monitor and support 
all the interested and affected parties, e.g. creditors and employees. 
A favourable feature of the Central ASEAN Insolvency Authority would be an end to the need 
for court-to-court communication because all the relevant information would be gathered by 
the Central ASEAN Insolvency Authority and distributed to the competent courts. 
Naturally, the centralization of regional insolvency treatment could face various obstacles such 
as language issues and the timeframe between the registration of proceedings and the beginning 
of the inability to pay the debts.  
Thomson emphasized the dearth of trust and fondness of Singapore towards ASEAN 
regionalism.644 Meanwhile, this has changed a lot. Taking into consideration that Singapore is 
the first country in ASEAN to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 
one can assume that the Singaporean authorities are open to discussion concerning a Regional 
Insolvency Framework in ASEAN. The strategic role of Singapore in ASEAN has increased 
significantly, e. g. in 2015 the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC) has announced strong growth in Asia in 2015. It confirmed Singapore's 
place as the fourth most chosen seat for arbitration worldwide. In addition to legal framework, 
there are various cultural indicators impacting the structure and functioning of legal documents.  
d. Common Language of Insolvency Proceedings and Judgements 
As mentioned, when addressing obstacles to the UNICTRAL Model Law implementation, the 
variety of languages in Asia may seriously hinder the application of common rules. Firstly, the 
different legal terms cannot be understood in the same way. Secondly, translations from one 
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Asian language to another may not entirely capture the meaning of legal concepts applicable in 
the insolvency proceeding in question. Thirdly, most ASEAN countries do not have insolvency 
proceedings rules addressing cross-border insolvency issues. For a common insolvency 
regulation, a common language – which should reasonably be English – would foster common 
understanding of legal concepts which Member States can agree on. It would require more 
precise definition of legal terms and concepts as well as a consideration of local legal traditions 
or the absence thereof. Nevertheless, this sense of having a common denominator will deepen 
the understanding of the common goal, which is the improvement and increase of debtors' assets 
and their allocation for a higher, equal and equitable satisfaction of domestic and foreign 
creditors to cross-border insolvency proceedings. Depending on the requirements of national 
states, judgements can be translated from English into the languages of parties involved in 
proceedings. 
e. Equal Creditors' Rights Protection System 
The protection of creditors' rights within insolvency proceedings differs from that in ASEAN 
national states. While some suggest an effective protection system, others do not even offer 
one. A system which equally protects creditors' rights is an essential building block for a 
common Regional Insolvency Framework. The harmonization of the divergent priorities of 
secured creditors is the first step to fulfil this requirement. This is achievable through the 
definition of common rules on secured creditors' rights. In addition, next to the redefinition of 
priorities on the regional level, equality is necessary in early insolvency stages to guarantee 
stable rights for creditors to file an application for the commencement of insolvency 
proceedings as well as for the registration of their claims to the central insolvency proceedings 
register. This transparent process also reflects the structural ‘footprint’ of the whole proceeding 
as well as guaranteeing the equal treatment of all creditors – both domestic and foreign – in all 






2. Cultural Criteria 
There are a variety of influential factors that may affect the legal architecture of a nation state. 
Among others, these factors include: political elements; economic elements; commercial issues 
such as stability, predictability, efficiency, fairness, and transparency; social elements such as 
religion, language, and the adherence to particular social values.645 All of these form the cultural 
frame of society and reflect its major logical, behavioural and decisional structure. This 
paragraph will consider the basic nature of culture and how regional cultural traits, such as 
‘Asian Values’, lay the foundation for the future legal environment of Asia. 
a. Culture as a Litmus Paper for the Law 
To identify the impact of culture on legal regulation, one must first seek a satisfactory definition 
of the term ‘culture’. Although many concepts of culture exist,646 one of the most widespread 
is the definition of ‘culture’ as being ‘conceptualized as a phenomenon lacking coherence, full 
of complexities, something that is dynamic, continuously changeable, fundamentally fluid, and 
endlessly multiplicity’. The term ‘culture’ is three-dimensional, the first of these dimensions 
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being from the postmodernist perspective. Here one envisages the individual as someone who 
is producing and not reproducing within his means and for his needs.647 
‘Culture is to society what memory is to individuals’.648 Triandis explains the individualistic 
and collectivist ends of the cultural spectrum through the dichotomies of tightness/looseness 
and simplicity/complexity. Tight and simple cultures tend to be collectivistic, e.g. Japan, while 
loose and complex ones are more individualistic. In addition, Triandis distinguishes between 
horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism: horizontal individualism means that 
people are independent but claim to be similar and equal; in horizontal collectivism people are 
interdependent and claim oneness and social cohesion, e.g. Confucian China; vertical 
individualism emphasizes individual values of ‘being the best’ and having special privileges, 
e.g. Germany and France; and vertical collectivism means serving the intra-group, sacrificing 
one's own interests for those of the group, e.g. Japan.649 While individualistic societies tend to 
pursue personal aims, collective societies are set up to strive for the goals of the group.650 
These four combinations can be explained in terms of being achievement-oriented (vertical 
individualism), cooperative (horizontal collectivism), dutiful (vertical collectivism) or 
identifying with the unique self (horizontal individualism).651 
According to Hofstede, there are five dimensions of governing national cultures: power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, masculinity, long-term 
orientation.652 
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Traditionally, individualism stands in opposition with collectivism and whereas individualism 
is typical of the West, collectivism is inherent to Asian societies.653 The core message of 
collectivism is a binding obligation of individuals towards the group and thereby implies the 
following features: firstly, belonging to a group is a key element of one's personal identity, 
secondly, sacrifice of one's individual goals for the sake of the group and thirdly, intra-group 
harmony is more valuable than individual well-being.654 
According to Schwartz, all individuals in any society recognize tradition and conformity, 
achievement and power, hedonism and stimulation, self-direction and universalism, security 
and benevolence.655 The values within a society identify its dimensions, goals and others of its 
patterns.656 In addition, Schwartz identifies seven types of values: conservatism, hierarchy, 
mastery, intellectual and affective autonomy, harmony and egalitarian commitment. 657  As 
Schwartz maintains, South Asia shows a strong sense of inertia and hierarchy, although the 
region is influenced by Confucian philosophy it is even more starkly affected by this 
embeddedness where intellectual autonomy reveals large differences, particularly in Japan and 
Singapore.658 The high level of embeddedness and the fulfilment of obligations within the social 
hierarchy accounts for the lack of law in the state.659 Schwartz also speaks about the cultural 
distinctiveness of the world regions in relation to their geographical proximity.660 
What is the link between law and local society? Local order is one of the determinants of the 
legal system and its function. Local and regional aspects affect the structure and the process of 
law. This too concerns the structure of cross-border insolvency law. The markedness of the law 
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is directly based upon general cultural values that are rooted in the region. This value dimension 
is one of the major measurements661 for legal rules. 
Japanese society approaches the law in an individual manner. ‘Nihonjinron’ is a Japanese 
phenomenon which distinguishes Japan from all other countries and confirms its uniqueness in 
the world.662 At the same time, the Japanese are very averse to litigation in order to resolve 
commercial disputes. 
When one speaks about culture, one is intrinsically speaking about cultural values, and in the 
Asian context about ‘Asian Values’. One perspective of ‘Asian Values’ asserts that the Western 
legal provisions are not compatible with ‘Asian Values’ and cannot be implemented in Asian 
countries.663 However, this assumption should be regarded from another perspective. ‘Asian 
Values’ can be taken into consideration as guiding criteria. 
b. Impact of ‘Asian Values’ on Insolvency Law 
In this paragraph the ‘Asian Values’ will be assessed based on their impact on insolvency law. 
The following ‘Asian Values’ will be considered, assessing their merit for integration into the 
legal process of a common framework: collectivism, fear of losing face, hierarchy, conflict 
avoidance and harmony. 
Collectivism 
One of the core cultural values that has a significant impact is the collective society approach. 
On the meta-level, collectivism as a value in Asian society stands in direct contrast to 
individualism in Western countries. This aspect results in the lower rate of the pursuit of 
individual interests via legal means in Asia and to the consequent higher proportion of informal 
workouts or out-of-court negotiations. In the case of insolvency proceedings, the impact of this 
cultural value centres on collective action where the debtors' assets are shared on a proportional 
basis. Collectivism may have a positive effect, at least on national insolvency laws, because 
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collective interests are commonly perceived as having higher value than individual ones. It is 
for the national insolvency lawmaker to reconsider the definition of fairness, especially in issues 
regarding priority-ranking between domestic and foreign creditors. The issue of fairness may 
impede the collective proceeding in the way that the asset allocation will differ from those stated 
by the court; however, this consideration of the collectivist value is necessary. Furthermore, if 
the central insolvency register were to reflect the collective understanding of the law, this would 
be a promising step towards its implementation. 
Fear of Losing Face 
Fear of losing face is of primary concern in many of the Asian countries, e.g. Brunei, China and 
Laos. There is also talk of the ‘stigma of insolvency’, in this case it is likely that the local debtor 
will avoid announcing his inability to pay. In Asian countries where losing of face is of 
significance, it is advisable when drafting regulations to bring forward the date of insolvency. 
The expectation is that the debtor will avoid applying for insolvency if possible. Hence, there 
are new mechanisms required for timely prevention. This element should also be considered on 
the regional level, e.g. in the case of ASEAN. 
Hierarchy 
Hierarchy and respect for the elderly is a further element that is characteristic of ‘Asian Values’. 
This value can be seen as going hand in hand with the ‘stigma of bankruptcy’. The management 
team of the debtor can hamper other influential employees from filing insolvency cases. The 
hierarchical structures in the debtor's company must be observed and respected, even in cases 
where the conditions for filing an insolvency case are given. For this reason, new mechanisms 
are essential in enabling the debtor's management to file an insolvency case. 
Conflict Avoidance 
The effect of conflict avoidance in the opening of insolvency proceedings can be double-edged. 
On the one hand, the Asian tradition of conflict avoidance is an auspicious precondition for out-
of-court conflict resolution, saving costs and taking the strain off courts. In China and Japan 
especially, before filing a claim the parties sit at the negotiation table and endeavour to find an 
amicable solution. However, this propensity for conflict avoidance also has a negative impact 
because the debtor may delay filing for insolvency. This is like the delay caused due to the 





to face a conflict which would result in having a winner and a loser. These characteristics stem 
from the Confucian concept of harmony. 
Harmony 
Harmony in Asia is a philosophy of both life and behaviour. All spheres of society reflect this 
desire for harmony. What impacts can this desire have? If we touch once more on the value of 
avoiding conflict, we can see that debtor and creditors would be willing to discuss insolvency 
issues. Institutional lawmakers can reflect this fact in the priority between local and foreign 
creditors as well as the general mode of distribution of the debtors' assets.  
Although those legal and cultural criteria deserve consideration, another major factor affects 
the development of transnational cases and cross-border regulations. This is the influence of 
technology on cross-border cases. Hence, insights drawn based on cultural sensitivities need to 
account for the role played by technological innovation. 
 
 
In the Sections I, II and III we dealt with the questions how the traditional matters and cultural 
matters on the one hand and existing legal projects on the other hand build a complex of criteria 
which can be assessed for a regional insolvency regulation in ASEAN. However, in the last 














plays more and more important role. Thus, this fact will be addressed in the following Section 
IV. 
Section IV – Changing the Frame: Legal Technology as a New Image for Regional 
Cross-Border Insolvency Mindset 
The world of business experiences more and more digitalization of processes in many areas. 
While private companies integrate this development into its daily business, courts worldwide 
seem to stay behind this ground-breaking change. The legislators shall integrate the digital 
component into the new regulations in order to consider the needs of the contemporary 
requirements of business in difficulties. This this Section IV, we will look at further criteria that 
might be considered for the Regional Insolvency Framework in ASEAN. Those criteria are 
artificial intelligence and automated law, big data, blockchain technology and smart contracts, 
internet of things, social media and data protection. 
1. New Implications – Underestimated Role of Innovation and Digital Age 
Globalization enables business growth, while digitalization plays a new role, crossing borders 
with new technologies without taking a single step. Legislators and law practitioners face new 
challenges. On the one hand, many businesses have gone online, but still act and interact 
globally while ‘only’ crossing borders online. On the other hand, new technologies have given 
legislators, litigators, judges, various legal professionals, and institutional legal bodies the 
chance to use them and carry out their legislative and regulative work more efficiently. The 
consciousness surrounding technology's impact on legal issues remains insufficient and often 
misses the spirit of the modern era. The role of technology for law is highly underestimated, 
indeed there are only few legal initiatives, which are predominantly private, which are 
undertaking empirical research on legal transformation and the role of new technologies in the 
future of the law, even though the effects of technology are independent of the steps taken in 
legal transformation. 
Legislators all over the world still ignore, or at least undervalue, the role of technology, its 
changes and trends. Technology's lacking role in legal regulations, national and international 
rules, as well as the methods of its interpretation illustrate this gap. 
The current technology trends involve big data, social media, cloud computing, digital 





economy, disruptive technology, virtual and augmented reality, blockchain technology, 
decentralized autonomous organizations, digital transformation, shared economy, smart 
contracts, etс. Individual areas of the aforementioned trends' development will be shown further 
in the following section. 
2. Artificial Intelligence and Automated Law 
Artificial intelligence and the discussion around automation law traces back to the early 70's 
and experienced a revival in the 21st century, involving questions of routine legal research 
within a computer database with indexation, as well as searching for more sophisticated 
programs that would have the semantic capability to ‘understand’ and analyse legal blocks.664 
This technology is steadily going to be further developed and open greater opportunities. The 
process can enhance efficiency and reduce transaction costs. Software will gradually be 
improved while a human learns and practises less. However, this approach has limits. A 
machine is not able to think to the breadth and depth that a human being does.  
This discussion mainly refers to the application of law in legal praxis, e.g. by lawyers and 
courts. The same scenario is conceivable at the institutional level, in the case of creating new 
legislation. Artificial intelligence can be deployed in the regulation drafting process, 
introducing additional criteria to a legal database, and enhancing the quality and precision of 
the law-making process. Hereby more criteria are incorporated into the grounds for decision-
making, more variations and possibilities for resulting outcomes, e.g. by categorizing clauses, 
structuring legal questionnaires and other assessments. Legislative institutions and legal 
professionals will have to develop other professions and subject fields. 
3. What is Big Data and Why Does It Matter? 
The term ‘big data’ is characterized by the steadily growing amount of data and IT solutions 
the attempt to structure and organize them, because most big data emanate from social networks 
and is consequently unstructured. Those datasets are beyond of the ability of typical software 
tools. New technologies and communication platforms transformed the human imagination 
about the collection and processing of data. Big data is typified by the following characteristics: 
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volume, variety, velocity, variability and veracity.665 Like every innovative issue, big data bring 
new opportunities but also new challenges which legislators, courts, insolvency administrators 
and other participants of insolvency proceedings must overcome.  
The positive impacts of big data are multifaceted, though depend on the branch and sector and 
their application of metadata intelligence. Through digitalization of analogue sources, these 
were made easily available.666 Businesses can expect new opportunities on the strategic level. 
Companies using big data can strengthen themselves and enhance their intelligence in making 
precise and correct decisions, improve their risk analyses and products, and reduce costs and 
other expenditures. The intelligent use of big data makes for competitive advantages, and 
enables better strategic decision-making, effective control of operational processes, as well as 
higher product and service quality. Another benefit of big data is transparency; knowledge of 
the customers’ needs arises using transaction data and marketing. An organization can find out 
new facts about their customers, partners, markets, etc.667 Therefore, big data promotes business 
intelligence and is an asset in owning a company because it contributes to the added values of 
the company, helping to reduce costs and refine a company's marketing and other strategies. 
The emergence of big data is the result of three main causes: the digitalization of business 
documents and the business itself, more data accumulation, and data monetization. However, 
big data does not ensure the quality of the data, this arises only as a result of its quantity because 
the gathering process of data remains unconnected to the data's eventual structure.668 A host of 
issues appear owing to a lack of long-term planning.669 Furthermore, big data faces challenges 
in data privacy law through the uncontrolled transfer of personal data. This harbours risks for 
data security for company data too. The wrong search criteria can lead to wrong results; to get 
a grip on big data, some instruments, such as big data analytics and data mining, have been 
developed. Big data analytics help to handle the data while ensuring speed and efficiency. There 
are tools that describe and analyse big data, facilitating the decision process for companies to 
reduce costs and launch new products and services. Some organizations apply specific analytics 
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called ‘advanced’ analytics (also ‘discovery’ or ‘exploratory’ analytics). 670  Business 
intelligence can be informed by data analytics;671 however, they require high performance and 
scalability.672 
Data mining searches for new findings in huge amounts of data entail the goal of presenting 
new models, templates and other business relevant issues for business analysis and business 
development. Mining data garners new knowledge from statistics and other knowledge sources. 
In short, data mining is a technique that extracts knowledge from the large amount of data673 
for its further application in business. 
4. Blockchain Technology and Smart Contracts 
‘A blockchain is a sequential database of information that is secured by methods of 
cryptographic proof, and it offers an alternative to classical financial ledgers’.674 One element 
of technology capable of impacting insolvency proceedings is smart contracts. Smart contracts 
are software tools which can document, verify, track and negotiate contracts. This is quite an 
old idea having first been suggested by cryptologist Nick Szabo in 1994 but is only now coming 
currently into play. A suitable field for the application of the smart contract technology within 
the context of insolvency proceedings could be insolvency agreements, proposed by the 
UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency in 2010 675  which provides 
information for practitioners and judges on practical aspects of communication and cooperation 
in cross-border insolvency case’. This technology offers more security in negotiating 
agreements as well as facilitating their enforcement. 
This reframing of traditional values affects both business and law. It does not necessarily 
remove these from the playing field. However, they are portrayed in a new light. The age of 
transformation inevitably leads to rethinking the values which affect the economic and legal 
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systems that have shaped nation states and multistate unions for decades. Smart contracts can 
expedite legal and negotiating steps. Smart contracts technology may also be used in the 
regulation drafting process, for documenting stakeholder's views as well as in insolvency 
proceedings generally, e.g. as part of creditors' committee etc. 
5. The Internet of Things (IoT) 
Digitalizing a business changes its nature and pace. In theory it provides new sources of revenue 
and turnover opportunities. Digitalization of the business creates new relationships between 
debtors and creditors while easing and expediting information flow and the speed of business 
transactions. It mainly concerns data, and big data, which is made more accessible and open to 
analysis. Connecting the physical and digital world, technology pushes the business to a higher 
level of development and operability. One such technology is the Internet of Things (IoT). 
The notion of the IoT first appeared in 1999 and was introduced by Kevin Ashton, but there is 
no uniform definition of the IoT.676 It enables control of the objects in the physical world 
through remote access677 and includes artificial intelligence. For example in personal health 
technology, the IoT refers to the use of wearables, and in the case of greenhouses adapting 
specially to the climate, 678  these are climate control devices. 679  The IoT aims for the 
standardization of digital services and their components, the introduction of an easy accessible 
and secure network, the reduction of the transaction costs and the development of an additional 
network that enables value-added cost-reducing services. 
In addition, it allows flexibility of access and facilitates the integration of emerging markets 
into the global supply chain, as businesses in developing countries often do not have sufficient 
financial means and logistical resources at their disposal.680 Companies started to build business 
models based on the IoT and to introduce IoT-based products and services under the heading 
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‘industry 4.0’. The combination of digital and physical components creates further added value 
by inventing new products, innovative business models and IT-based services and products, all 
connected to a global product system.681 
Although innovative in a broad spectrum of economic sectors, the IoT remains on the edge of 
transformation in business and society. While business drives forward the process of 
globalization, most companies are still not prepared to transform to be fully in line with its 
evolution. Such a transformation requires knowledge and clearly structured processes, first, to 
be possible at all and second, to be effective and efficient in the long term. The IoT raises 
different issues such as security, privacy, interoperability and standards, legal and regulatory 
issues, economic and development matters, 682  transparency, 683  accountability, 684  and the 
allocation of critical resources685 which make up modern technology. 
The IoT reflects a sustainable need for appropriate legal regulations that are transparent and 
accessible for each participant of insolvency proceedings. For this reason, the governmental 
and other public bodies must support private sector. The IoT's administration necessitates a 
multifaceted and flexible framework which allows for an equally flexible regulatory approach 
to the handling of cross-border insolvency issues. Businesses and customers are the main 
stakeholders in the IoT, and hence require access to insolvency proceedings in their roles as 
debtors and creditors in an equal capacity and with equal rights. Their contributions are valuable 
inputs for modern law design.686 Through communication and information exchange on the 
IoT, the legislator will be kept up to date in business and technology affairs. The same approach 
is just as indispensable in cross-border insolvency cases. Insights from businesses in their role 
as debtors and customers in their role as creditors in legal process illustrate their requirements 
precisely and cement their preferences in terms of formation, shaping and arrangement of 
proceedings based on efficiency and effectivity and reducing administrative expenses. 
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6. Social Media and Insolvency Proceedings 
Social media is a part of the Web 2.0 generation.687 The presence of a corporate entity on social 
media makes provides a detailed, structured and transparent ‘footprint’ of the business and 
associated stakeholders. It is likely to enable and support some unwilling disclosure of 
information and break sensitive privacy principles affecting one field or another where the 
business in question is involved. The publication of mistaken, incomplete, or inexact 
information may lead to the deception of creditors and may show or hide the probability of 
insolvency if this is the case. Moreover, this is likely to encourage creditors to undertake further 
business and financial transactions, having a detrimental effect on the security of their invested 
assets. At same time, social media presence runs a high risk and harbours pitfalls regarding 
insolvency cases.  
The functionality of social media continues to change as it grows. It touches on seven areas of 
implications, which are identity, sharing, presence, conversations, relationships, reputations and 
groups. 688  So-called ‘citizen journalism’ 689  increases the likelihood of spreading incorrect 
information affecting the way information is portrayed to creditors. Furthermore, this disclosure 
of information can lead to unequal scattering of information among creditors concerning an 
imminent insolvency situation. On the other side, creditors who receive unofficial information 
about the impending insolvency have more of a chance to retrieve their assets from the debtor's 
possession before other creditors are officially notified by the insolvency administrator, eligible 
authorities or insolvency professionals. 
7. Cross-Border Insolvency in the Digital Age – Technology-Driven Smart Law Design 
Insolvency practitioners should be aware of the power modern media and digital age hold in 
enabling the collection of more data and processing more information than ever before. This 
data may be not available to the court. Ensuring the existence of and gathering the necessary 
data may be a challenge which some courts will face. The use of technology as a method for 
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accelerating insolvency proceedings as well as a mean of storage for insolvency data such as a 
cloud is a new implication on laws of the future. Analysing data streams is likely to improve 
the quality and precision of legal rules and proceedings. Technological progress raises further 
questions regarding insolvency proceedings. What happens with big data in the insolvent 
companies? Who owns those data: debtors or creditors? What are the implications of big data 
and digital transformation for lawmakers and law practitioners? In the case of exchanging 
information across borders on insolvency-related issues, technology will grow in quantity. In 
consideration of the legal criteria, one could create an ‘insolvency cloud’ for gathering 
information related to insolvency proceedings and thereby build up insolvency proceedings’ 
‘footprint’, integrating different categories and taking into consideration constant and variable 
factors. In this way, the competent court and other participants will be able to cooperate and 
communicate quickly and efficiently, and hence reduce the costs of insolvency proceedings. In 
turn, this will increase the debtor's assets to be allocated between the creditors. 
8. Data Protection Impact on Cross-Border Insolvency  
Although digitalization opens many opportunities for insolvency proceedings, many challenges 
must still be overcome. Data protection gains more relevance for cross-border insolvency cases 
after the General Data Protection Regelation (EU) 2016/679 came in force. Considering the 
increasing importance of privacy law, the court and insolvency administrators must bear in 
mind the protection of the personal data of all parties taking part in insolvency proceedings. 
The following questions still require answers. Firstly, what personal data is regulated in the 
insolvency cloud? This touches on issues such as data anonymization, the ability to access this 
data, data fragmentation, etc. Secondly, who is responsible for handling data in the insolvency 
cloud – debtor, creditors, insolvency administrators, insolvency courts or other data processors 
such as cloud providers? Thirdly, which national data privacy rules apply, i.e. what is the 
applicable jurisdiction and in relation to which regional insolvency rules? And fourthly, the 







9. Asian Law and Technology Change – Tradition vs. Innovation  
Businesses may move faster than the law, but technology moves even faster than businesses. 
Southeast Asia has become a target for technology investments over the last few years. 
Companies such as Carousell, Tokopedia and iFlix received huge investments for further 
development and growth. Hence, the relevance of technological progress will sooner or later 
affect the process of the law to a greater degree than tradition does. 
The rapid development of new technologies must at some point converge with law, law design, 
the law-making process, and various legal proceedings. This means the appearance of new 
structures and methods in law design and law application. Regulations must hold technology in 
one hand, whilst keeping proceeding in the other. These regulatory developments pertain to 
new spheres such as social media, cloud computing and digital business. 
The relevance of technology to some extent infringes upon the existing basics of law. Sources 
of communication have become various, e.g. social media. Many companies do not afford 
enough attention to social appearance and public communication. Social media transports 
information in real time and urges business players to act and interact accordingly. Real-time 
communication through social media opens up new channels of information exchange, enabling 
immediate information disclosure. This fact modifies the basic principles of law and 




















changes the substance of legal rules and defines different demands of regulations structures, 
law-designing methods, and processes. 
Section V – Asia Pulp & Paper Case – Is Technology the Answer? 
Returning to the Asia Pulp & Paper case, what implication does our analysis have? Once a 
cross-border insolvency case occurred, there were several open issues, based on the missing 
insolvency framework. The petition of creditors for the appointment of a judicial manager was 
rejected by the courts on two counts. The court argued that the appointment of the judicial 
manager in Singapore would not allow him authority over the assets of the debtor in other 
countries, e.g. in China or Indonesia, because the administration of those assets fell under local 
laws and regulations which did not allow the participation of foreign insolvency administrators 
or the enforcement of foreign judgements in insolvency issues. The lack of coordination 
between legal systems and courts required the reframing of legal criteria and the elaboration of 
other criteria in order to achieve adequate results because the authority of the Singaporean Court 
would not be recognized by insolvency courts in Indonesia or China. This would lead to an 
additional application for the appointment of a judicial manager in each of the affected countries 
and increase transaction costs. How would the Asia Pulp & Paper case look if the previous 
analysis of various criteria for a Regional Insolvency Framework in Southeast Asia, in 
ASEAN+3, were taken into consideration? 
The debtor's centre of main interest would form an effective criterion for drafting a cross-border 
insolvency framework in Asia. It assigns decision competence to one court in one country, party 
to the cross-border insolvency framework. Hence, the Singaporean Court would be competent 
for the appointment of the judicial manager in Singapore who would also be entitled to dispose 
the debtor's assets in Indonesia or China – provided that those countries adhere to the Regional 
Insolvency Framework. Another legal role would be played by the central insolvency 
proceedings court. As such, the Singaporean Court would have the authority to coordinate the 
whole proceedings across different jurisdictions. This possibility would reduce the timeframes 
for closing insolvency proceedings. In addition, a central insolvency proceeding register would 
ensure the transparency of simultaneous proceedings in several countries, which could be 
administrated by a central insolvency authority. Finally, a common language for insolvency 
proceedings and judgements is required for communication and document workflow between 





jurisdictions where Asia Pulp & Paper may have their assets. A common language of 
proceedings would certainly facilitate this process. However, this would face various 
challenges, e.g. legal terms which cannot be directly translated because of some legal concepts 
which are not available in another legal system or if the legal systems use different English 
terms for one and the same legal concept because it was borrowed from different legal 
backgrounds, e.g. common law or civil law systems. Nevertheless, the advantages speak in 
favour of the Regional Insolvency Framework in ASEAN and ASEAN+ 3. Equal treatment of 
all creditors could be assured by an equal creditors' rights system. This requires creditor-friendly 
national insolvency systems, though this is unlikely to become the case across all countries in 
ASEAN and ASEAN+3. For example, while Singapore has a creditor-friendly insolvency 
system, Japan tends to confer more rights to the debtor. Again, during the Regional Insolvency 
Framework's implementation this matter would contribute to equal treatment of creditors 
independent of their corporate seat and the seat of the debtor and his affiliates or the location of 
the debtor's assets. 
These criteria reveal the discrepancy between national rules in various legal systems and the 
needs of the modern technology-driven business world. They take a different approach and have 
a traditional impact. The institutional law should consider these criteria in drafting a new 
Regional Insolvency Framework. These principles would make cross-border insolvency 
proceedings more effective; however, it would take a significant amount of time to draft a 
consistent and workable set of rules that will require maintenance and adjustments over time. 
In view of traditional and cultural aspects, it is of course necessary to emphasize that traditional 
background is intrinsically reflected in legal rules. The sense of collectivism dissuades local 
creditors from commencing the opening of insolvency proceedings and so as not to stand out 
from the group. In reverse, in the case of Asia Pulp & Paper, Western creditors applied for the 
appointment of the judicial manager. The local creditors' restraint should be weighed up in the 
Regional Insolvency Framework and additional motivation given to creditors to apply for the 
opening of insolvency proceedings. This would have a positive impact on the rights of other 
stakeholders. Hand in hand with collectivism is the tendency to avoid conflict. A local creditor 
would rather relinquish his rights within the insolvency proceedings and retain a good business 
relationship with the debtor, thereby ensuring harmony within the creditors' company too. This 
trait also affects other foreign creditors, especially if they come from Western countries and are 





plays a crucial role. Respect for elders in local creditors' companies may lead to resistance in 
filing for insolvency proceedings. Finally, the fear of losing face often drives debtors to 
insolvency procrastination and leads to higher damages for all stakeholders in insolvency 
proceedings. This aspect is different from Europe where the only reason not to apply for 
insolvency proceedings is often the financial motivation of the debtor. The fact that Asia Pulp 
& Paper did not apply for the opening of insolvency proceedings in time reflects this traditional 
aspect. A Regional Insolvency Framework in ASEAN and ASEAN+3 should consider this 
through special rules for the application for opening of insolvency proceedings.  
Although the legal criteria and traditional barriers should be considered in drafting a Regional 
Insolvency Framework in ASEAN and ASEAN+3, it will most likely take many years or even 
decades to reach an effective Regional Insolvency Framework. This fact serves to highlight the 
speed with which new solutions are emerging because globalization, alongside technological 
progress and digitalization, do not wait for the law. In this regard, technology can be of service 
in setting up for cross-border insolvency cases. A positive aspect is that the technology is the 
same for everyone; it does not have roots in tradition as the law does; rather, its structures are 
the same for everyone. Technology is precise and follows clear algorithms. If smart contracts 
or blockchains had been applied to insolvency legal issues, Asia Pulp & Paper case would have 
been resolved faster. Digitalizing insolvency proceedings increases their transparency. All 
creditors in the Asia Pulp & Paper case would have had equal access to debtor-related 
information. These new means of communication would have expedited the decision-making 
process because the closely guarded and structured insolvency information with its controlled 
disclosure rights would also have supported the Singaporean Court. It would have been able to 
cooperate with other foreign courts and share necessary information with them. An insolvency 
cloud would facilitate this and supersede paper-based document workflow. A digital 
information sharing platform has many advantages such as facilitating communication between 
all participants in insolvency proceedings, reducing transaction costs and saving of time. 
In short, technology is not the answer; however, it is in a way a guideline for the law to follow. 
Owing to their long historical development, cultural aspects reveal the law's origins as well as 
its limits, which are defined by traditional tropes. Technology is the future; it guides the way 
for the law. It removes limitations and gives the law a new identity. For a long time now, the 
law has in fact impeded stakeholders in cross-border insolvency proceedings from achieving 





the accomplishment of international transactions as well, of course, of cross-border insolvency 
cases.  
In the light of our analysis, it can be concluded that to achieve the most practical and tailor-
made solution for cross-border insolvencies in Asia, it is not necessary to decide in favour of 
one of the existing solutions. It would be of much more interest and effectivity to create a 
differentiated approach for legislative, judicial, and private legal processes. This is possible 
under equal consideration of legal, cultural, and technological impacts to support the balance 
of interests referred to in Chapter I. 
Because of different levels of welfare across countries, it makes sense to introduce a local, 
flexible, cross-border template regulation for ASEAN which can extend to cover ASEAN+3 or 
further. Elements for a Regional Insolvency Framework for ASEAN should contain the 
following features: interests of creditors, consideration of ‘Asian Values’, Central ASEAN 
Insolvency Authority, judgement enforceable in each ASEAN Member State, regulation for 
insolvency cases of groups of companies. If we include these types of cooperation principles 
found in the UNCITRAL Model Law, countries expressing horizontal collectivism are more 
likely to achieve them successfully. 
In this Chapter VI, essential criteria for a regional insolvency regulation have been assessed. It 
is reasonable to address the various groups of factors impacting the structures of insolvency 
proceedings on various levels. The first group of criteria is legal: centre of main interests, central 
insolvency proceedings register, central insolvency proceedings court, common language of 
proceedings and equal creditors' rights protection system. The second group of criteria is 
cultural and based on ‘Asian Values’: collectivism, fear of losing face, hierarchy, conflict 
avoidance and harmony. Finally, technology and innovation have a very new impact on the 
cross-border insolvency framework: big data, blockchain technology and smart contracts, 














CHAPTER VII – CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis was to determine a set of general, multifaceted criteria rather than to 
present a ready product, in the form of principles and guidelines for an eventual ASEAN 
Regional Insolvency Framework. These criteria should serve as a signpost for lawmakers and 
legal practitioners. Restating principles set by legal theory, national and international legal 
bodies, these factors move forward to a meta-level and call for global reflections on the 
complexity and feasibility in the handling of cross-border insolvencies. 
Cross-border insolvency has become an integral part of the modern economy. It is characterized 
by local traditional values and driven by modern technology, both elements which must be 
considered in the modern law design process. Aside from social and economic factors, it is 
influenced by society and technology. ‘Asian Values’ form the groundwork in designing 
appropriate legal rules, with technology acting as a guiding force. 
The challenge for institutional lawmakers is to consider cultural aspects in law-making 
proceedings, while integrating digitalization and technological innovation. This dynamic 
process requires a constant awareness and oversight of the changing technological world in 
order to adequately react to and accommodate it within the law-making process. Likewise, it 
necessitates a deep and detailed consideration of the cultural challenges inherent to the Asian 
region. As globalization and technology grow in significance and more similarities in business 
develop, the aspect of tradition wanes in importance. That notwithstanding, the cultural impact 
remains ever present in the middle of society, this is reflected in the legal rules and regulations 
applied in insolvency cases too. 
The pressing need for a legal framework in Southeast Asia has been seen in the example of the 
Asia Pulp & Paper Case that followed the region's financial crisis. Previous legal projects on 
cross-border insolvency law such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
and the European Insolvency Regulation give a solid basis of the substance of fundamental 
legal rules, which require further development and law-design in the transnational insolvency 
context. A common legal framework on cross-border insolvency in ASEAN countries calls for 
a more differentiated approach. 
Further considerations have been made in this discussion. Firstly, the options available in 





surrounding the implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
within Asian countries. Next, the possibility of a Regional Insolvency Framework within 
ASEAN was discussed as well as which legal elements are necessary in building an effective 
framework. Finally, we demonstrated the impact of cultural features in the legal setting and 
how these cultural elements must be taken into consideration when drafting and implementing 
the new cross-border insolvency framework within ASEAN. 
Counting in favour of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency's 
implementation by Asian countries are its flexibility and simplicity of handling because it does 
not require harmonization with domestic insolvency laws or their amending. 
Objections to the Model Law's adoption are mainly rooted in the inadequacy of institutional 
structure in Asian countries and among ASEAN members as well as the absence or deficiency 
of national insolvency laws, the insufficient preparation of judges and other legal professionals, 
deep mutual distrust of jurisdictions, lack of appropriate experience, widespread corruption 
issues, and divergent definitions in terms of public policy and fairness, in particular, in relation 
to priority issues between local and foreign creditors. In addition, the adoption of the Model 
Law may also be an issue of time because it will require longer than, for example, industrial 
countries do. Finally, difficulties may also be encountered in the definition of the COMI, which 
is incumbent upon the honesty of the court. The key challenge is not to identify the obstacles 
arising in adopting the Model Law and so to reject it because of its inadequacy, but rather to 
transform these into difficulties that simply increase the complexity of the Model Law's 
adoption but do not preclude its pertinence within the frame of globalization. 
On a regional level within ASEAN, a central insolvency authority could be launched and 
endowed with control functions alongside an ASEAN insolvency proceeding register. 
Furthermore, we have also found out that across the law-making criteria, the cultural value 
system of national states and regions must be integrated into the legal framework in order to 
reflect the local and regional needs of different interest groups in the international context. 
‘Asian Values’ such as the fear of losing face, collectivism, hierarchy, conflict avoidance and 
harmony would have a latent as well as a visible impact on the design of national and regional 





By traditional society values we refer to those latent factors which define the frame of the 
regulation because ‘Asian Values’ are a part of the cultural network and have a fundamental 
influence on the theoretical drafting, development and practical functioning of the insolvency 
law. In short, it is up to the national legislators and regional authorities to identify these cultural 
factors, assess their impact on the legal system and take them into consideration not just in the 
law-making process but in its implementation too. 
To launch a common Regional Insolvency Framework within ASEAN, the governing powers 
of its Member States should consider implementing the following legal concepts, which form 
part of the basic structure of the common framework on cross-border insolvency law. Firstly, 
is the definition of the centre of main interest under consideration of the provisions and 
amendments of the UNICTRAL and European Commission texts on cross-border insolvency 
with respect to the insolvency of a group of companies. The second considerable factor would 
be an interstate court competent for decisions in cross-border insolvency cases within the 
ASEAN framework. Thirdly, the introduction of the common insolvency proceedings register 
would enable all participant parties in cross-border insolvency proceedings to have the same 
level of information, which secures creditors' rights inter alia, especially those of foreign 
creditors that do not have access to domestic courts. Fourthly, is the introduction of the English 
language as a common language of the insolvency regulations and insolvency proceedings. 
Finally, on the interstate level, the Member States should consider implementing a creditor 
rights protection system. To this end, some rules from the World Bank project dealing with 
creditors' rights systems should be observed. This will bring all the creditors under the same 
level of protection, reflecting the importance of rules of this kind for countries with only 
rudimentary insolvency rules or insolvency proceedings oriented towards the rights of debtors. 
We have identified the following cultural criteria which impact on the design of insolvency law 
and especially cross-border insolvency law within ASEAN. These cultural elements are 
collectivism, fear of losing face, hierarchy, conflict avoidance and harmony. Firstly, 
collectivism focuses one's attention on the importance of the group over the individual. 
Secondly, the fear of losing face reflects the disregard of society, which plays a more 
fundamental role than in Western societies. What is more, this fear of losing face stems from 
Confucian societal norms and requires concerted consideration in the law-making process 
because of the ‘stigma of bankruptcy’. Thirdly, the principle of hierarchy underlines the 





management mindset within the insolvent company. The filing of insolvency applications by a 
responsible person may be hindered by a hierarchically higher member of management, which 
could lead to the absence of an insolvency application by the debtor company. Fourthly, the 
factor of conflict avoidance can, to some extent, hinder creditors from launching an insolvency 
to avoid an unpleasant situation for all concerned parties. In addition, this issue concerns cases 
where the creditors are corporate entities and the management is reluctant to become involved 
in the conflict by filing an insolvency case. Fifthly, the harmony principle also traces back to 
Confucian philosophy and reflects an unwillingness to enter the discussion. 
However even legal criteria and cultural impacts do not suffice in the development of a Regional 
Insolvency Framework. Much more significant to this end is technological progress and 
digitalization which together define legal technology. For this reason, the final implication in 
this regard concerns the technological mindset in the cross-border insolvency context, which is 
a driving force for modern businesses. This mindset inevitably touches on legal rules or rather 
highlights their absence. Technological development challenges legislators and other legal 
professionals to rethink legal structures and processes not only on the national stage, but also 
on the regional and international level, which are both becoming more and more relevant 
through the continuing interconnection of the various spheres of business, technology and law. 
New concepts necessitate concerted consideration within and alongside a law-making process. 
Firstly, the issue of big data is of increasing importance because it overhangs all aspects of 
business and hence the legislative process in regulating economic matters. Secondly, 
blockchain technology and smart contracts can be considered by legislators for ruling on 
insolvency agreements and protocols. Thirdly, the IoT requires consideration in the law-making 
process and broadens the areas of business which require regulation. The technology factor 
fosters business as well as challenging the law to move towards reframing and re-regulation. 
Insolvency law and cross-border insolvency law are subject to the implications of technology. 
These implications substantiate the recreation of new legal areas such as insolvency and cloud-
computing, as well as communication and cooperation in data privacy law, which gain 
importance in the face of extensive data movement. Scalable and differentiated regulation in 
this field are susceptible to change and must adapt to precisely these changes. 
Legislators, legal practitioners, intergovernmental organizations, institutional and other legal 
bodies involved or otherwise interested in ongoing legal research and technology-driven, 





appropriate form of legal handling in the cross-border insolvency cases in Southeast Asia. 
Determining further legal, cultural and technological factors in order to develop a common 
framework on cross-border insolvency is prerequisite to achieving an effective and fair solution 
for insolvency asset allocation within ASEAN, which is optimized through the integration of 
innovations and by respecting traditional notions.  
The divergence between the law and technology is becoming an ever-greater issue. Artificial 
intelligence continues to permeate more and more legal fields. The possible convergence 







General Overview of International Insolvency Projects 
Adoption Date Insolvency Project Issuing Institution 
1989 Model International Insolvency Cooperation 
Act (MIICA) 
Committee J of the International Bar Association 
31 May 1996 Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat Committee J of the International Bar Association 
30 May 1997 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency  
United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law 
2 August 1999 Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures: 
Key Issues 
International Monetary Fund 
April 2000  Good Practice Standards for insolvency law 
(16 Principles) 
Asian Development Bank 
16 May 2000 Court-to-Court Communication Guidelines in 
Cross-Border Cases 
The American Law Institute in Cooperation  




Principles and Guidelines for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems 
The World Bank 
31 May 2002 European Insolvency Regulation  The Council of the European Union  
2003 Transnational Insolvency Project The American Law Institute 
2007 European Communication and Cooperation 
Guidelines for Cross-Border Insolvency  
INSOL Europe 
2012 Global Principles for Cooperation in 
International Insolvency Cases 
The American Law Institute 
2013 Guidelines for Coordination of Multinational 
Enterprise Groups 
International Insolvency Institute 
2014 European Communication and Cooperation 
Principles on Cross-Border Insolvency (‘EU 
JudgeCo Principles’) 
European Commission and International Insolvency 
Institute 
2014 European Communication and Cooperation 
Guidelines on Cross-Border Insolvency (‘EU 
JudgeCo Guidelines’) 
European Commission and International Insolvency 
Institute 






Country National Insolvency Rules National Rules on Cross-Border Insolvency 
Brunei  Bankruptcy Act 1984 No. 
Cambodia Law on Bankruptcy 2007 
Draft of the Cambodia Civil Code 
No. 
Indonesia Regulation of Bankruptcy 1906 
(embedded in the Commercial Code of 
Indonesia; applicable to Indonesians since 
1945) 
No. Relevant since Asia Pulp & Paper Case 
Reform plans 
Laos Law on Bankruptcy of Enterprises No. 
06/1994; Enterprise Rehabilitation and 
Bankruptcy Law (№ 75/NA, 26th 
December 2019) (the Bankruptcy Law) 
No. Recognition in case of Secured 
Transactions Law issues. 
Malaysia Malaysian Company Act 1965 
The Act 360 Bankruptcy Act 1967 
Yes. Recognition of foreign insolvency 
judgements and court orders as well 
proceedings related to the assistance of courts 
in foreign jurisdictions.  
Section 104 of the Act 360 Bankruptcy Act 
1967 – Reciprocal provisions to Singapore and 
designated countries (Member States of 
ASEAN).  
Myanmar Yangon Insolvency Act 1908 
Myanmar Company Act 1913 (winding-
up) 
Myanmar Insolvency Act 1920 
Burma Insolvency Rules 1924 
New Insolvency Law 2020 
Yes. The UNCITRAL Model Law was adopted 
on 14 February 2020 
The Philippines Insolvency Act 1906 (corporate 
insolvency not rules) 
Presidential Decree No. 902-A (PD 902-
A) 1980 
SEC Rules of Procedure on Corporate 
Recovery 1999 
Yes. Corporate Recovery and Insolvency Act 
(Draft) 
Singapore Singapore Company Act 1967 
Company Amendment Act 1987 
New Bankruptcy Act 1995 
Yes. Decided to adopt UNCITRAL Model Law 
(2017) 
Thailand Bankruptcy Act 1909 
Bankruptcy Act 1911 with amendments in 
1927 and 1933 
Bankruptcy Act 1987 with amendments in 
1998 and 1999  
Bankruptcy Court Act 1998 
No. Section 91 of the Bankruptcy Act requires 
foreign debtors to fulfil the requirements of 
section 178 of the Bankruptcy Act; no 
recognition of insolvency administrator 
appointed by foreign court; only if foreign 
creditor proves that local Thai creditors would 
have an entitlement to claim the same rights in 





repayment of their debts in Thailand pursuant 
to section 177 of the Bankruptcy Act. 
Vietnam Law on Business Bankruptcy 1993 
Bankruptcy Law No. 21/2004/QH11 2004 
Bankruptcy Law No. 51/2014/QH13 2014 
No. Attempts to consider foreign elements in 
the Draft to Bankruptcy Law in 2002. Article 4 
of the Law of 2004 provides that the 
Bankruptcy is applicable to all enterprises 
doing business in Vietnam, hence, there is no 
language excluding or including foreign 
debtors. 






Country National Insolvency Rules National Rules on Cross-Border 
Insolvency 
Japan Bankruptcy Code of 1922, Corporate 
Reorganization Act of 2002  
 
Yes. Japan adopted the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency in 2000 
under the Law of Recognition and Assistance 
for Foreign Insolvency Proceedings 
(LRAFIP) with some deviations. Japan links 
the non-discrimination principle to 
reciprocity principles: only if the mother State 
of the foreign creditor applied the same non-
discrimination rule is this rule likely to be 
applied by a Japanese court. There is no 
automatic recognition of foreign judgements. 
China 
PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Law 2007 
No. 
South Korea 
Corporate Reorganization Act, Bankruptcy 
Act, Composition Act and, Individual 
Debtor Rehabilitation Act unified in Debtor 
Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act 
(DRBA) in April 2006 
Yes. The principle of equality between 
Korean and Non-Korean creditors had been 
adopted. 






Country of ASEAN National ‘Asian Values’ 
Brunei  
Power distance, avoidance of uncertainty, abasement of individualism (or low 
individualism), hierarchy of power structure between different social class, fear of 
losing face, group and family-oriented.  
Cambodia 
Hierarchy (hereditary and non-hereditary obligations), family-oriented structure of 
society (divided into upper class and rural peasants or lower class), respect for elderly, 
honesty, munificence, mercy, conflict avoidance, piety, fear of losing face.  
Indonesia 
Indigeneity, communitarianism over individual rights, dominance of obligations over 
rights, consensus over contest, respect of hierarchy (family principle), mutual help.  
Laos 
Hierarchy (also hierarchy of the village), authority of elderly, responsibility and 
decision-making by authoritarian leaders, fear of losing face, conflict avoidance, 
importance of family relationship in business, no deviation from appointed social 
position.  
Malaysia 
Community interests stand over individual interests, self-sacrifice for common goal, 
self-effacement, courtesy, responsibility, respect for elderly, harmony; in business, 
trust, sincerity, and loyalty. 
Myanmar Responsibility and decision-making by authoritarian leaders. 
The Philippines 
Notion of public good is defined by family and not by individual, social acceptance, 
contribution to national welfare, recognition of humanity and its sharing by others, 
cooperation, condolences to other in case of hard luck, trust, favour of friends and 
supporters, patience, God-fearing, national or community consciousness, orientation to 
needs of others, balanced reciprocity, fear of losing face, avoiding shaming others, 
communalism.  
Singapore 
Discipline, communitarianism over individual rights, respect for elderly and the state, 
collectivism, communitarianism (as a national ideology), reciprocity and family-
orientedness, ‘nation before community, community before self’, consensus instead of 
contention, community support for individual.  
Thailand 
Division of values into rural (lower education, passivity, love of recreation, 
materialism, respect for people doing good things, face-saving, refraining from causing 
displeasure to others, submission to the powerful, informality and strong kinship 
obligations) and urban (rationality, competition, materialism, face-saving and face-
promoting, Westernization, respect for legitimate authority, lack of discipline, 
disregard for public property, paying lip-service instead of practical action, jealousy 
and selfishness); more generally, materialism, respect for order and holders of power, 
collectivism, hierarchy, knowing your place and liking it, loyalty and obedience, 
indebted goodness, restraining one's desire or interest which could cause conflict or 
displeasure to others, conflict avoidance, harmony of family and society, keeping calm 
in case of frustration or conflict.  
Vietnam 
Rejection of individual rights against the state, duty to serve one's country, collectivism, 
social hierarchy, obligations and duties.  
Table 4 – National ‘Asian Values’ in the Member States of ASEAN 





Country of ASEAN+3 National ‘Asian Values’ 
Japan 
Collective thinking, conflict avoidance, hierarchical order in society, harmony, 
integration of individual into society (networking), implicit communication, 
consensus-building, harmony. 
China 
Collectivism, pre-eminence of the concept of the clan, harmony (the highest 
priority), indirect communication, avoidance of saying ‘no’, respecting age and 
status, family-based business, building trust in family (networking) rather than in 
society, information sharing, significance of status and seniority in negotiations, 
principle of saving or losing face (fear of losing face). 
South Korea 
Social harmony, authority, predominance of group interests over personal interests 
within both family and society, interpersonal relationships, loyalty, filial piety. 




Legal Criteria Cultural Criteria Technology Criteria 
Centre of Main Interests 
(COMI) 
Collectivism Big Data 
Central Insolvency Register Fear of Losing Face 
Blockchain Technology and Smart 
Contracts 
Central Insolvency Court Hierarchy Internet of Things 
Common Language of 
Insolvency Proceedings 
Conflict Avoidance Social Media 
Common Creditors Rights 
Protection System Harmony 
Insolvency Cloud 
Data Privacy  
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Cross-Border Insolvencies in Southeast Asia: Regional Insolvency Framework for 
ASEAN 
Many world economies integrate cross-border insolvency regimes in their national insolvency 
laws, which is also reflected at regional and international levels. Chapter I introduces the topic. 
Despite the progress in adoption of cross-border insolvency regimes in advanced economies, 
there is still a wide gap when it comes to emerging countries. Specifically, numerous Asian 
economies, with some exceptions, do not have national laws on cross-border insolvency. 
Although some countries in Asia have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency, many of them faced significant challenges in the aftermath of the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997. Asia does not have a Regional Insolvency Framework like the European 
Insolvency Regulation; however, the government of Indonesia addressed this need in 2013. 
This shows that the emergence of a regional solution on cross-border insolvency in the Asian 
region is more than relevant nowadays. One of the prominent examples for cross-border 
insolvency is Asia Pulp & Paper insolvency. 
In the 1990s, several international organizations attempted to address this topic by assessment 
and comparison of the national insolvency regimes in Asian countries. Despite this, Asian 
countries have not yet launched a regional solution. This thesis looks to examine probability of 
a Regional Insolvency Framework in Asia. In a nutshell, it looks to work out impactful criteria 
that play a significant role in a setting up a regional insolvency solution on cross-border 
insolvency. To this end, in addition to studying the existing literature, interviews with 
practitioners in Asian insolvency law were also conducted. 
This research approaches and describes different legal criteria for a Regional Insolvency 
Framework in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN+3. 
Moreover, it assesses further impactful elements for cross-border insolvency proceedings based 
on historical and traditional views. Finally, it addresses the impact of digitalization and its role 
on cross-border insolvency, specifically, what influential criteria might be considered for a 
Regional Insolvency Framework. It is to be expected that taking into account further 
globalization and digitalization of multinational businesses, national legislators in Asia will 
promote regional insolvency solutions and make business in Asia more attractive. 
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Chapter II points out in detail cross-border insolvency challenges in Asia. First of all, it 
addresses the origins and implications of the Asian financial crisis and assesses its 
macroeconomic, financial, structural, and institutional dimensions. Some authors indicate 
factors such as enormously fast growth of the national economies, massive capital outflow that 
led to unexpected changes in the market expectations, structural and policy distortions. 
Consequently, the crisis led to business collapses that crossed national borders and triggered 
numerous insolvencies of multinational companies.  
A prime example of cross-border insolvency is the Asia Pulp & Paper case, which occurred in 
2001 and concerned many cross-border businesses throughout Asia. This case demonstrates 
effects of the absence of cross-border insolvency law and underlines its urgency, as the 
Singaporean Court could not handle this case for all Asian subsidiaries of the debtor company. 
Last, Chapter II identifies interest groups and needs affected by cross-border insolvencies and 
defines in detail the scope of this research.  
Chapter III examines basic concepts and theories proven in multistate insolvencies as well as 
previous international initiatives. Then, it addresses the most prominent international project on 
cross-border insolvency law – the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. The 
basic concepts on cross-border insolvency comprise territorialism, universalism, modified 
universalism, cooperative territorialism, and contractualism. Further, the Model International 
Insolvency Cooperation Act and the Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat laid the foundation 
for further projects, specifically for the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. 
The Model Law aims to promote cooperation between courts and other authorities in charge of 
national and foreign states to improve regulatory confidence for international investment and 
trade, which helps ensure protection and maximization of the asset values for debtors. The 
Model Law does not aim to unify insolvency laws, nor to formulate design substantive rights; 
conversely, it aims to enhance the efficiency and coherence of cross-border insolvencies. The 
Model Law addresses situations that are likely to occur in cross-border insolvency cases: The 
debtor has his assets in more than one state or creditors of the debtor are not from the state 
where the insolvency proceeding takes place. The Model Law is limited to procedural questions 
of cross-border insolvencies, since it is designed for enacting states that have advanced national 
insolvency regimes and need non-binding solutions to the particularities of national legislations. 
In detail, it focuses on the following aspects: access of foreign representatives and creditors to 
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the courts in the enacting state, recognition of foreign proceedings, relief, cooperation between 
foreign representatives and the courts of enacting states, and management of multiple 
proceedings.  
Chapter IV evaluates regional approaches on cross-border insolvency law and addresses several 
projects: the European Insolvency Regulation, the Transnational Insolvency Project of the 
American Law Institute, and other undertakings, e.g. Court-to-Court Communication Project 
on Cross-Border Cases, and some other smaller initiatives such as the World Bank Principles 
for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes and the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Recognition and Enforcement. Some attention is also given to the handling of the groups of 
companies in insolvency. The focus is put on the European Insolvency Regulation with the 
analysis of its main subjects of the ruling: scope of application, competent forum and applicable 
law, recognition of proceedings, secondary insolvency proceedings, information of creditors 
and lodgement of claims, and centre of main interest. Regarding Transnational Insolvency 
Project, general overview is presented where core elements of the project are pointed out: 
general principles, procedural principles, legislative recommendations, and global principles 
for cooperation in international insolvency cases. 
Chapter V outlines an overview of national insolvency laws and traditional impact on the 
ASEAN and ASEAN+3. Moreover, the Chapter V outlines that Indonesian government 
emphasizes the emergence of a regional solution on cross-border insolvency within the 
framework of the ASEAN. 
One of the aims of the ASEAN is promotion of active collaboration and mutual assistance on 
matters of common interest in economic questions. This apparently implicates that cooperation 
in cross-border insolvency issues is also previewed by the ASEAN Economic Community. 
‘ASEAN Way’ is the mode of operation of the ASEAN. The Member States developed their 
own distinct approach for cooperation. The Asian Development Bank made some proposals to 
approach insolvencies in Asia and drafted a Good Practice Standards for RETA economies. 
Furthermore, the Forum of Asian Insolvency Law Reform supports in developing policies and 
insolvency regimes that fit to the Asian regional setup. 
However, the national insolvency regimes of the Member States of the ASEAN and ASEAN+3 





Member States have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (e.g., 
Singapore, Japan), it is not enough to address cross-border insolvency cases where many 
jurisdictions are involved. This again emphasizes the necessity of a Regional Insolvency 
Framework for the ASEAN.  
Being culturally and historically different from the Western economies, Asia has its own 
historical and traditional past based on its own values and approach to regulation of society. 
Therefore, in this study, historical roots of the ASEAN and ASEAN+3 Member States are 
assessed and traditional aspects in national insolvency systems are evaluated. It turns out that 
traditional values significantly impact the legislative setup on the national and regional level.  
Therefore, Chapter VI provides important insights into significant factors that build the frame 
for a future regional regulation that is likely to become a workable solution in practice. 
However, a copy-paste method in terms of legal transplants is not suitable to find a practical 
solution. Hence, in the very first step toward a Regional Insolvency Framework, its core criteria 
must be defined.  
Based on the research, different groups of criteria are elaborated. One group relates to legal 
criteria, which are based on the analysis of the previously mentioned projects on cross-border 
insolvency. None of those works can be copied to draft a Regional Insolvency Framework. 
However, it is recommendable to borrow some legal categories and add the new ones such as 
centre of main interest, central insolvency proceedings court, central insolvency proceedings 
register, common languages of insolvency proceedings and judgements, and equal creditors 
rights protection system.  
In addition to the legal criteria, cultural criteria are also elaborated. It is suggested to consider 
the following factors: collectivism, fear of losing face, hierarchy, conflict avoidance, and 
harmony.  
In the 21st century, the role of technology has significantly increased because of digitalization 
and impact of COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. For this reason, also another group of criteria was 
suggested for consideration, which includes the following items: artificial intelligence, 
automated law, big data, block chain technologies, smart contracts, Internet of things, social 





Finally, Chapter VII concludes that we cannot rely only on legal factors. Also, cultural 
differences must be considered, which will be difficult to overcome. Moreover, we should 
probably rely on digital technologies. Although it is too early to draw conclusions, we already 
can see the first discussions emerging in this area. Hence, a possible convergence between the 
law and technology in regional and global context offers a new space for future research and 
scholarship. 
